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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This case was "poured-over" for disposition to the Court of 
Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court on June 12, 1989- Jurisdiction 
is conferred under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
WAT9fiS OF THIS PfiQgSgPXFgS 
Plaintiff-appellant David George (hereinafter "appellant")/ 
appeals from a Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Judge Pat Brian presiding, dated March 2, 1989. The Final Judgment 
was based on a Jury Verdict rendered November 9, 1989, by Special 
Verdict. On November 22, 1989, appellant moved for a New Trial or 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Appellantfs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
The Verdict was withdrawn. Appellant's Motion For A New Trial was 
heard and denied on January 27, 1989. No written Order denying this 
Motion was entered by the trial court. 
Appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed on March 31, 1989. 
STATSMSNT QF TBS ISS7BS 
1. Where the evidence demonstrated that the hospital staff 
failed to alert physicians to changes in the medical condition of 
Betty George requiring immediate medical diagnosis and treatment, 
did the trial court commit reversible error by requiring appellant 
to produce expert testimony as to causation? Stated another way, 
was this not a case "obvious to laymen", in which the jury could 
have found negligence and causation without the necessity of expert 
testimony? 
2. In a case alleging negligence against LDS Hospital, did the 
trial court commit reversible error by instructing the jury that 
proof of causation could only come from expert physicians, as 
opposed to nursing and respiratory therapy experts? 
3C Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing or 
refusing to submit to the jury, appellant's proposed instructions 
which set forth his theory of the case, which was supported by 
competent evidence? 
4, Did the trial court commit reversible error by inserting 
the previously rejected instructions 16A and 21A into the final set 
of instructions on the last day of trial, after both sides had 
rested, immediately before closing argument? 
5. Did the trial court commit reversible error by overruling 
appellant's objections that LDS Hospitalfs physician expert's 
testimony as to causation was speculative, and without foundation? 
In the same respect, did the trial court commit reversible error 
when it violated its own specific ruling, and allowed the 
respondent's experts to testify as to cause of death. 
6o Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying 
appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict as to Dr0 Lloyd and Dr. 
Lahey? 
7. Did the Special Verdict form, submitted to the jury over 
appellant's objections, constitute reversible error? 
8. Did the trial court's denial of appellant's right to 
present rebuttal argument constitute prejudicial error? 
9. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it denied 
appellant's motion for a new trial? 
10 c Did the trial court err in awarding respondent costs 
associated with the taking of depositions pursuant to Rule 54(d), 
Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL M P STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant David George alleged that the death of his wife, 
Betty George, was caused by the negligence of respondent LDS 
Hospital, through its nursing and respiratory staff, and by the 
medical malpractice of Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey, Mrs. George's 
physicians. The physicians settled with appellant prior to trial, 
and their participation in the trial was very limited. The 
physicians were included on the Special Verdict form submitted to 
the jury at the close of the trial. 
On November 9, 1988, the jury, pursuant to the Special Verdict 
form provided by the trial court, found that Dr. Lloyd and Dr. 
Lahey had not been negligent. The jury also found that the 
respondent LDS Hospital, through its staff, was negligent, but that 
its negligence was not a proximate cause of the death of Betty 
George. 
Appellant's Motion for a New Trial dated November 22, 1988 [R-
443], was denied by the trial court on January 27, 1989. [R-587] 
Final Judgment was entered on March 2, 1989. [R-709-712] 
Appellant's Notice of Appeal was thereafter filed on March 31, 1989. 
[R-739] 
FACTS 
The following fac t s are re levant to the Cour t ' s determinat ion 
of the issues on appeal: 
1. A p p e l l a n t ' s wife, Bet ty George, was admit ted to LDS 
h o s p i t a l on July 27, 1986, by Dr. Kimball Lloyd, for a rou t ine 
hysterectomy and exploratory surgery of a pelvic mass. 
2. The surgery was performed on July 28, 1986, without apparent 
complication. The pelvic mass turned out to be a benign cyst. [R-
270, See, "Operation Report, P's Exh. 1] 
3* Over the next several days, Mrs. George developed post-
operative respiratory complications. Her treating physicians, Dr. 
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey (an internal medicine specialist 
called in as a consultant by Dr. Lloyd), and various resident 
M.D.'s, considered her complications at various times to be the 
result of: a) a "normal" post-operative reaction; b) adynamic ileus; 
and c) pulmonary embolus. [Id*, pp. 25-31] 
4o Mrs, George's respiratory condition deteriorated 
significantly on August 1, 1986, and Dr. Lahey scheduled a pulmonary 
angiogram for August 2, 1986, to rule out or confirm the working 
diagnosis of pulmonary embolus. [Id.] 
5c By the morning of August 2, 198 6, Mrs. Georgess condition 
had deteriorated to the point where Dr. Pat Bearnson, a resident, 
classified her condition as "poor". Drc Bearnson ordered that Betty 
George be transferred to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Dr. Lloyd 
learned of, and agreed with Dr. Bearnsonfs order prior to the 
transfer. [Id. at 30, 116; R-765, p. 381] 
6. Nurse Anne Etta Terry, the Charge Nurse for the 8th Floor, 
and Nurse Mary Ann Schnabel, who was assigned to provide nursing 
care to Mrs. George during the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p^m. shift on 
August 2, 1986, both agreed that the transfer to ICU was necessary 
to assure that Mrs. George would be closely monitored and receive 
adequate care. [Terry; R-764, p. 80; Schnabel; R-764, pp. 137-38] 
7. Following the pulmonary angiogram, Mrs George was 
transferred to the ICU pursuant to the standing order. There, Dr. 
Lahey evaluated Mrs. George and determined that her condition did 
not warrant admission to the ICU. However, it was determined that 
Mrs. George should be assigned a "special duty nurse" to attend her 
at all times after her return to the 8th Floor. [R-7 67, p. 5 91/ R-
768, p. 695; R-764, p. 86] 
8. Upon Mrs. George's return to the 8th Floor, both Nurse 
Terry and Nurse Schnabel were of the opinion that the patient's 
condition was worse than it had previously been when the order for 
the ICU transfer was made. [Terry; R-764 at p. 86; Schnabel; R-764, 
pp. 142-43] The Nurses' notes at 2:20 state: "Return per cart from 
ICU. Patient very distant. Responsive - but incoherent at times." 
Another note at 2:40 p.m., indicated Mrs. George's "Breathing very 
labored." [R-270, P's. Exh. 1, p. 169] 
9. Dr. Lloyd, who was at home on the afternoon of August 2, 
1986, received a call from Nurse Terry who incorrectly indicated 
that Mrs. George's condition was no different from what it had been 
earlier that morning. None of the information contained in the 
medical record was provided to Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey, and Nurse 
Terry did not inform them that Mrs. George had become "distant and 
incoherent." [Lloyd; R-765, pp. 386-89; Lahey; R-767, p. 615] 
10. At 3:00 p.m., on August 2, 1986, Nurses Schnabel and 
Terry left, and Nurse Peggy Soraghan, the "special duty nurse" 
assigned to Mrs. George by LDS Hospital, came on duty. 
11. Nurse Soraghan had had no previous contact with Mrs. 
George. She was not licensed as a Registered Nurse at the time. [R-
766, pp. 425, 431] 
12. Nurse Soraghan's initial notes written between 3:30-4:00 
p.m., include the following: 
"Patient lying supine in bed - disoriented. Responds 
with 'Yeah' to every question, and only after 
vigorous arousing. Skin hot to touch and 
diaphoretic* Vital signs: temperature up (39.5). 
Dr. Adams notified and now in to see patient. Blood 
pressure difficult to auscultate. Pulse rapid and 
strong. (152) . . . Lungs with moist crackles in 
lower lobes - apparently history of collapsed lower 
lobes. Respiration labored and rapid. . . No bowel 
sounds audible. Abdomen distended and taught with 
circumference of 110 cm. . . , Patient incontinent of 
urine. . . Family given 15 minutes teaching re: 
physical condition, and 15 minutes emotional support 
to relieve obvious stress and agitation re: patient's 
condition and prognosis." [R-270, P's. Exh 1, pp. 
169-170] 
13. Nurse Soraghan did not contact Dr* Lloyd or Dr. Lahey to 
inform them of the significant deterioration in Mrs. George's 
conditionc Though the record indicates that a resident, Dr. Adams, 
visited Mrs. George during Nurse Soraghan• s shift, Dr. Adams was 
only made aware of Mrs. George's elevated temperature. [Lloyd; R-
765, ppe 396-98; Lahey R-767, p. 615; Adams; R-768, p. 722] 
14. Nurse Soraghan's note at 5:00 p0mo, August 2, 1986, 
indicates that Mrse George's respirations had "slowed to (blank)", 
and that further emotional support had to be given to the family. 
Nurse Soraghan again failed to alert Mrs. George's physicians that 
Mrs. George's respiration had decreased to dangerously low level. 
[R-270, P's Exh. 1, p. 170; R-768, pp. 725-26] 
15. From the time of Betty George's return to the 8th Floor at 
approximately 2:20 p.m., on August 2, 1986, until approximately 
6:30 p.m., that evening, David George, her husband, and Traci Lee 
Huber, her daughter, who were continually physically present at the 
Hospital, demanded and begged the LDS hospital nurses to call Dr. 
Lloyd or another physician to provide necessary diagnosis and 
treatment to Betty George. [R-766, pp. 495, 499] 
16. Despite her obvious and critical need for appropriate 
diagnosis and treatment, no one on the hospital staff informed Mrs. 
George's physicians of the adverse changes in her medical condition, 
and no physician saw Betty George at all between 5:00-7:00 p.m. on 
August 2, 1986. [R-768, pp. 725-27] 
17. At approximately 7:00 p.m., on August 2, 1986, the 
George's daughter, Cynthia Brown, arrived at LDS Hospital to find 
her mother unattended, cyanotic, cold and not breathing. Dr. Adams 
arrived shortly thereafter and confirmed that Mrs. George was not 
breathing, and was, in fact, in full cardiac arrest. [R-764, pp. 26-
32] Emergency resuscitative measures were successful in re-starting 
Mrs. George's heart. She was, however, by that time, brain dead 
from lack of oxygen to the brain. [R-768, p. 760] 
18. Following her cardiac arrest and brain death, Mrs. George 
was found to be severely infected. The source of the infection was 
not determined, and remains unknown. [R-767, p. 596] 
19. Two days later, on August 4, 1986, Betty George died after 
a second cardiac arrest. [See, Autopsy Report, R-395, D's. Exh. A, 
p. 1] 
20. David George, as personal representative of the heirs of 
Betty George (himself and 4 adult children), filed an action under 
Utah's wrongful death statute, Utah Code Ann., §78-11-7. [R-7-10] 
21. David George, as personal representative of the Estate of 
Betty George, also filed an action for the damages suffered 
personally by Betty George prior to her death under Utah's "survival 
statute," Utah Code Ann./ §78-11-12. [R-13] 
22. Appellant offered the testimony of two experts: Nurse 
Harriet Gillerman [R-764, pp. 169-218 and R-766, pp. 414-464; and 
Donald Owings, a respiratory therapist. [R-765, ppc 276-351] Both 
witnesses were duly qualified by the trial court as experts as to 
the applicable standards of care, its breach, and whether the 
hospitalfs negligence was a contributing proximate cause of the 
cardiac arrest suffered by Mrs. George on August 2, 1986. [See, 
Addendum V] 
23o There was no evidence or testimony produced by any party 
as to the standard of care applicable to Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey, the 
breach thereof, or causation. [Appellant is unable to cite to non-
evidence . ] 
24. At the close of the respondent LDS Hospitalfs case, the 
trial court denied appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict with 
respect to Drc Lloyd and Dr* Lahey„ [R-768, p« 793] 
25o On the last day of trial, just before closing arguments 
were to begin, the Court, over appellant's objections, inserted Jury 
Instructions 16A and 21A in the Jury Instructions provided to the 
Jury, [R-511, 518] 
26. Previously, the court had rejected appellant's proposed 
Jury Instructions, including Nos. 24 and 32 [R-251, 261], which 
accurately reflected appellant's theory of the case and were 
supported by competent evidence. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
1. Appellant 's primary contention is that the t r i a l court 
erred in depriving appellant of his fundamental r ight to have the 
jury consider his theory of the case for l i a b i l i t y against the 
respondent LDS Hospital. This error permeated the t r i a l , but can be 
broken down into categories as follows: 
a. Erroneous rulings as to expert witnesses; 
b. Failing to submit appellant's proposed, legally 
correct instructions as to the causation issue which were supported 
by competent evidence; 
c. Submission of clearly erroneous instructions which 
effectively directed a verdict for LDS Hospital on the issue of 
causation; 
d. Denying appellant's Motion for Directed Verdict in 
favor of Drs. Lloyd and Lahey at the close of the evidence, contrary 
to law; 
e. Prejudicial errors in the Special Verdict form; and 
f. Irregularities on the last day of trial extremely 
prejudicial to appellant's case constituting reversible error. 
A. ERRONEOUS RULINGS REGARDING EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY 
To support his case of liability against LDS Hospital, 
appellant introduced the testimony of two experts: Harriet 
Gillerman, an extremely competent nurse with 25 years experience and 
impeccable credentials; and Don Owings, R.T., a respiratory therapy 
expert. Both of these witnesses were qualified as experts by the 
trial court, and the trial court ruled that they were qualified to 
express expert opinions on whether the negligence of the LDS 
Hospital staff was a contributing proximate cause of the cardiac 
arrest suffered by Betty George on August 2, 1986. Both experts so 
testified. Nurse Gillerman and Don Owings, R.T. were the only 
witnesses to testify at trial with respect to the standard of care 
applicable to LDS Hospital, the breach of that standard by the 
Hospital through its staff, and that the Hospital's negligence was a 
contributing cause of the damages and injuries claimed by appellant. 
In the course of discussions on appellantss experts' 
qualifications, the Trial Court made very specific rulings that the 
underlying medical cause of the death of Betty George was irrelevant 
to appellant's claims against LDS Hospital, and that, in any event, 
the only persons qualified to testify concerning the underlying 
medical cause of her death were those who personally participated in 
officially determining the cause of death. 
The hospital's defense was that the medical cause of Mrs. 
George's death was sepsis, for which the hospital was not 
responsible. After it became clear what the hospital's defense was, 
the trial court ignored its prior rulings and permitted the 
Hospital's physician experts to testify at length concerning the 
underlying medical cause of Mrs. George's death. The testimony of 
respondent's experts regarding causation, was complete speculation, 
without proper foundation, and contrary to the trial court's 
previous rulings. This testimony included their unsubstantiated 
opinions that medical procedures which were never performed on Mrs. 
George, would not have affected her chance for survival* 
B, THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON APPELLANT'S THEORY 
Appellant submitted legally accurate jury instructions setting 
forth his theory that if the jury found that the negligent conduct 
of the hospital was a substantial factor, increased the risk of 
harm, or was a contributing proximate cause, of the injuries and 
damage suffered, that the jury could render a verdict in appellant's 
favor. These instructions were rejected by the trial court, without 
explanation. 
Co SUBMISSION OF CLEARLY ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS 
Not only did the trial court fail to instruct the jury on 
appellant's theory, it gave Instructions 16A and 21A, which 
effectively directed a verdict for the hospital on the issue of 
causation. The instructions are fully described hereafter. The 
instructions were legally erroneous in at least the following 
particulars: 
(1) Requiring appellant to prove the underlying medical 
cause of death, contrary to law and contrary to the court's prior 
rulings during trial; 
(2) Requiring appellant to prove the underlying medical 
cause of death exclusively through expert physician testimony, 
contrary to law and contrary to the court's prior rulings during 
trial; 
(3) Stating that all of appellant's damages flowed from 
the death of Betty George, thereby eliminating one-half of 
appellant's entire case, that being appellant's claims for damages 
for the injuries and damage suffered by Betty George prior to her 
death; and 
(4) Instructing the jury not to consider the competent, 
previously admitted testimony of appellant's experts (the only 
experts to testify with respect to the hospital's negligence) on the 
issue of causation. 
D. ERRONEOUS RULINGS ON .APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DRS. LLOYD AND LAHEY 
Not one witness testified concerning the standard of care 
applicable to Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey, whether they breached the 
applicable standard, or whether such breaches caused the injuries 
complained of by the appellant. No witness testified that the 
injuries complained of were the result of the defendant physicians1 
conduct, or that Mrs. George's doctors should have done anything 
other than what they did. Nonetheless, the trial court denied 
appellant's Motion for Directed Verdict for Drs. Lloyd and Lahey at 
the close of the evidence. 
E. ERRORS ON THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
The Special Verdict form, submitted to the jury by the trial 
court, contained numerous prejudicial errors, including the 
following: 
(1) Failing to individually name the heirs of Betty 
George on the Special Verdict form, and failing to instruct the jury 
that each was individually entitled to recover damages for the 
wrongful death of Betty George; 
(2) Incorporating the legal errors contained in Jury 
Instructions Nos. 16A and 21A in Question 3B of the Special Verdict 
from, thereby directing a verdict for the respondent LDS Hospital on 
the issue of causation; 
(3) Omitting from the Special Verdict form a place for 
the jury to assess and award damages to appellant on his claim for 
injuries and damages suffered by Betty George prior to to her death. 
F. PREJUDICIAL IRREGULARITIES ON THE LAST DAY OP TRIAL 
On November 8, 1989, the day before Election Day, the Court and 
counsel met specifically for the purpose of agreeing to a final set 
of jury instructions to be presented to the jury, A jury instruction 
that contained the substance of Jury Instruction No,16A had been 
previously eliminated in discussions between counsel, and was not 
discussed in the November 8th meeting. That which subsequently 
became Jury Instruction 21A was specifically rejected by the Court 
during that conference. A final set of jury instructions numbered 1 
through 53 was compiled. 
After the close of evidence the following day, immediately 
prior to instructing the jury and closing arguments, appellant's 
Motion for Directed Verdict in favor of Drs. Lloyd and Lahey, was 
heard in chambers and denied. Thereupon, there was "further 
discussion" concerning additional jury instructions submitted by 
respondent LDS Hospital. 
At that point, despite the trial court's prior rulings that: 
(1) appellant's experts were qualified to testify concerning the 
hospital's negligence and the effect thereof; (2) that the 
underlying medical cause of Betty George's death was irrelevant to 
appellant's claims against LDS Hospital; (3) that the Hospital's 
experts were not qualified to testify concerning the underlying 
medical cause of Betty George's death; (4) that the Hospital's 
proposed jury instructions on causation did not state the law; and 
despite the trial court's knowledge of appellant's theory of 
liability against LDS Hospital, the trial court permitted the 
hospital to resubmit, and gave, Jury Instruction No. 21A, over the 
objections of appellant. 
Further, at some point after the conference on November 8, 
1988, the trial court was apparently provided, accepted, and gave 
Jury Instruction N0.I6A. There was no discussion concerning this 
Instruction, nor did appellant have any opportunity to object to 
this Jury Instruction prior to the time the trial court read it to 
the jury. 
At the conference just before closing arguments, there was also 
discussion concerning the Special Verdict form wherein the trial 
court, over appellant's objections, ordered the use of the form 
containing the numerous prejudicial errors described herein. 
The obvious and irremediable prejudicial effect of Jury 
Instructions Nos. 16A and 21A, and the Special Verdict form given to 
the jury by the trial court, was to preclude the jury from 
considering appellant's theory of liability against the respondent 
LDS Hospital, to direct a verdict for the respondent Hospital on the 
issue of causation, and to preclude the jury from considering 
appellant's claims for damages. 
As the result of these erroneous, surprising and untimely 
rulings, appellant's counsel had approximately 10 minutes to 
restructure his entire closing argument to the jury0 However, no 
argument could overcome the fatally prejudicial effect of the 
foregoing Jury Instructions and Special Verdict form given by the 
trial court. 
Despite the request of appellant's counsel for additional time 
for rebuttal in light of the trial court's rulings, the trial court 
stuck to its prior ruling limiting closing argument to 90 minutes 
per side (equal time despite hugely disparate burdens), and denied 
appellant the opportunity to rebut the hospital's closing argument 
which predictably took full advantage of the final hour 
irregularities set forth. 
2. The trial court awarded respondent, as costs pursuant to 
Rule 54 r Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the cost of copies of the 
depositions of the hospital employees and witnesses taken by 
appellant; the cost of depositions of witnesses who never testified; 
the cost of depositions never used or referred to at trial; and the 
cost of the depositions of appellant's experts. These rulings were 
contrary to law and the purpose and intent of Rule 54, U.R.C.P. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE 
An understanding of the theory of liability asserted by the 
appellant against the respondent LDS Hospital at trial is crucial to 
this Court's review of this appeal. Simply stated, that theory was 
that: 
a. The hospital staff attending Betty George in the 
absence of her physicians, had a duty to protect her from harm. 
This included the duty to be the "eyes and ears" of the physicians, 
and to immediately notify them of adverse changes in the Betty 
George's condition so that necessary diagnosis and treatment could 
be provided [DUTY]; 
b. The hospital staff breached this duty on the afternoon 
of August 2, 1986, by failing to notify Betty George's physicians of 
important adverse changes in Betty George's medical condition which 
required immediate diagnosis and treatment [BREACH]; 
c. The hospital's negligence (as found by the jury), 
deprived Betty George of any meaningful chance of being diagnosed 
and treated, and therefore of survival, and thus was a substantial 
factor or contributing cause of her cardiac arrest and subsequent 
death. [CAUSATION] 
Appellant asserts that the trial court ignored, and/or 
fundamentally misunderstood, his theory of liability against the 
respondent LDS Hospital, which directly precipitated the errors 
complained of on appeal. It was appellant 8s theory that the 
hospital's negligence in failing to procure necessary medical care, 
directly and obviously contributed to the cause of Betty George's 
initial cardiac arrest and subsequent death, regardless of the 
underlying medical cause of her death. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAD AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO HAVE THE JURY 
INSTRUCTED ON HIS THEORY OF LIABILITY AGAINST THE RESPONDENT 
LDS HOSPITAL 
Under Utah law, each party is entitled to have his theory of 
the case, including his theory on causation, submitted to the jury 
for consideration. It has been uniformly held that the failure to 
submit jury instructions setting forth a party's theory of 
liability, where there is competent evidence to support it, is 
prejudicial, and constitutes reversible error. Goode v. Dayton 
Disposal, Inc. 738 P.2d 638 (Utah 1987); Grgen v. Trj-Q-Arc, 667 
Pe2d 598, 606 (Utah 1983); Watters v. Ouerry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 
1981); Mikkelsen v. Haslam, P.2d , 96 Utah Adv. Rep, 19, 22 
(Utah App. 1988); Steele v. Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah App. 
1987); BisweU v, Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987); fUUer 
v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 (Utah App. 1987); and Joraensen v. Issa. 
739 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987). 
A. EXTENSIVE EVIDENCE FROM BOTH APPELLANT AND 
RESPONDENT WAS INTRODUCED IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S 
THEORY OF THE CASE. 
The testimony introduced at trial by appellant and respondent 
was the same in the following particulars: 
(1) The LDS Hospital staff had a duty to contact Mrs. 
George's physicians or other competent personnel to inform them of 
adverse changes in her condition; 
(2) There were adverse changes in Betty George's medical 
condition on August 2, 1986/ which required that physicians be 
notified; 
(3) The hospital staff failed to notify, or was negligent 
in notifying Mrs 0 George's physicians of adverse changes in her 
medical condition; 
(4) Deprivation of oxygen to the major organs can cause 
serious injury or death in a matter of minutes; 
(5) MrSe George was deprived of oxygen; and 
(6) Even if the underlying medical cause of Betty 
George's cardiac arrest and death was sepsis, the standard of care 
applicable to the hospital required prompt notification of relevant 
signs and symptoms, in order to facilitate immediate aggressive 
intervention by Betty George's physicians for the purpose of saving 
her life; 
(7) No competent physician was informed of Mrs. George's 
deteriorating condition on the afternoon of August 2, 1986, with the 
consequence that she had no opportunity to be diagnosed, treated and 
saved. 
The extensive evidence in this regard, unanimously supported by 
the George family, appellant's experts, Mrs. George's treating 
p h y s i c i a n s , t h e h o s p i t a l s t a f f and the h o s p i t a l ' s e x p e r t s i s s e t 
f o r t h in Addendum I . 
B. APPELLANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS SETTING FORTH HIS 
THEORY FOR RECOVERY WERE IMPROPERLY REJECTED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Appellant fs theory was that the negligence of the hospital 
s ta f f deprived Mrs. George of any chance for diagnosis and 
treatment, and was thereby a "substantial factor" or a contributing 
proximate cause of her a r r e s t and subsequent death. Appellant 
proposed proper jury i n s t r u c t i o n s a s s e r t i n g t h i s theory . 
Appellantfs proposed Jury Instruction 24, [R-251] provided: 
If p la in t i f f s demonstrate that the acts or omissions 
of LDS Hospital increased the r isk or harm to Betty 
George, such evidence furnishes a basis for you to go 
further and find tha t the increased r i sk was a 
proximate cause resu l t ing in the death of Betty 
George, and the consequent in ju r i e s and damage 
suffered by her immediate family and Estate. 
Similarly, appel lant ' s proposed Jury Instruction 32, [R-2 61] 
provided: 
In this case plaintiffs have alleged that the acts 
and omissions of LDS Hospital by and through its 
officers, agents and employees resulted in the 
failure of Betty George to receive the medical care 
necessary to save her life, and ability to continue 
living in a normal and productive fashion. Should 
you determine that the negligence of LDS Hospital 
effectively terminated Betty George's chance for a 
normal life, then you should disregard any conjecture 
as to the measure of the chance for a normal life 
that was eliminated. That is, if you find that the 
negligence of LDS Hospital destroyed a substantial 
possibility that Betty George might have survived and 
returned to a healthy, productive state, then 
defendants are liable for whatever injuries and 
damage was thereby proximately caused. 
The trial court's failure or refusal to give appellant's 
proposed jury instructions concerning his theory of the case, is 
solely a question of law, and may therefore be reviewed by this 
Court de novo. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989-) 
The recent case of Mikkelsen v. Haslam. P.2d , 96 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah App. 1988) illustrates the application of this 
standard of review. There, the plaintiff was seriously injured when 
she skied several years after a total hip replacement operation. 
Plaintiff's theory of the case was that the defendant physician had 
approved and encouraged her to ski. The defendant physician denied 
he had given such advice. After the trial, the jury was instructed 
on contributory negligence and assumption of the risk (defendant's 
theory), but were not instructed that if the jury believed plaintiff 
and her experts, that those defenses would be inapplicable. This 
Court reversed a verdict for the physician and remanded for a new 
trial, holding: 
A party is entitled to have his theories of the case 
submitted to the jury provided there is competent 
evidence to support them. (citations omitted) 
Failure to give requested instructions is reversible 
error if it tends to mislead the jury to the 
prejudice of the complaining party or erroneously 
advises on the law. [Id. at 22] 
It is very important to note that in Mikkelsen, there was 
competent evidence favoring the defendant from which the jury could 
have arrived at the same verdict. However, since this Court could 
not determine, as a matter of law, the effect of the failure to 
give plaintiff's instructions, a new trial was required. Thus, the 
inquiry as framed by this Court in Mikkelsen, and equally applicable 
here, is whether the failure to instruct as to appellant's theory 
might have unfairly prejudiced his case. If so, appellant is 
entitled to a new trial. 
The case of Rudeck v. Wright, 709 P.2d 621 (Mont. 1985), 
graphically illustrates the trial court's error below. There, as 
here, plaintiffs had sued physicians and a hospital for wrongful 
death and survivor claims. There, as here, settlements were reached 
with some but not all of the parties. There, as here, the remaining 
defendant attempted to shift not necessarily the blame, but the 
cause to others. The Court held that in such cases, instructing the 
jury on the theory of "substantial factor" or "legal cause" rather 
than proximate cause is required, defining a "legal cause" of death 
as one which is a "substantial factor" in bringing about the death. 
[Id. at 628] The Court explained its rationale as follows: 
The "substantial factor" rule was developed primarily 
for cases in which application of the "but for" rule 
would allow each defendant to escape responsibility 
because the conduct of one or more of the others 
would have been sufficient to produce the same 
result. It is possible, and even more helpful, to 
apply axi alternative formulation that addresses 
directly the need for declining to follow the "but 
for" rule in this context. The alternative 
formulation is this? When the conduct of two or more 
actors is so related to an event that their combined 
conduct, viewed as a whole, is a "but for" cause of 
an event, the application of the "but for" rule to 
them individually would absolve all of them, the 
conduct of each is a cause in fact of the event. 
[Id.] 
A "substantial factor" instruction is perfectly suited to 
medical negligence cases involving the combined and completely 
interrelated conduct of physicians and a hospital staff. The Rudeck 
court, finding support in Snead v. U.S., 595 F.Supp. 658, 665 
(D.D.C. 1984), agreed, stating: 
In cases of alleged medical mismanagement of a 
patient's existing and potentially fatal condition, 
the appropriate test for causation is the 
'substantial factor' test. Under this test, 
plaintiffs must show that the defendant's deviation 
on 
from the standard of care was a 'substantial factor1 
bringing about [the patient's] present condition. 
In the instant case, appellant's request for the above "reduced 
chance of survival" and "substantial factor" instructions, was based 
on ample, well-reasoned support from other jurisdictions and legal 
authorities. For example, in Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative 
of Puaet Sound. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash 1983), the issue 
was whether a stipulated 14% reduction (from 39% to 25%) in 
decedent's chance for survival was sufficient evidence of causation 
to allow the jury to consider whether the failure to provide timely 
diagnosis and treatment was a proximate cause of death. 
The Herskovits court reviewed the relevant case law and 
succinctly summarized the persuaisive rationale for the "reduced 
chance" theory as follows: 
Rarely is it possible to demonstrate to an absolute 
certainty what would have happened in circumstances 
that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to pass. 
The law does not in the existing circumstances 
require the plaintiff to show to a certainty that the 
patient would have lived had she been [appropriately 
treated] promptly. [Id. at 47 8, citing Hicks v. U.S.. 
369 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966)] 
It is not necessary for a plaintiff to introduce 
evidence to establish that the negligence resulted in 
the injury or death, but simply that the negligence 
increased the risJc of injury or death. The step from 
increased risk to causation is one for the jury to 
make- [Id., citing Hamil v. Bashline. 481 Pa. 256, 
392 A.2d 1280 (1978), emphasis added] 
As a proximate result of defendant's negligence, 
James was deprived of the opportunity to receive 
early treatment and the chance of realizing any 
resulting gain in his life expectancy and physical 
and mental comfort. No matter how small that chance 
may have been - and its magnitude cannot be 
ascertained - no one can say that the chance of 
prolonging one's life or decreasing suffering is 
valueless. [Id., citing James v. U.S.. 483 F.Supp. 
581 (N.D.Cal. 1980), emphasis in original] 
The Herskovits court correctly stated: "More speculation is 
involved in requiring the medical expert to testify as to what would 
have happened had the defendant not been negligent." [Id.] 
In this case, the respondent LDS Hospital relied on the 
testimony of three physician experts who testified that Betty George 
died of sepsis, and that none of a string of individual actions by 
the hospital staff would have altered the outcome. However, none of 
these experts testified that each of the actions in combination, 
would not have increased Mrs. George's chances for survival. The 
Court is encouraged to study the testimony of Dr. Trowbridge [R-7 65, 
pp. 518-47], Dr. Weinstein [R-767, pp.637-59], and Dr. Elliot [R-
768, pp. 739-86] closely. Never do these experts state with any 
certainty what caused the alleged sepsis, when it occurred, or the 
point at which Mrs« George's death from the sepsis could not have 
been prevented by diagnosis and treatment«, The clear import of the 
testimony of respondent's physicians is that Mrs. George's condition 
became irretrievable only at the time of her cardiac arrest at 
approximately 7:00 p.m. on August 2, 1986. Of critical importance 
is that no defense witness refuted appellant's primary claim that 
the hospital staff's failure to notify Mrs. George's physicians of 
the specific signs and symptoms exhibited by Mrs. George upon her 
return to the 8th Floor, and thereafter, was a substantial factor, 
or contributing proximate cause, of her subsequent cardiac arrest 
and death. 
In fact, all of the respondent Hospital's physician experts 
supported appellant's claims of negligence on the part of the 
hospital staff, by testifying that Betty George's symptoms and 
worsening condition required prompt action; that the LDS Hospital 
staff should have contacted physicians capable of diagnosing and 
treating Mrs, George, and that they each routinely and successfully 
treated patient's critically ill with sepsis, indicating that 
diagnosis and treatment could prevent death in patient suffering 
from serious sepsis• [See, Testimony of Drs. Trowbridge, Weinstein 
and Elliot in Addendum I] Given such testimony, the jury should 
have been allowed to perform its exclusive function of determining 
the factual question of whether the respondent Hospital's negligence 
was a substantial factor or contributing proximate cause of 
appellant's injuries and damages. 
Numerous decisions support appellant's claim of reversible 
error here. These includes Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital, 
566 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977); McBride v. U.S. . 462 F.2d 92 (9th 
Cir. 1972); Jeanes v. Milner. 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970); Kaiser 
Foundation v. Sharp. 741 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1987); McKellioos v. Saint 
Francis HQSPital, 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987); Thompson v. Sun City 
Hospital. 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984); Roberson v. 
Counselman. 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984); Vassos v. Roussalis. 
658 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1983); Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, 421 A.2d 
674 (1980); Johnson V, St. Bernard Hospital, 399 N.E.2d 198 
(Ill.App. 1979) KQlaKQwsKi Y, VQriS, 395 N.E.2d 6 (Ill.'App 1979); 
Hernandez v. Clinica Pasteur, Inc.. 293 So.2d 747, 750 (Fla.Ct.App. 
1974); Kallenbera v. Beth Israel Hospital. 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974). 
These courts all characterize the Hospitalfs conduct as 
depriving the decedent of a "significant" chance to survive or 
recover, rather than requiring proof, as was done in this case, that 
the defendant's conduct was the cause of the underlying medical 
condition. The rationale for this rule of law can be summarized as 
follows: " I t is not for the wrongdoer who put the possibility of 
recovery beyond realizationf to say afterward that the result was 
inevitable." BerskQvitS v, GfQUP Insurance, supra, 664 P,2d at 476. 
(emphasis added); and "[T]he interest which the law is protecting is 
the chance itself, and the chief problem is the evaluation of the 
chance, which is a function peculiarly within the province of the 
jury." Thompson, supra, 688 P.2d at 616 (c i ta t ions omitted) 
POINT II I 
THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTIONS 16A AND 21A 
CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL 
AND REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Ae THE INSERTION OF INSTRUCTIONS 16A AND 21A ON THE 
LAST DAY OF TRIAL, AFTER THE CLOSE OF EVIDENCE, 
CHANGED APPELLANT'S BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE 
CAUSATION ISSUE FROM WHAT IT HAD BEEN THROUGHOUT 
THE LITIGATION, AND DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL. 
The primary issue in the trial of this matter was, or should 
have been, whether the negligent conduct of the LDS Hospital staff 
was a substantial factor, or contributing proximate cause of 
the patient's cardiac arrest and irreversible coma on August 2, 
1986. 
Addendum II sets forth the numerous instances in which the 
trial court ruled that the underlying medical cause of the patient's 
death was "irrelevant" or "not at issue." In reliance on those 
correct rulings, appellant's counsel expected that appellant's 
theory on causation, together with the evidence offered by 
appellant's experts, Nurse Gillerman and Don Owings, R.T., would be 
considered by the jury on the causation issue. Consequently, 
appellant never intended to, and never attempted to prove the 
underlying medical cause of Betty George's death. 
Consequently, appellant was shocked when, on the last day of 
trial, after counsel for both sides had rested, and only minutes 
before closing arguments were to begin, the trial court added Jury 
Instructions 16A and 21A to the final set of Instructions. [R-511, 
518] 
Jury Instruction 21A provided: 
You are instructed that where the proximate cause of 
Betty George's death and therefore the injury or loss 
claimed by plaintiff is not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence based on reasonable 
medical probability from testimony of a medical 
doctor, but is left to conjecture or speculation and 
may be reasonably attributed to causes over which the 
hospital or doctor had no control or responsibility, 
then the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden 
of proof as to proximate causation. 
Jury Instruction 16A, which appears to have simply been a 
reformulation Instruction 21A, provided: 
The plaintiff in this case cannot recover against the 
doctors or the hospital unless it is proven that: 
1. Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS 
Hospital's nursing staff or respiratory therapist, or 
all of them, based on a degree of reasonable medical 
probability, failed to exercise that degree of 
reasonable care and skill in caring for the plaintiff 
that was ordinarily possessed and used by others in 
the respective profession practicing in 1986 in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, or similar communities under similar 
circumstances; 
2. Based on a degree of reasonable medical 
probability established through expert medical 
testimony from a duly qualified medical doctor, that 
such failure, if any, was the proximate cause of the 
death of Betty George, and; 
3. That David George personally, and the heirs of 
Betty George, and the representative of the Estate of 
Betty George, was damaged by the negligence, if any, 
of one of the defendants or all of them. 
If you do not find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, all of the foregoing propositions with 
regard to either Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey 
or LDS Hospital, the party or parties, as the case 
may be, against whom any one proposition is not found 
cannot be found to have committed medical malpractice 
and your verdict must be in favor of that defendant 
or defendants. If you find that the evidence is 
evenly balanced on any of the above-mentioned issues, 
then your verdict should be for the defendant or 
defendants on whose behalf the evidence is evenly 
balanced. 
Instruction 21A had been specifically rejected by the trial 
court the day before in an off-record conference held for the 
specific purpose of arriving at a final set of instructions. 
Tuesday, November 8, 1989, was Election Day and the court reporter 
had the day off. Consequently, the conference was not reported. Jury 
Instruction 16A had also been previously rejected. It was inserted 
into the final set of jury instructions on the last day of trial 
without discussion. The version read to the jury does not even 
appear in the record until November 14, 1988, five days after the 
jury's verdict. [R-409, 431] The designation "A" after these 
Instructions is proof that they were added after the final set of 
instructions was agreed to between the Court and counsel on November 
8, 1988. (The sequence of events regarding Jury Instruction 21A is 
fully set forth in PLAINTIFFfS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT - OR FOR A NEW TRIAL [R-443-478, pp. 454-59]/ and the 
unrebutted AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL, [R-479-493, 
specifically 515-31, pp. R-483-87]) 
It was simply and fundamentally unfair for the trial court to 
"change the rules of the game" after the trial had ended, especially 
when the last-minute changes adopted respondent's defense and 
instructed the jury not to consider appellant's competent, and 
previously admitted evidence on causation. The error in submitting 
Jury Instructions 16A and 21A is boldly highlighted in contrast to 
the clear, concise and correct statement of appellant's burden as 
agreed to, and set forth in Jury Instruction 16 [R-510]. 
Appellant's burden, as set forth there, was simply to prove "that 
the negligence of LDS Hospital, through its employees, was a 
proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs." 
B. INSTRUCTIONS 16A AND 21A REQUIRED APPELLANT TO 
PROVE THE UNDERLYING MEDICAL CAUSE OF DEATH, AN 
IRRELEVANT ISSUE, THROUGH A PHYSICIAN. 
Addendum II sets forth the trial court's law-of-the-case 
rulings that only the physician who signed the death certificate, or 
those actually involved in officially determining the underlying 
medical cause of death could testify on that subject. Pursuant to 
those rulings, appellant's experts were precluded from testifying as 
to underlying medical cause of death. However, the trial court had 
properly permitted appellant's experts to testify that the 
hospital's negligence was a cause of the crucial event in the case, 
that being the initial cardiac arrest suffered by Betty George on 
August 2nd, resulting in an irreversible coma and her eventual 
death. 
Thereafter, in violation of the trial court's prior rulings, 
all three of respondent LDS Hospital's experts were allowed to offer 
purely speculative opinions on the irrelevant, underlying medical 
cause of death. The repeated violation of the trial court's own 
ruling would have been of no consequence, but for the last-minute 
insertion of Jury Instructions 16A and 21A which made testimony on 
the underlying medical cause of death through a physician, critical 
elements of appellant's burden of proof. 
What instructions 16A and 21A did, very simply, was to tell the 
jury that they were not allowed to consider any of appellant's 
experts' evidence on the issue of causation after both had been 
properly qualified and their testimony allowed* In this case, the 
hospital's liability flows directly from the Hospital's breach of 
duty to protect the patient from harm. Assuming for the purpose of 
argument, that- sepsis was the operative underlying medical 
condition, that would in no way alter the hospital's duty, nor the 
proximate result from of a breach of that duty. In fact, it is 
quite clear from the evidence that sepsis is dangerous and demands 
immediate, aggressive intervention in order for a patient to 
survive. 
The view, apparently adopted by the trial court after the close 
of evidence, that qualified nurses and respiratory therapists are 
incapable of rendering opinions with regard to the effect of 
hospital staff negligence, is contrary to law and common sense. For 
example, in Campbell v, Pitt County Memorial Hospital/ 352 s.£.2d 
902 (N.C.App. 1987), an obstetrical case, plaintiffs claimed that 
the nursing staff's failure to obtain the patient's informed 
consent, and the subsequent failure to alert physicians as to 
adverse changes in the patient's condition was negligence, and a 
contributing proximate cause of severe brain damage suffered by the 
infant. Plaintiffs supported their case with the testimony of 
several nurse experts. In affirming a verdict for the plaintiffs, 
the Court held: 
Nurse Susan Rumsey, another expert for the plaintiff, 
testified that a parent who had been informed that 
its baby was in the footlong breach presentation and 
who had been informed of the risks of a vaginal 
delivery ordinarily "would opt for a safer 
procedure." Accordingly, failure to see that 
informed consent had been obtained "could have 
affected the outcome . . . " here in Nurse Rumsey's 
opinion. [Id. at 908] 
[W]e hold t h a t p l a i n t i f f s p r e s e n t e d s u f f i c i e n t 
evidence to show t h a t the h o s p i t a l ' s g e n e r a l 
ob l iga t ion "to make a reasonable e f fo r t to monitor 
and oversee the t r ea tment" . . . , included the 
spec i f i c duty . . . , t o e s t a b l i s h an e f f e c t i v e 
mechanism for the prompt repor t ing of any s i t u a t i o n 
tha t created a th rea t to the heal th of a pa t i en t . . 
Plaintiffs' evidence is also sufficient to 
demonstrate that defendant-hospital ' s failure 
to perform this duty was a proximate cause of 
Jennifer's injuries. [Id. at 90 9, emphasis added] 
Consequently, the e f fec t of the Cour t ' s l a s t -minute erroneous 
changes in the i n s t r u c t i o n s not only e l iminated a p p e l l a n t ' s theory 
on the causa t ion i s s u e , but a l so r equ i red a p p e l l a n t t o meet a 
l ega l ly erroneous burden of proof which was d i f f e ren t from what had 
been in ef fec t throughout the t r i a l . In a l ega l system grounded in 
f a i r n e s s , and the oppor tuni ty for a l l l i t i g a n t s to have a jury 
consider t h e i r theory of recovery, the r e s u l t in t h i s case cannot be 
allowed to stand* 
C. APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SUBMIT THE CASE 
ON CAUSATION AGAINST LDS HOSPITAL WITHOUT EXPERT 
TESTIMONY FROM A PHYSICIAN. IF ANY EXPERT 
TESTIMONY WAS NECESSARY, THE TESTIMONY OF 
APPELLANT'S EXPERTS WAS SUFFICIENT. 
In the t y p i c a l medical malpract ice case, expert testimony i s 
required t o e s t a b l i s h the appl icable standard of care , i t s breach, 
and tha t the breach was a proximate cause of the i n ju r i e s and damage 
in i s s u e . One except ion to t h i s genera l r u l e i s t h a t exper t 
testimony i s unnecessary i f the conduct complained of, or the r e s u l t 
of such conduct, would be obvious to laymen. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 
P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980.) 
In this case, appellant's theory, fully supported by competent 
testimony and evidence, was that the hospital staff failed to 
procure the presence of a competent physician(s) for essential 
medical diagnosis and treatment when it was obviously necessary. 
There was unrefuted evidence that the hospital staff failed or 
refused to call a doctor despite the repeated pleas of members of 
the George family who were actually present; that critical nursing 
observations were not provided to resident Carol Adams who was 
supposedly present on occasion; and that the condition of Mrs. 
George was allowed to steadily deteriorate, without intervention, 
over a 5 hour period to the point of cardio-pulmonary arrest, 
despite the presence of a specially assigned one-on-one nurse whose 
sole duty that afternoon was to continually monitor Betty George and 
make sure that changes in condition were immediately reported. 
Evidence in this regard is more fully set forth in Addendum I. [See, 
Testimony of Dr. Lloyd, Nurses Terry and Schnabel, and David George] 
The failure to procure effective medical assistance in the face 
of obvious need is an issue which a jury can understand without the 
assistance of expert testimony. A lay person can reasonably infer 
the outcome for a patient with serious respiratory difficulties who, 
after more that 24 hours with respirations more than double the 
normal, suddenly has their respiratory rate "slowed to ", and 
is thereafter not seen by a physician for two full hours, at which 
point the patient's breathing ceases. There is nothing mysterious 
about the need of human beings for oxygen, and what happens if that 
supply is severely diminished or cut off for a prolonged period. 
Under these circumstances, appellant should have been able to submit 
the factual question of whether the hospital's negligence 
contributed to the cause of appellant's injuries without the 
requirement of producing expert testimony. 
For example, in Brennan v. Lankenau Hospital. 417 A.2d 196 (Pa. 
1980), the plaintiff suffered severe injuries when the hospital 
nursing staff failed to report adverse changes in the patient's 
condition to attending physicians. The Court held that under those 
circumstances the jury could determine the issue of the hospital's 
liability without expert testimony, stating 
We think it clear that staff failure to notify the 
attending physician of the deteriorating condition of 
one of his patients falls within the exception to the 
requirement of expert testimony. 
eDuring the night, no hospital staff member 
monitored changes in appellant's condition or 
notified Dr. West. Staff failure here to so notify 
the supervising physician is a glaring example of 
want of care. Thus, it was for the jury to consider 
Lankenau's liability. [Id. at 201, emphasis added] 
Appellant, in opening argument, stated that it was the first 
and highest duty of LDS Hospital to do whatever is necessary within 
the scope of its authority to protect a patient from harm. This 
simple truth, which was later supported by expert testimony and not 
contradicted by anyone, elicited an immediate Motion for a Mistrial 
by the respondent LDS Hospital. In fact, this duty of a hospital, 
which was the pivotal point of appellant's case, is unanimously 
supported by legal and medical authorities. Typical language on 
this point is found in Beeck v. Tuscon General Hospital/ 500 p.2d 
1153, 1157 (Ariz, App. 1972): 
Having undertaken one of mankind's most critically 
important and delicate fields of endeavor, 
concomitantly therewith the hospital must assume the 
grave responsibility of pursuing this calling with 
appropriate care. The care and services dispensed 
through this high trust, however technical, complex 
and esoteric its character may be, must meet 
standards of responsibility commensurate with the 
undertaking to preserve and protect the health, and 
indeed, the very lives of those placed in the 
hospitalf s keeping. 
Jarvis v. St. Charles Medical Center, 713 P.2d 620 (Or. App. 
1986), is a good example of how the causation issue should have been 
submitted in this case. There, plaintiff alleged that the failure of 
the hospital nurses to alert the patient's doctor of signs and 
symptoms of Compartment Syndrome resulted in the subsequent death 
and removal of the patient's leg tissue* Prior to trial, the 
plaintiff had settled with the treating physician. At trial, 
evidence was admitted that the patient's physician had been aware 
of, and had provided treatment for the condition, but that later 
complications went unreported. The facts of Jarvis are strikingly 
similar to the case at bar, with the exception that the 
responsibility of LDS Hospital here would be greater since Mrs* 
George's complications were obviously life-threatening. 
In Jarvis. the hospital's theory to avoid liability was that 
no doctor testified "to a reasonable medical probability" that the 
change in plaintiff's condition had existed long enough to have been 
discovered by the nursing staff in the exercise of reasonable care, 
and that therefore, the plaintiff had failed to prove that the 
nurses' negligence caused his injury. The George case does not 
suffer from even that uncertainty. Rather, the evidence was 
uncontradicted that the change in the Betty George's condition 
requiring physician notification was apparent immediately upon Mrs. 
George's return to the 8th Floor, five hours prior to her cardiac 
arrest. 
The Jarvis Court cogently observed that the "it doesn't matter 
what we did" defense, if allowed, would be self-insulating. That 
is, the very negligent acts and omissions complained of provide a 
*30 
built-in defense, since it would be impossible to predict the 
outcome had the hospital complied with the standard of care. 
In Jarvis, the trial court also flatly rejected the defense 
contention that the plaintiff is required to prove the underlying 
medical cause of his complication, where the allegation is that 
hospital negligence deprived a patient of necessary diagnosis and 
treatment. In so holding, the Court pointed out the critical 
difference between the issue of what the operative medical condition 
was [LDS theory], and the issue of whether something could have been 
done to prevent the medical complication [George theory]. The Court 
held that where the issue is the latter, all that is necessary to 
prove causation is that the evidence provide a reasonable inference 
that the hospital's negligence deprived the patient of necessary 
treatment* The Court stated: 
[The doctor's] opinion testimony, together with his 
description of the surrounding circumstances, 
supported the inference that there was a reasonable 
probability that the change in the condition of 
plaintiff's leg became discernible several hours 
before [the doctor] examined [the plaintiff]• 
Moreover, [the doctor's] testimony was not the only 
evidence that supported that inference. Plaintiff's 
chart showed that no tests were performed by the 
nurses during the four and one-half hour period 
preceding [the doctor's] examination. [Id. at 622, 
emphasis added.] 
In Jarvis, the defendant hospital produced expert testimony to 
the effect that the doctor was negligent, that the nurses were not 
negligent, and that nothing the nurses did or did not do caused the 
injury. Despite the defendant's expert testimony, the Jarvis Court 
held: 
The argument misses the point. It is true that [the 
hospital's ] experts testified that [the doctor] was 
negligent, that the nurses were not and that [the 
doctor's] failure to respond adequately to the 
February 18 symptoms caused plaintiff's injury. 
However, their testimony was also relevant to whether 
the nurses would have found observable symptoms if 
they had adequately examined plaintiff between 4 and 
8:30 on the morning of February 20, and, therefore, 
it was inferentially probative of whether the nurses1 
failure to conduct the examination as well as [the 
doctor's] negligence contributed to plaintiff's 
injuries. [Id. at 623] 
Once again, the facts in the instant case are stronger than 
those in Jarvis. Not only did all of the respondent's experts' 
testimony confirm LDS hospital's negligence and support the 
inference that it was causally connected to the outcome, there was 
also direct testimony of that causal relationship through the 
testimony of appellant's experts and the patient's own non-negligent 
treating physicians• Unfortunately, the effect of Jury Instructions 
16A and 21A was to prevent the jury from considering the competent 
and unrefuted evidence linking the negligence of LDS Hospital to the 
cause of Betty George's cardiac arrest and death. 
similarly, in utter v, United Hospital Centerr inc»# 236 s.E.2d 
213, 216 (W.Va. 1977), the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital 
with a broken wrist and elbow. The nurses there observed and 
reported obvious changes in the condition of the limb, but did not 
report associated changes in the patient's mentation. Then, when 
the physician failed to act, the nurses failed to protect the 
patient from harm by contacting other hospital or medical 
authorities. A jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff was reversed 
on appeal. In reinstating the jury verdict, the West Virginia 
Supreme Court held: 
It is contended by the defendant hospital that the 
nurses contacted the treating physician and did all 
that their duties required; that they had no reason 
to believe that the patient was not receiving proper 
care. The question of the propriety of the action or 
inaction of the nurses is one to be decided by the jury under the evidence before it. 
The tenor of the defense's contentions indicates that 
the nurses are being treated unfairly and that they 
should not be expected to heal the patient's ills. 
While registered nurses certainly are not charged 
with the responsibility of curing patients, they are 
charged with duties clearly reflected in the record. 
Nurses are specialists in hospital care who, in the final analysis, hold the well-being, in fact in some 
instances, the very lives of patient 's in their 
hands, [emphasis added,] 
The underlying factual predicate for this decision is 
essentially the same as in this case. Here, the respondent LDS 
Hospital made the same "contentions" with respect to the duties and 
responsibilities of a hospital . Given the opportunity to perform 
their function to determine if inaction on the part of a hospital in 
alerting physicians for necessary diagnosis and treatment is a 
proximate cause of subsequent injuries, the jury will respond 
positively every time. Protecting a patient from harm is the least 
anyone expects from a hospital staff, yet it is also the hospital's 
most vital function. The causal connection in this case is 
completely obvious. See also, Poor Sisters of St. Francis Seraph of 
the Perpetual Adoration. Inc. v. Catron. 435 N.E.2d 305, 308 
(Ind.App. 1982): 
[I]f a nurse or other hospital employee fails to 
report changes in a patient's condition and/or to 
question a doctor's orders when they are not in 
accord with standard medical practice and the 
omission results in injury to the patient, the 
hospital will be liable for its employee's 
negligence, [emphasis added.] 
- and a seminal case in this area of the law, Darling v. Charleston 
Community Hospital. 33 111.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965). 
Karriaan v. Nazareth Convent & Academy. Inc, , 510 P.2d 190 
(Kan. 1973), is also persuasive precedent relevant to appellant's 
contention that the testimony of expert physicians should not have 
been required in order to prove that the hospital's negligence was a 
contributing proximate cause of appellant's damages in this case. 
There, plaintiff sued his doctor and the hospital for damages 
suffered as a result of post-operative complications, the cause of 
which was unknown. The trial court directed a verdict for both 
defendants. On appeal the judgment as to the physician was 
affirmed. 
The issue as to the hospital was its failure to contact the 
patient's doctor or secure other medical attention for him, when it 
was obvious that his condition was deteriorating. The hospital had 
been awarded a directed verdict because the plaintiff had not 
secured the testimony of an expert to say that a hospital must do 
whatever it can within the limit of its authority to protect the 
patient from harmc Despite the lack of expert testimony, the Court 
held that the dismissal of the hospital was reversible error, 
observing that: 
There remains however, the failure of the nurses to 
make more than one attempt to locate Dr. Stone. A 
majority of this court feels that even laymen might 
justifiably find this effort inadequate in light of 
plaintiff's repeated requests for a doctor, his 
severe pain, and his apprehensiveness acute enough 
that he called for a priest. Under these 
circumstances - with the patient's condition 
deteriorating to the point where his doctor found him 
"critical" - it does not seem necessary to require 
expert testimony to establish that a hospital 
exercising ordinary skill, care and diligence would 
have secured a doctor by his bedside. IfrDr. Stone 
could not be reached, the jury might have found it 
the hospital's duty to secure the presence of some 
other doctor. Failure to secure a doctor for him 
without question caused plaintiff at least mental 
anguish, for which he would be entitled to recover if 
the hospital had a duty to call one. [Id. at 196, 
emphasis added] 
The George case again provides more compelling facts. Here, 
members of the family of Betty George who were present as her 
condition deteriorated made repeated pleas and demands that the LDS 
Hospital nurses get Betty some help - all to no avail. [See, 
Testimony of David George in Addendum I] The record reflects that 
the unlicensed "one-on-one special duty" nurse assigned by LDS 
Hospital spent more time trying to reassure the family about Betty 
George's condition than she did in attending to the patientfs urgent 
needs. [R-270, P's. Exh. 1, pp. 170-71] Mrs. George's physicians 
were not summoned until after she had stopped breathing, and by that 
time, Mrs. George was brain dead. 
Appellant here strenuously asserts that where the negligent 
conduct at issue is so basic, so central to the duty and 
responsibility of a hospital, and so vital to the health and well 
being of patients to whom the hospital owes a duty, that there is no 
need for expert testimony to establish causation. The court so found 
in Hiatt v. Grace, 523 P.2d 320 (Kan. 1974), affirming a jury 
verdict against the defendant hospital despite the lack of any 
expert testimony establishing liability, holding: "Non-expert 
witnesses can testify as to external appearances and manifest 
conditions observable by anyone1"; and "It required no degree of 
medical expertise for Mr. Hiatt to observe the degree of pain his 
wife was enduring and the frequency of her contractions." [Id. at 
325o] See also, Libbee v. Permanent^ Clinic, 520 P.2d 361, 363 
(Or. 1974). 
The trial at issue in this appeal was against LDS Hospital. If 
expert testimony was required to prove that the hospital's 
negligence contributed to the cause of appellant's damages, 
appellantfs expert nurse and respiratory therapist experts were 
perfectly capable of testifying as to that causal link. The trial 
court specifically so foundc [See, Addendum III; and R-7 65, pp* 
327-28.] Thus, there was clear prejudicial error in subsequently 
instructing the jury that it was appellant's burden to prove the 
underlying medical cause of death exclusively through physicians. 
Under the the facts and circumstances in this case, Jury 
Instructions 16A and 21A were irrelevant, unnecessary, confusing, 
contrary to law and reason, and extremely prejudicial. 
De THE PREJUDICIAL ERROR CAUSED BY INSTRUCTIONS 16A 
AND 21A REQUIRES REVERSAL AND REMAND FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
In determining whether the trial courtfs error in submitting 
Jury Instructions 16A and 21A to the jury requires remand for a new 
trial, the focus of the inquiry is not whether the evidence 
presented below supports the verdict rendered, but whether it is 
possible that the verdict would have been different absent the 
error(s) complained of. Specifically, with respect to this case, 
the proper inquiry is: Did the submission of Instructions 16A and 
21A deprive the appellant of a chance that the jury would find that 
the negligence of LDS Hospital was a proximate cause of the death of 
Betty George? If it did, then a New Trial must be granted. 
Mikkelsen v. Haslam. P.2d ,, 96 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 22 (Utah 
App. 1988) 
Plaintifffs position finds ample support in the case law from 
other jurisdictions. For example, in Roberts Realty v. City of 
Great Falls, 500 P.2d 956, 964 (Mont. 1972), a new trial was ordered 
after the court gave an erroneous instruction on the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur. The Court held: 
In the appeal before us, we find the giving of the 
res ipsa instruction particularly prejudicial because 
the jury may have used the doctrine to cast a 
presumption of negligence upon the defendant when the 
evidence of simple negligence was near equipoise. We 
do not know on what finding the jury based its 
general verdict. 
Where, as here, it is impossible to say upon what 
theory or under what part of the court's instructions 
a verdict is based, error in any one of the 
instructions which is prejudicial and which may 
influence the jury entitles the unsuccessful party to 
a new trial. [Id. at 964, citation omitted, emphasis 
added.] 
This is true regardless of the effect of other instructions, 
correct or contradictory. Koch v. Stevens, 552 P.2d 525, 527 
(Colo.App* 1972). There, as here, the argument was over the 
instructions on burden of proof. Basically, the instructions may 
have led the jury to believe that the plaintiff had the burden to 
prove something that was not legally necessary in order to prevail. 
The Court stated: 
An instruction that could lead the jury to place upon 
the plaintiff the burden of establishing to what 
extent the defendant is not responsible for his 
present condition would be erroneous, (citation 
omitted) Likewise, because it is impossible to 
determine by which instruction the jury was guided in 
reaching a verdict, the submission of conflicting 
instructions upon the burden of proof is error, 
(citations omitted) Furthermore, if the effect of an 
instruction to which an objection has been made is to 
cause the jury to speculate, it is sufficient to 
render a new trial necessary, even though the 
instruction itself may be technically correct. 
(citation omitted) The instruction as given here may 
well have led the jury to conclude that it was 
plaintiff's obligation to show the extent to which 
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of 
plaintiff's present condition, and that, failing in 
this obligation, plaintiff would be entitled to 
little or no damages, (emphasis added.) 
see also, Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage. 718 P.2d 456, 462 
(Alas. 1986), "An erroneous instruction is prejudicial if we cannot 
say that the jury's verdict may not have been different had it not 
been so instructed." 
While observing that there is no precise formula for measuring 
the effect of a particular instruction on a jury's verdict, the 
California Supreme Court has set forth a number of factors which may 
be considered in LeMons v, Regents of the University of California, 
582 P.2d 946, 950 (Cal. 1978). Such factors include: 
1. The degree of conflict in the evidence on the 
critical issue; 
2c Whether defendant's argument to the jury may have 
contributed to the instruction's misleading effect; 
3. Whether the jury requested a rereading of the 
erroneous instruction; 
4o The closeness of the jury's verdict; 
5o The effect of other instructions in remedying the 
error. 
Applying these factors to this case, the likelihood that Jury 
Instructions 16A and 21A had a prejudicial effect is manifest. 
First, there was a great deal of conflict on the causation issue. 
Proximate cause was, in fact, the critical issue in the George 
trial. Second, the Hospital counsel's closing argument to the jury 
focused almost exclusively on the precise instructions at question. 
The jury was repeatedly told that instruction 21A was the key to 
their deliberations. [R-768, pp.878-882] The effect of respondent's 
argument was enhanced by the fact that appellant's counsel did not 
have the opportunity to rebut it. The third factor is inapplicable 
here, since the jury was allowed to take the instructions with them 
during deliberations. However, respondent's counsel re-read 
instruction 21A to the jury and specifically referred to it in 
closing argument. The fourth factor is unknown. Finally, no other 
instructions given by the Court would have had any curative impact 
of Jury Instructions 16A and 21A. In fact, appellant's proposed 
Jury Instructions 24 and 32, which specifically set forth 
appellant's theory as against the hospital, were not given. 
In this case, it is impossible to say that the jury's verdict 
on causation was unrelated to instructions 16A and 21A, and/or the 
failure to specifically instruct the jury as to appellant's theory. 
At the same time, it would be perfectly logical for this Court to 
assume that the jury did as they were clearly told in those 
instructions, and held appellant to the burden of proving the cause 
of Mrs c George's ultimate death through the testimony of a 
physician. Consequently, the trial court's error in giving these 
instructions were not harmless, and a new trial is required in the 
interests of justice and fairness. 
POINT IV 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM UTILIZED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
MADE THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS 16A 
AND 21A UNAVOIDABLE AND CONSTITUTED ADDITIONAL 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
The Special Verdict form submitted to the jury can be found at 
R-401-03. The final judgment is at R-709-12. Appellant primarily 
complains of Question 3B on the Special Verdict Form which read: 
If you answered "yes" to No. 3A above (was LDS 
Hospital negligent?), then answer the following 
question: Was the negligence of LDS Hospital 
including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory 
therapists, a proximate cause of the death of Betty 
George and the damages claimed by David George and 
the heirs of Betty George? 
The jury answered this question "No." The verdict form then 
states: 
If you answered "No" to question 3A or 3B, or if you 
found no preponderance of the evidence either way, 
then answer no further questions. 
If there were any other instructions which mitigated the 
prejudicial effect of 16A and 21A - and appellant asserts that a 
careful reading of all the instructions, individually, and as a 
group, reveals there was not - the Special Verdict form made the 
error inherent in Instructions 16A and 21A unavoidable. 
A, THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM PROHIBITED THE JURY FROM 
CONSIDERING THE INJURIES AND DAMAGES SUFFERED 
PERSONALLY BY BETTY GEORGE PRIOR TO HER DEATH. 
If the jury found that appellant had not proved the 
underlying medical cause of death though a physician, as required by 
Instructions 16A and 21A, the jury was then told not to consider any 
damages. A significant part of appellant's case was the claim under 
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12, for the injuries and damage suffered 
personally by Betty George prior to her death. In regard to these 
injuries and damage there was extensive unrebutted evidence 
introduced on appellant's behalf to support that claim. [See, e.g., 
Excerpts from the testimony of Molly Brewer, David George, Traci 
Ruber and Cynthia Brown set forth in Addendum I.] 
Appellant's claim for damages under Utah's Survival Statute was 
completely separate and distinct from his claim for wrongful death. 
Damages under Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12, belong to the deceased's 
estate, while wrongful death damages under Utah Code Ann. §78-11-7, 
flow directly to the statutory heirs. Switzer v. Reynolds. 606 P.2d 
42 
244 (Utah 1980). Consequently, it defies common sense to require a 
party to prove cause of death as a prerequisite to recovering for 
injuries and damage that occurred prior to death. Further, from the 
evidence set for in Addendum I, it is apparent that the hospital's 
negligence caused Betty George, at the least, considerable pain and 
suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress prior to her 
cardiac arrest - all of which are compensable damages. See, 
Karriaan. 510 P.2d at 196, cited supra, at pp. 32-33. 
The Special Verdict form utilized by the trial court over 
appellant's objection, eliminated that aspect of appellant's case. 
Though there were appropriate jury instruction on this aspect of the 
case [See, Instructions 39 and 40, R-539, 540], there was no place 
for the jury to decide if the hospital was responsible for pre-death 
fn
-
 l
 damages, and other parts of the Special Verdict specifically 
instructing the jury not to consider that significant aspect of 
appellant's case if there was a negative answer on the issue of 
cause of death. fn- x 
fn. 1 
Appellant's proposed Special Verdict for would have curred the error. 
See, Exhibit 1, attached. Therein Question 3B was framed as follows: 
If you answered "yes" to question 3A above, then you should 
answer this question: Was the negligence of LDS Hospital . . ., 
a proximate cause of the death of Betty George, and the damages 
claimed be David George personally, the heirs of Betty George 
Si the Estates of Betty George? (emphasis added) 
Appellant's proposed verdict form also includes a separate Question 5: 
If you answered "yes" to any of the questions above, then you 
should answer this question: What amount of money damages 
would fairly and adequately compensate the Estate of Betty 
George for the pain and suffering, mental anguish and emotional 
distress, if any that Betty George experienced personally 
prior to her death? 
This format would have allowed the necessary separate consideration of 
this element of appellant's case. 
A O 
This arbitrary elimination of a significant aspect of 
appellant's case and claim for damages on the Special Verdict form, 
constituted prejudicial error requiring a new trial. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
AS TO DEFENDANT DOCTORS LLOYD AND LAHEY 
Prior to trial, appellant believed that his strongest and 
clearest case was against the hospital. Accordingly, appellant 
settled with Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey for an amount which appellant 
believed fairly reflected those defendants' percentage of 
comparative negligence. [0-20%] At trial appellant produced no 
evidence with respect to the standard of care applicable to the 
physician defendants, or the breach of that standard. Neither Dr. 
Lloyd or Drc Lahey put on any evidence. Respondent LDS Hospital 
completely failed to elicit any evidence about the standard of care 
applicable to the physicians or its breach. In fact, the physician 
experts called by the respondent Hospital all testified favorably 
for Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey. [See, Addendum IV] 
Consequently, at the close of the evidence, Dr. Lloyd and Dr. 
Lahey were absolutely entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of 
law. Farrow yt Health Services, Corp./ 604 p.2d 474, 477 (Utah 
1979) . Appellant moved the trial court for a Directed Verdict in 
favor of these physicians, which motion was denied. Discussion on 
appellant's Motion for Directed Verdict is contained in the record 
at R-787-793; 796-799; and 801-803. There the trial court makes 
clearly erroneous assumptions about the testimony of respondent's 
experts, then refuses to consult the record to learn the truth of 
the matter. 
The jury was required to consider the conduct of the physician 
defendants in Jury Instructions 16A, 18, 19, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 35, 
37 and the Special Verdict Form. This was particularly prejudicial 
to appellant, since the respondent LDS Hospital relied on physician 
experts for its defense, and Jury Instructions 16A and 21A 
erroneously required proof from physicians to establish appellant's 
claim against the Hospital on the causation issue. The prejudicial 
error permeating the submission of the case to the jury is 
highlighted in this respect: While the trial court was willing to 
allow the jury to decide negligence and causation as against the 
physicians without any competent evidence, it specifically 
instructed the jury not to consider appellant 's competent and 
previously admitted expert testimony on proximate cause against the 
hospitalo 
The jury proved it was capable of doing its job by finding that 
Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey were not negligent. However, it is 
impossible to assess what effect the erroneous inclusion of those 
defendants had on the jury's decision of the causation issue as to 
LDS Hospital. For that reason, the Judgement herein must be 
reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. On remand, the 
judgments in favor of Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey should be affirmed, 
and the matter remanded against LDS Hospital only. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT DEPOSITION 
COSTS UNDER UTAH R, CIV. P. 54 
After trialf the lower court awarded respondent LDS Hospital 
the full $2,291.58 it sought for costs under Rule 54, Utah R. Civ. 
P. [R-724-26] *fn° 2 Since the trial court had properly awarded 
plaintiff $1,650,00 for costs incurred pursuant to the Hospital's 
deposition of appellant's expert nurse, Harriet Gillerman, LDS 
Hospital was awarded the difference of $641.58 in the Final 
Judgment. [R-709-711] Appellant asserts that all but $40o00 for 
witness fees was improperly awarded to respondent. 
The decision on whether deposition costs are properly taxable 
as costs is a matter of discretion with the trial court. Hull v. 
Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P,2d 245 (1955). However, in order for 
deposition costs to be awarded, it is clear that the taking of 
depositions must be necessary for the development of the moving 
party's case, which is a fact which must be proved, in this 
instance, by LDS Hospital. Highland Construction Co. v. Union 
Pacific R.R.. 683 P*2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984). Obviously, 
depositions of LDS Hospital witnesses and employees taken by 
appellant's counsel are not necessary to the development of 
fn. 2 
These costs can be broken down as follows: 
- $841.23 for the cost of LDS Hospital*s chioce to obtain a copy of 
depositions of defense witnesses taken by appellant, [Bearnson, Adams, Hoff, 
Kaufman, Flinner, Greenway, Schnabel, Taylor, Lahey, Terry, Wilkerson, Davis and 
Moulten] 
- $283«70 for LDS Hospital's share of the cost of deposing the George family 
members. [David George, Traci Huber and Cindy Brown] 
- $1,126.65 for LDS Hospital's deposition costs associated with its taking of 
appellant's nures experts. [Gillerman and Ferguson] 
- $40.00 for witness fees of Jollensten and Brewerton. 
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respondent 's case. Appellant has found no authority for the 
illogical proposition that a party may be awarded costs associated 
with depositions taken by an opponent, and none was advanced below. 
A review of the depositions taken by appellant [R-746-762] reveals 
that respondent's counsel asked no questions of the witnesses. 
While counsel for respondent certainly should be able to obtain a 
copy of depositions, that is not an expense which appellant should 
later be ordered to bear* 
Utah law has developed sensibly to limit the taxing of 
deposition costs to those instances where a deposition was necessary 
to preserve testimony, and was subsequently utilized for that 
purpose at trial. Thus, it is generally held that the cost of a 
witness1 deposition who subsequently testifies at trial is not 
taxable as costs. Hull v. Goodman, supra. Depositions in this 
category include Bearnson, Adams, Schnabel, Lahey, George, Huber, 
Brown, Terry, Wilkerson and GiHerman. 
Similarly, the cost of depositions not used or referred to at 
trial are not taxable as costs, unless necessarily incurred for the 
preparation of the moving party's case. Nelson v. Newman. 583 P.2d 
601 (Utah 1978) . Depositions in this category include Kamman, Hoff, 
Flinner, Greenway, Taylor, Davis, Moulten and Ferguson. In any 
event, respondent introduced no specific evidence below that any of 
these depositions were necessary for the preparation of their case. 
[See, PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
EXPENSES, R-694-697.] 
On remand, the Judgment awarding appellant $1,650.00, should be 
affirmed. If the Judgment is not reversed, appellant should still 
be awarded $1,610 0 [$1,650 for Gillerman's deposition less $40 
properly awarded for witness fees.] 
CONCLUSION 
The trial which is the subject of this appeal was against LDS 
Hospital. Appellant proved that the hospital had a duty to protect 
Betty George from harm, and that it completely failed to carry out 
that vital responsibility. The factual questions for the jury to 
decide were thus: Was the hospital's negligence a substantial 
factor or contributing proximate cause of the injuries and damage 
complained of? Did the hospital's negligence increase the risk of 
harm to the patient? The evidence on these questions was 
unanimously in the affirmative, and appellant submitted legally 
appropriate Jury Instructions setting forth his clear and simple 
theoryo Appellant's proposed Instructions were rejected, and 
consequently, appellant was denied the fundamental right of having 
his theory for recovery presented to the jurye In so doing, the 
trial court committed prejudicial, reversible error. 
Instead of appellant's proposed instructions on causation, the 
trial court, after the close of evidence, inserted Jury Instructions 
16A and 21A, which, in addition to being factually and legally 
erroneous, were also contrary to the numerous rulings made by the 
trial court with respect to the causation issue during the course of 
trial. The trial court's alteration of the Jury Instructions after 
the close of evidence was totally unfair, and constituted 
prejudicial, reversible error. 
The combined effect of the erroneous Jury Instructions and 
Special Verdict form made it impossible for the jury to consider 
appellant's very substantial claim on behalf of the Estate of Betty 
George, for the injuries and damage she personally had suffered 
prior to her death. This summary amputation of one-half of 
appellant's case is unheard of in the law, and constituted 
prejudicial, reversible error. 
Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
respondent the cost of obtaining copies of the depositions of 
hospital witnesses and employees taken by appellant, the cost of 
depositions never used or referred to at trial, and the cost of 
deposing appellant's expert witnesses. 
For all of the reasons stated herein, appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court AFFIRM the Judgments entered below with 
respect to Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey; REVERSE the Judgment entered 
below with respect to respondent LDS Hospital and REMAND that aspect 
of the case for a NEW TRIAL; REVERSE the trial court's final 
judgment with respect to costs awarded LDS Hospital; and award 
appellant the costs associated with this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ****- day of HM^^'i~ , 1989. 
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Exhibit 1 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID GEORGE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LDS HOSPITAL, KIMBALL LLOYD, 
M.D., and MICHAEL LAHEY, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Your function as jurors in this case is to answer questions. 
Your answers will constitute your verdict, and based on your 
answers the Court will enter an appropriate judgment or judgments 
with respect to all of the parties in accordance with the law. If 
there is a preponderance of the evidence in favor of the question, 
indicate by finding "yes." If there is a preponderance of 
evidence against the question, indicate by finding "no." 
The same individuals need not agree as to every question so 
long as there are at least 6 who do agree. 
The questions you are to answer are as follows: 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil NOo C-87-4199 
Judge Pat Brian 
QUESTION 1 
Ac Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of Betty 
George? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
B. If you answered "yes" to question #1 above, then you 
should answer this question: Was the negligence of Dr. Kimball 
Lloyd a proximate cause of the death of Betty George, and the 
damages claimed by David George personally, the heirs of Betty 
George, or the Estate of Betty George? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
OTB3TTW Z 
A. Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of Betty 
George? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
B. If you answered "yes" to question #3 above, then you 
should answer this question: Was the negligence of Dr. Michael 
Lahey a proximate cause of the death of Betty George, and the 
damages claimed by David George personally, the heirs of Betty 
George, or the Estate of Betty George? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
QiregTIQN 3 
A. Was LDS Hospital, through its employees including nurses 
and respiratory therapists, negligent in its care of Betty George? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
B. If you answered "yes" to question #5 above, then you 
should answer this question: Was the negligence of LDS Hospital, 
through its employees including nurses and respiratory therapists, 
a proximate cause of the death of Betty George, and the damages 
claimed by David George personally, the heirs of Betty George, or 
the Estate of Betty George? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
QUESTION 4 
If you answered "yes" to any of the questions above, then you 
should answer this question: What is the amount of money damages 
which would fairly and adequately compensate plaintiffs for the 
following damages: (Note - Damages for Loss of Consortium should 
be calculated separately for David George, and each of the 
children of Betty George). 
a. Funeral and Burial Expenses: $ 
bo Medical Expenses: $ 
c. Lost income, benefits and 
household services $ 
d. Loss of Consortium: 
David George, Sr. $ 
Gail Hoover $ 
David George, Jr. $ 
Cynthia Brown $ 
Traci Lee Huber $ 
5. If you answered "yes" to any of the questions above, then 
you should answer this question: What amount of money damages 
would fairly and adequately compensate the Estate of Betty George 
for the pain, suffering, mental anguish and emotuional distress, 
if any, that Betty George experienced personally prior to her 
death? 
ANSWER: $ 
6. Assessing a percentage only to those parties found to be 
negligent, what percentage of negligence do you find is 
attributable to the following: (Note: The sum of your 
percentages must equal 100%.) 
Dr. Kimball Lloyd % 
Dr. Michael Lahey % 
LDS Hospital % 
TOTAL 100 % 
Dated this day of , 1988. 
FOREPERSON 
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Addendum 1 
ADDENDUM I 
Collected here for the Court's reference is some of the evidence 
produced at trial tending to show that the negligence of LDS Hospital, as 
found by the jury, was a substantial factor or contributing proximate cause of 
the arrest and subsequent death of Betty George. This evidence is submitted 
as proof that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to plaintiffs 
theory of the case, compounded by submitting erroneous instructions such as 
16A and 21A, constituted prejudicial error requiring that the judgment be 
reversed and the matter remanded for a New Trial. 
MOLLY BREWER testified as a fact witness for the appellant. Her 
testimony is set forth in R-7 64 at ppc 3-14 and includes the following: 
Pages 5-12 
Q0 Were you aware of when Betty George actually did go into 
the hospital? 
A, Yes. 
Q, Did you made any attempt to contact or visit Mrs. George 
in the hospital? 
Ac Yes. I called her on Thursday, after her surgery. I 
called her from my office. 
Q. For the benefit of the jury, let's get the dates lined 
up. Thursday would have been July 31? Is that your 
recollection? 
A. Yeah, I believe so. 
Q. I guess we could get out a calendar, if need be* You 
say you called her? 
A. Yes, We had a rather short conversation. She had told 
me that she was in a lot of pain, that she was having 
problems breathing, that she was on some type of a breathing 
device, the incentive spirometer. 
1 
Q. Spirometer. 
A. And that she was having a hard time using it, and it 
hurt her to use it. 
Qc Do you recall about what time that phone call was? 
Ac About 3:00 in the afternoon. 
Q. Do you recall anything that Mrs. George told you about 
what her hospital course had been? 
A. I believe she said that — 
A. She had stated that she was in a lot of distress and a 
lot of pain, having problems breathing, and that the doctors 
and nurses just didn't seem to do anything. They just donft 
seem to care. 
Qo Can you tell the jury, can you describe what she sounded 
like over the telephone? 
A* She was gasping for — it was like she was gasping for 
breath, just more short sentences. That's why our our 
conversation a little short, because she was having a hard 
time talking. And we finally cut the conversation off. She 
just couldn't talk any longer. She told me she just 
couldn't get enough air to even talk. 
Q. That question was, do you remember the substance of your 
conversation with Betty George on the telephone on August 2 
—• on August 1? 
A. On Friday? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I had called her on the telephone again, and I was 
really upset, just talking to her, I could tell that she was 
in a lot of distress. She told me that she now had an 
oxygen mask on. She was in a considerable amount of pain, 
in her abdomen, away from where her surgery was. She was 
having a hard time breathing. She just couldn't get — she 
said it was like she couldn't get enough air. 
Q. Did you do anything after you talked to her? 
A. I called my husband at work, and met him at work, and we 
went up to the hospital. 
0 
Q. Did you go to LcD.S. Hospital on Friday August 1, 1986? 
A, Yesc 
Q0 What time did you arrive? 
Ac Right around 6:00. 
Q. Where did you go? 
A. Right up to her room. 
Q. Who was present in Betty George's room while you were 
there? 
A. Her husband, Dave, and my husband, Doyle, and myself. 
Qc Anyone else? 
A. Just the four of us. 
Q6 How did Mrs. George look to you when you arrived? 
Ao When I walked to the room, I was shocked• She was just 
pale* she looked like death. 
Qo Did you have any discussion with Betty George about how 
she was feeling, or what was happening with her condition? 
Ac Yes. She told me that she was still experiencing a lot 
of pain in her abdomen, that her breathing situation had 
gotten worse, that there were times she would even take off 
-- while I was there she took off the oxygen mask, trying to 
get enough air. She felt it didn't feel like there was any 
air coming through the oxygen mask, and she lay there, 
gasping for breath. 
Q. How long did you spend at the L.D.S. Hospital on the 
1st? 
A. Between two and two and a half hours. 
Q. So you were there until 8:00 or 8:30? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Mrs. George's condition visibly change at all during 
the time that you were there? 
A. It had gotten worse during the couple of hours that we 
were there. It was hard for here to continue to carry on a 
conversation. She never said like a complete sentence. It 
was more, you know, just disjointed words, because she was 
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having a hard time talking and breathing. I spent a lot of 
time just sitting be her bed, holding her hand, and doing 
most of the talking. 
Q. Was Mrs. George able to understand you when you would 
talk to her? 
A. Yes, she was. As a matter of fact, while I was there, 
a call came in for her, from her daughter Cindy, and she 
told me not — you know, to tell the girls not to come up, 
because she didn't want them to see her like that. But I 
told Cindy on the telephone that she had better get up 
there, because I was in fear for Betty's life, the way she 
looked. 
Qc Were you in Mrs. George's room continually from 6:00 to 
Approximately 8:00 or 8:30 when you left? 
Ac Yes, I was. 
Q. During that time did you see any L.D.S. Hospital nurses? 
A. A nurse had come in one time, spent just a few minuted, 
just checking her pulse. I don't know, she didn't seem to 
be too concerned. While I was there, we had buzzed for the 
nurse, and she never came. Finally I helped Betty get more 
comfortable, lifted her up in the bed, tried to sit her up 
so she could get more air. I even helped get a bedpan for 
her, because we couldn't get anyone to come in and help. 
Q. During the two, two and a half hours while you were 
there, did you see any L.D.S. Hospital respiratory 
therapists? 
A. There was a gentleman that came in for a few seconds, 
came in, looked at the tubes, sort of checked the dials on 
the machine, and turned around and walked out, didn't say 
anything to Betty at all. 
Q. Did you have any impressions as to Mrs. George's 
condition, or what was going to happen to her when you left? 
A. Well, I was really afraid for her, because her 
condition, for such a fairly simple operation, her condition 
had deteriorated. She should have been ready to come home 
by Friday. when I had helped her with the bedpan, I had 
also noticed that she had had quite a large bruise on her 
hip, and when I had asked her about it, she wasn't aware of 
how it had gotten there, she said she didn't have it before 
she came into the hospital. But I was a little afraid, 
because there did seem to be a lack of attention. 
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CYNTHIA BROWN is a daughter of Betty George. Her testimony is set forth 
in R-764, ppc 14-41, and includes the following: 
Pages 25-32 
Q, Did you go to the hospital on Saturday, the 2nd of 
August? 
Ae Yes, I did. Traci called me at workc I had come home 
for lunch, and Traci had called again, and left a message, 
and for a reason that I can't remember, I didn't call her 
backc Then when I got back to work, she called me there. 
As soon as she called, I left work early and went up to the 
hospital. I got to the hospital approximately 6:45, 
therabouts• 
Qe Where did you go? 
Ac I went straight to her room. 
Qo Who was in the room when you got there? 
A„ Nobody o Just my mother. 
Q„ No nurse? 
Ac No nurse. 
Qe Cay you describe for the jury your mother's condition 
when you arrived? 
Ac I stood in the doorway, and I looked at Mom, and she had 
the tube down her nose, and she was laying there in bed. 
She had a light on above her. She was gray. She was —• I 
could see blue in her fingernails. Her hands were down by 
her side. I could see blue in her fingernails and blue 
around her mouth. I went closer because I was thinking 
maybe it was the light. I tried to hold her hand, and she 
was cold to touch. And as you can normally bend a hand or 
get it to bend easily, I had to pry my mother's had around 
mine so I could hold her hand, I did notice that her 
fingernails were in fact blue and she was blue around her 
mouth. 
Q. What was her breathing like at the time? 
A. Her — she would open her mouth and try to get air in, 
and I believe she was getting some air in, but you know how 
5 
your chest normally rises and falls. Her chest wasn't 
rising and falling. It seemed like it would go down to 
maybe her throat and come right back out again. And it was 
very fast and very, very heavy. 
Q. Did you try to talk to your mother? 
A* Yes, I did, 
Qe Was she able to talk to you? 
Ae No. I don't even know that she knew that I was there. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. I, in a fit of despondency, practically, I ran out of 
the room and I found two nurses. There was my mother's 
room, and then across the hall and slightly down a little 
bit there was like an ice station with some water there, and 
there was like a ledge that came out from the wall, and 
there were two nurses there sitting on something. 
And I went over and I asked the nurse, Where is the nurse 
that is supposed to be with my mother? And one nurse said, 
She is not in the room? And I said, No, she is not. And I 
asked her — this one other — the other nurse said that 
maybe she was with the other patient. And the other nurse 
said, Well, she could be on break. I said, Tell me about my 
mother. And she said, Your mother is a very sick woman. 
And I said, I want to talk to somebody. They said, I will 
get a nurse into the room as soon as I can. 
I went in and I used the bathroom. When I came out, there 
was a nurse standing on the opposite side of her bed. 
Q. Let me stop you there for a second. Can you describe 
your emotional state as you were talking to the nurses by 
the nurses* station? 
Ao I was hysterical. 
Q. Did you tell the nurses by the nurses' station what 
condition you had found your mother in? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were they doing out t h e r e ? 
A. They were w r i t i n g and t a l k i n g back and f o r t h , l augh ing . 
Q. What d i d t h e nurses do when you gave them t h a t 
i n f o r m a t i o n about your mother? 
£ 
Ac Nothing 
Qe Did they get up? 
A. No 
Qe What did t h i s nurse do, that you saw? 
A„ F i r s t of a l l , she t r i e d to calm me down, and 
then through the conversation back and forth she 
t r i e d to t e l l me that Mom was doing bet ter now that 
she was ear l i e r today. And I t o l d her t ha t I couldn ' t 
see how anybody in tha t condition could be doing any be t t e r 
than, say e a r l i e r today. 
Q The nurse t o l d you your mother was doing 
b e t t e r ? 
A. Yes 
Qc She made that comment in the room where your 
mother was? 
A, She made that comment right in the room, I was 
on one side of my mother ss bed, and she was on the 
other sidec 
Qc Was your mother still in the condition that you have 
described her, when she made that comment? 
A„ Yes. 
Q. What did you respond to that? 
A. I told her that I couldn't believe that my mother was in 
any better condition now than she could have been earlier. 
She was terrible. 
Qc What did the nurse do in response to that? 
A. She told me if I didn't believe her I could call 
my father. Then she asked me if I wanted to alk to my 
fathero And I said yes, I did. And I went around to the 
side of the bed, and there was a phone right there, and I 
used that phone, and I contacted my father. 
Qo Let me stop you there for a second. The nurse told you 
if you didn't believe her about your mother's condition, 
that you could call your father? 
A. Yeah. I was a little upset with this, because 
obviously, she was there, and my father wasn't. How was he 
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going to tell me she was doing better, when she was standing 
right there in the room? 
Q. Prior to the time that the nurse told you if you wanted 
to find out about you mother's condition to call your 
father, did she do anything to check your mother's 
condition . 
A. No, she didn't. 
Qc What was the next thing that happened? 
A. I was holding Mom's hand, and had the phone in the other 
hand, and the two nurses ceime in, the same nurse that was 
there when I came out of the bathroom. She came in with 
another nurse, to help sit Mother up in bed. And they had 
lifted her up once, under the arms, and Mom slid down. And 
when she slid down the second time she wasn't breathing 
anymore. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. First of all, I told dad that Mom is not breathing 
anymore. I think she is dead. The two nurses were just 
walking out of the room. I turned to one nurse and I 
said, She is not breathing anymore. And the other 
nurse said, Your mother is just fine. 
Q 
ANNE ETTA TERRY, was one of Betty George's nurses on August 2, 198 6. 
Nurse terry was also the Min-chargeM nurse responsible for the 8th floor. She 
was called as a witness by appellant. Her testimony appears in R-7 64, pp. 42-
128, and includes the following: 
Page 48 
Qe It is also the responsibility of the nurses in L.DoS. 
Hospital to report changes in the patient's condition to the 
patient's doctor, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's also a very important function, isn't it? 
A. That's true,, 
Q0 In order for a doctor to be able to know what to do for 
a patient* he has to know what the patient's condition is, 
doesnBt he? 
A, That's true* 
Qe And if you, as a nurse taking care of a patient, have a 
substantial question about a patient's condition, you take 
that question to someone who can give you an answer, don't 
you? 
A, That's righto 
Q. That's what you are supposed to do, is it not? 
A. Yes. 
Page 50 
Q. And the nurses can call the respiratory therapist any 
time they want to? 
A. That's true. 
Go If a patient is having a problem breathing, that the 
nurse has a question about, they are supposed to call 
respiratory therapy, right? 
A. Right o 
Q 
Page 80 
Q. [On the morning of August 2nd] Dr. Bearnson told you 
that the transfer was due to the fact that Betty's condition 
had gotten worse and because it was necessary to have her 
somewhere where she could be watched more closely; is that 
true? 
A. That's true. 
Q. You thought that was a good idea, didn't you? 
Ac Yes. 
Pages 86-88 
Q. You could see, when Mrs. George came back, just by 
looking at her, that her condition was worse, couldn't you? 
Ac She was really tired. Yes, she had changed. I wouldn't 
say how much worse, but she definitely had changed. 
Q. You didn't — when Mrs. George came back, you didn't 
immediately call someone up and say, 'This woman's condition 
is worse than it was when she left, did you? 
A. No. Because I had been informed of the physician seeing 
her in intensive care, and I felt comfortable with what they 
had said and what they ordered for herc 
Q. You had felt comfortable earlier that day with the fact 
that Mrs. George was going to go to ICU? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now here she was backin worse condition than you had 
seen her, right? 
A. Yes. But I feel like after what the doctors had found 
out from angio, and also a complete evaluation in intensive 
care, and they felt she could come back, I felt comfortable 
with it. 
Q. You didn't get any information about that evaluation, 
did you? They didn't give you any numbers, did they? 
A. No. But they told me they had spoke to the physician 
about it. He felt comfortable, so why shouldn't I 
feel comfortable with her coming back? 
i r\ 
Page 98 
Q. You could see when Mrs. George returned to the floor in 
the afternoon that her respiratory status definitely needed 
some improvement, couldn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't call the respiratory therapy department 
though, did you? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Page 123 
Qo If a doctor thinks a patient's condition is not serious 
or not critical, and a nurse, who is with the patient, can 
see that it is . . . That they might stop breathing. What 
does the nurse do? 
Ac Go to the physiciano 
Qo She tells somebody about it? 
A. YeSc 
Qo As fast as she can, doesn't she? 
A. Yese 
Qo And that's a basic requirement of nursing? 
A c Right• 
Qo You would expect that of any nurse, wouldn't you? 
A. Yes. 
MARY ANN SCHNABEL, R.N. was the nurse assigned to Betty George's care 
from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on August 2, 1986. She was called as a witness by 
appellant. Her testimony appears in R-764, pp. 128-169, and includes the 
following: 
Page 138 
Q. It was your opinion and agreement that Mrs. George would 
benefit from ICU care, wasn't it? 
Ac Well, yes, she would benefit. . 
Qo You told David George that in ICU Betty would be able to 
be observed more closely and that ICU had the facilities to 
take care of her, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Page 142 
Q. It was obvious to you when Mrs. George got back that her 
condition was worse than it had been before, wasn't it? 
Ac Well, she was — she was very distant. She was a little 
bit incoherent. But she had been gone from our floor from 
10:30 to 2:00. And she had gone to angiography, and she had 
gone to ICU. So she could have been very, very tired, 
because she acted tired when I asked her questions. 
Page 156 
Q. What nursing care plan did you give to the one-on-one 
special duty nurse? 
A. That she would have to be observed closely, . . .that 
she was to notify the doctor if she had questions concerning 
the patient's health. 
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HARRIET GILLERMAN, R.N., testified as an expert for the appellant. She 
was the only nurse qualified as an expert to testify at trial. Her testimony 
appears in R-764, pp. 169-218; and R-766, 414-463. Her testimony includes the 
following: 
Pages 187-191 
Q. You are still under oath, Nurse Gillerman. As part of 
your education and training, did you learn about human 
physiology? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you learn about the human pulmonary system? 
A. Yes. 
Qo Do you know how the pulmonary and respiratory systems 
work? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Qc Do you know, from your training and experience, what 
happens to people if they stop breathing? 
Ao Yes, I do. 
Q. What happens to them? 
A. When a patient stops—when a person stops breathing, 
they no longer have oxygen profusing their body: their 
brain, their heart, their kidneys, their lungs, their liver, 
their entire body. They also have a build-up of carbon 
dioxide and a build-up of carbon dioxide also causes 
specific signs and symptoms. 
Q. What is the range of things that can happen to a person 
from prolonged lack of oxygen? 
Ae I like to describe it on the basis of anything from what 
I call respiratory distress to respiratory failure to death 
of cells. 
Excuse me. I an sorry. What is respiratory distress? 
1 -3 
A. Respiratory distress is defined in signs and symptoms 
that have to do with decreased oxygenation of the cells of 
the body. When we speak of respiratory distress, we think 
of someone who is having difficulty in exchanging air, both 
oxygen and carbon dioxide. 
Q. Are there objective sings and symptoms associated with 
respiratory distress? 
A. Yes, there are. 
Q. Are those objective signs and symptoms things that 
nurses learn and are expected to know? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. What is respiratory failure? 
Ac Respiratory failure is when the body can no longer 
compensate for the distress that's being caused. There is a 
very specific definition. But mainly it has to do with the 
inability of the body to again respond and meet the needs 
that are necessary. 
Q« Are there objective signs and symptoms for respiratory 
failure? 
Ao Yes, there are. 
Qc Are those things that nurses learn and are expected to 
know? 
A. Yes, they are. 
Q. Is it possible for a patient to suffer respiratory 
arrest from lack of oxygen? 
A. Yes. 
Qc Is it possible for a patient to die from lack of oxygen? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is the effect on a patient of a lack of oxygen any 
different, depending on what is causing the patient to have 
a lack of oxygen? 
A. There are very specific signs and symptoms that have to 
do with lack of oxygen, no matter what the cause. 
Q. Speaking as an expert, as the Court has designated, can 
you tell your jury — tell the jury, based on your 25 years 
of experience as a professional nurse, what the function of 
1 A 
a Registered Nurse is in patient care, of a person in a 
hospital? 
A. Well, I think there would be different categories. I 
would like to go about kind of discussing those categories. 
The nurse in a patient advocate. 
Q. What does that mean? 
A. It means that the nurse must assure that the patient's 
needs are met by the entire health team, that if indeed 
there is something going wrong with their condition, that 
the nurse has been able to identify, that some help is 
gotten for that patient, so harm won't come to that patient, 
if at all possible. 
It also means that if a patient doesn't understand his 
therapy or her therapy, that explanations are given. It 
also means that the patient is assured that all members of 
the team will have information that will make it so that the 
team will be coordinated, so that it won't be fragmented 
care, so that the nurse is responsible for the continuity of 
care for that patient, from sometimes before the patient 
comes in, all the way to when the patient is homec 
Pages 192-194 
Qc What is a nursing care plan? 
Ac I think even my basic nursing students would be able to 
tell you that there are certain components of a nursing care 
plan* The first step of the nursing care plan is to assess 
the patient, and to make sure that one knows as much 
information and what we call a head-to-toe assessment, and 
also to know about the family, to know where the patient is 
in his or her life. All of the data that one can get about 
the patient. So that's assessment. 
The second part of a nursing care plan is what we call a 
nursing diagnosis or a conclusion that the nurse draws. 
The third part of the nursing care plan is to determine the 
outcomes. Based on the assessment that one has done, and 
the conclusions that one has come to, the nurse develops 
outcomes. 
Q. What are outcomes? 
A. Outcomes are the goals or where we would hope that the 
patient would be able to be. 
The next part of the nursing care plan is interventions, or 
actions. The interventions, or actions, as far as the 
nursing care plan are concerned, involves all those things 
that need to be done for the patient: the physician's 
orders, the respiratory therapy interventions, the things 
that need to be done because nurses are meeting a basic 
standard of care in what they just know has to be done for 
that type of patient. It could involve the — the actions 
could involve giving medications, making assessments, and 
making sure that the entire medical and health team plan is 
being carried out. So that's the next part of the nursing 
care plan. 
Then there is a very important part, what a nurse knows as 
part of the nursing care plan, that doesn't always appear on 
like a care plan chart. And that part is called the 
evaluation. So the evaluation is how the patient is 
responding to the medical intervention, how the patient is 
responding to . the nursing actions, to the health team 
action, and how the patient is doing in response to the 
plan. Then it starts all over, because after you have 
evaluated, you have to either revise the plan or you 
continue with the plan, based on how the patient is 
responding to that plan. So the parts of the nursing care 
plan would be the assessment, the nursing conclusions, the 
interventions or actions, the outcomes, and the evaluation. 
Pages 200 -210 
Q. If a nurse is not capable of doing what a patient needs 
to be done in a particular circumstance, do you have any 
expectation of what the nurse will do in that circumstance? 
A. As I have said to my students and to the nursing staff 
that I have always worked with, it is okay not to know as 
long as one can identify that they don't know. But it is 
not okay not to get assistance or help in being able to meet 
the patient's needs. We do have to refer to other members 
of the health team or to each other, and can't always 
remember everything that we need to do. But we need to know 
what needs to be done, so that what we do is get assistance, 
especially when a patient's condition is deteriorating. 
Pages 213 - 215 
Q. What would be the effect on the patient, of the nurses 
not performing those orders, on the atelectasis condition? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection on the basis of competency, your 
Honor. 
The Court: Counsel will approach the bench. 
(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
The Court: Rephrase your question. 
Q. The question, Nurse Gillerman, on a patient with 
existing atelectasis, and orders to do the functions that we 
have talked to, if the nurses do not perform those orders, 
what would you expect to be the effect on that patient? 
MrQ Burbidge: Objection to the form, your Honor. 
The Court: Overruled. 
A I would expect that the atelectasis would increase, that 
the patient would be receiving less oxygen for the needs of 
his or her body, and that the condition would perpetuate 
itself. 
Q. In your review of Mrs. George's medical record and 
testimony you have heard in this courtroom, does that appear 
to be the case with Mrs. George? 
Mr* Burbidge: Objection, your Honor. She isn't competent 
to provide that testimony. 
The Court: Read the question back please. 
(The pending question was read back by the court reporter.) 
Mrc Russell: Your Honor, the medical record talks about the 
condition. The nurses that testified this morning talked 
about her condition. And they were there. 
Mr, Burbidge: Your Honor, it is a matter of competency. 
She is not competent to provide testimony as to what the 
cause was in this particular case. 
The Court: Read the question one more time please 
(The pending question was read back by the court reporter„) 
The Court: The objection is overruled. You may 
answer it. 
A o Yes, it does. 
Note: Emphasis was added to illustrate instances where the trial court 
specifically ruled that appellant's nurse expert was competent to testify with 
regard to the proximate cause of nursing negligence. 
Pages 216-217 
Qe Under what circumstances would Registered Nurses be 
required to evaluate a patient's neurological status? 
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A. At any time that it is ordered, at any time that the 
neurological system has been interfered with in some kind of 
surgery, at any time there is any possibility of hypoxia, at 
any time there is any kind of respiratory distress of any 
kind* When a patient is waking up form anesthesia, it is 
very necessary. 
Q. And those circumstances that you have just enumerated, 
is it a requirement of the standard of care that nurses make 
neurological assessments? 
Ac Yes, it is. 
Q. Is it important that they do that? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Why is it important? 
A. Because is would be the nurse who would be able to 
detect any of the changes that go on in the minute-by-
minute, hour-by-hour condition of the neurological system of 
the patient. 
Q. If the proper neurological assessment is made, does the 
standard of care require that information be put in a 
patient's chart? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. In the case of Mrs. George, in your review of the 
record, did you find any neurological assessments? 
A. I did find words that were scattered throughout the 
nurse's notes, that talked about coherence, or sleepiness, 
or anxiety. I didn't really see a neurological assessment, 
and I didn't see a consistent recording of what was going on 
with her, in her neurological status. 
Q. Was Mrs. George's condition on August 1 and August 2 of 
the type that would require the nurses to make neurological 
assessments, in order to comply with the standard of care? 
A. Yes, it was. As soon as one finds that a patient is not 
alert or is incoherent or distant or unresponsive or any of 
those things, it is important that the nurse carry out the 
rest of the neurological assessment, to see what else is 
wrong, so that, again, she can be the eyes and ears fo the 
physician, and also the patient advocate, to make sure the 
condition is not deteriorating, without being noted and some 
intervention occurring. 
Pages 418-425 
1 a 
Q. We were referring to the L.D.S. Hospital policies and 
procedures, and my question before all of that was whether 
you have just found, in your review of the record and 
everything you just testified to, areas where the nurses at 
L0DoS. Hospital did not follow their own policies and 
procedures in taking care of Mrs. George? 
Ac Yes. 
Q. Would you explain those to the jury. 
A. As I reviewed the policies and procedures and I reviewed 
the chart, I concluded that there were breaches in the 
standard of care by Nurse Terry and Nurse Schnabel. The 
breaches in the standard of care started before what I am 
talking about, but I would like to focus on the time when 
the patient returned from intensive care with the oximeter 
removed and the decrease in the oxygen. 
The patient had gone from the floor on six liters of oxygen, 
and having had used the oximeter all morning to determine 
how much oxygen that she was receiving and using in her 
body* When she came back at 1420, the oximeter was not 
there, and the oxygen was reduced to three liters. There 
was no order for that, the doctor's order for that was not 
written until 1515. 
Qo Could you use regular time for the jury's benefit. 
A. That would have been 2:20 for 1420 and 3:15 for 1515. 
I believe that the nurses should have questioned whether 
that was proper liters of oxygen for the patient to have 
gotten, because they had no orders, since in had been 
previously established that she had a previous order for 
that oxygen. They especially should have questioned in 
because she had a change in her condition. The condition 
that she had had previously was that she wan coherent, and 
that she was having difficulty breathing, but that she was 
responsive and able to talk about the fact that she was 
short of air. 
At this time her condition had changed, and I believe it was 
their responsibility at that time to make sure the order 
that they knew what was going on with this patient, and why 
the order that they had had previously and the 
concentrations that were used previously were not at this 
time being followed, especially with the change in 
condition. I believe, and the patient advocate, that they 
should have at that time called Dr. Lahey, Dr. Lloyd, or 
anyone, to question this change. 
i r\ 
If indeed Dr. Lahey had been the one who sent the patient 
back from ICU, I believe they should have explained to Dr. 
Lahey that on 8/1, August 1, the day before, this patient 
had been able to talk and respond and make sense, and was a 
little bit short of breath, but now the patient's condition 
had changed a great deal, and perhaps he didn't know that 
since 8/1 and then even the morning of 8/2, August 2, they 
should have informed him of how different this patient was. 
That's the essence of being a patient advocate, to make sure 
that everybody knows that this patient had really changed 
conditions. That's being the eyes and ears of the doctor. 
They should have even asked what happened in ICU. There is 
no documentation on the chart at all about what happened in 
ICU* And when she left at 10:20, to go to angiogram, she 
was supposed to go to ICU. They should have questioned it, 
and made sure that everybody know that she had indeed 
deteriorated. According to the policies and procedures, a 
deteriorating condition fo a patient is not only reportable 
to the physician, but it is to nursing supervisors, to 
anyone, to where one can get intervention or help for a 
patient whose condition is deteriorating. And probably the 
only ones that would have known this is the nurses who had 
been at the bed side. 
Even if the physicians knew it, it is really important that 
a nurse doesn't stop with the fact that things are being 
observed. You have got to pull these things together and 
assist the patient to get the proper care. 
Q. Are there other policies and procedures? 
A. Yes. And that's important for us to know, that another 
thing they should have done is to call the respiratory 
therapist. It is their responsibility to inform the 
respiratory therapy department of a change in condition, a 
change in equipment, and that's written right here in the 
scope of services. The nurse who is responsible for the 
patient should inform the department in cases of malfunction 
of equipment or changes in patient equipment and mode or 
frequency of therapy ordered. 
They should have also called the respiratory therapists to 
report -— or to get some help with assessing this patient. 
The patient's condition had changed. The equipment had 
changed. And if they — and they said in their deposition 
that they didn't know how to do the complete respiratory 
assessment. Then they should have gotten some help to make 
sure that somebody that was more qualified or specialized 
than them should have been able to help them in assessing 
this patient. 
on 
They should have told Dr. Lloyd, who was really now the 
primary physician, about the changes in the patient's 
condition. They talked to Dr. Lloyd on the phone. They 
called Dre Lloyd. But they didn't inform him of the changes 
in condition. They didn't let him know the very important 
facts that would have assisted him in caring for this 
patient more completely. 
They should have also evaluated and established or 
reestablished or adhered to the nursing care plan. They had 
a very specific plan that had told them that they were to 
assess the breath sounds, that they were to assess for signs 
and symptoms of hypoxia, and report them. They had a care 
plan that assisted them in having outlined what they should 
be doing. If that care plan was no longer adequate, they 
had the opportunity to establish a new care plan or to 
reevaluate the care plan, add to the care plan, subtract 
from it, so it would guide them in their care. 
Qe Excuse me Nurse Gillerman« Is this the care plan that 
you are referring to; 
Ac Yes, it iSc 
Qo The one that was prepared by Nurse Taylor on the evening 
of August 1? 
A, Yes. 
And they should have added to that care plan specifically to 
observe for signs and symptoms, and report those signs and 
symptoms of deteriorating condition, because this, indeed, 
is a change in the patient's condition. They really should 
have investigated the goals of Dr. Adams. Dr. Adams wrote 
orders at 1515, She wrote a note at 1700. And on the note 
at 1700, she just talked about the things that she had 
ordered at 1515. There was nothing to intervene, nothing to 
assist this patient, at this particular time, with making 
sure that she was properly oxygenated. 
The nurses needed to coordinate. They needed to bring 
together a lot of facts. On 8/1, August 1, in the morning -
- I mean, this patient was able to talk. She was able to 
make sense. She was having trouble respiratory-wise. But 
on 8/2, she wasn't making as much sense in the morning. She 
was having trouble getting enough air. And then on — at 
1420, she wasn't even able to respond. She was incoherent. 
They should have been able to report and get somebody to 
listen, that this patient came in without any respiratory 
problems in —• for her surgery. Now she was deteriorating. 
Instead of improving at all, she continued to deteriorate. 
And everybody is — everybody is looking at this patient. 
They are assessing them — 
21 
Q. Do you have any observations with regard to the standard 
of care, about the assignment of Nurse Soraghan during the 
shift? 
Ac The assignment of Nurses Soraghan was as a one-to-one 
nurse o I was up to Nurse Terry to assure that this nurse 
was a one-to-one nurse that understood her duties, that she 
was competent, experienced, and was able to care for a 
patient who was in a deteriorating condition. The 
assignment of Nurse Soraghan to this particular patient, as 
I see it, was a breach of standard of care, in making sure 
that a critical patient was assigned properly, by way of 
level of preparation and acuity of patient. 
Nurse Soraghan was not a licensed nurse. 
Pages 432-434 
Q0 Now that we have gotten that out of the way, did Nurse 
Soraghan comply with the standard of care applicable to nay 
nurse during her shift? 
Ac I believe she did not. 
Q. In what respects did she deviate for the standard of 
care? 
A. She failed to go up the chain of command, despite 
ominous signs and symptoms of her patient. 
Q. Should Nurse Soraghan have informed Dr. Lloyd of the 
notes that she made in the patient's record? 
A. She should have informed Dr. Lloyd, or, if she informed 
anyone to inform Dr, Lloyd, she must have also gotten 
something that would assist her in giving better care to her 
patient. 
Q. Is there any indication in the record that anything was 
done to address the respiratory distress that Nrs. George 
was suffering during Nurse Soraghanfs shift? 
A. No, there isn't, until she got CPR and ventilatory 
assistance. 
Q. Do you have other areas that you have located, where 
Nurse Soraghan violated the standard of care applicable to 
her? 
A. Yes, I do. Nurse Soraghan was a one-to-one nurse. A 
one-to-one nurse continuously monitors her patient, unless 
22 
relieved by another nurse, When Nurse Soraghan was assigned 
as Dr. Lloyd said, it was to assure that there would be 
continuous monitoring of the patient, in order to alert a 
physician or anyone to intervene. 
A. Dr. Lloyd was assured, and so was Nurse Terry and Nurse 
Schnabel when they left, that Nurse Soraghan would be the 
one-to-one nurse, which meant that this would have — this 
nurse would continuously monitor the patient, and alert the 
physician or anyone to intervene if the patients condition 
changed Nurse Soraghan was out of the room. According to 
Cindy's testimony, Nurse Soraghan was not in the room at a 
very important time, to be able to alert a physician to the 
change in condition in Mrs. George. 
Nurse Soraghan also did not give the Keflin that was 
ordered. 
Qc What is Keflin? 
A* It is an antibiotic. 
Q„ What is that for? 
Ac For infection. There was an order for Keflin, and it 
was not administered by her« 
Qe Whose responsibility was it to administer the 
antibiotic? 
A. Nurse Soraghan1s, Nurse Soraghan also did not notify 
respiratory therapy of the change in condition. 
Q. What was she required to do? 
A. According to the policies and procedures, the nurse who 
is responsible for the patient should inform the department, 
in cases of malfunction fo equipment or changes in patient 
condition. 
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MR. DON OWINGS, testified as an expert in the field of respiratory 
therapy for the appellant. His testimony appears in R-765, pp. 276-350. His 
testimony includes the following: 
Page 307 
Q„ What should Mr. Wilkerson have done in order to comply 
with the standard of care applicable to him? 
A. One aspect would be to suggest alternate forms of 
therapy, that may increase her ventilation or her 
inspiratory capacity. Another standard would be to inform 
either the nursing supervisor or the physician of the fact 
that this inspiratory capacity has decreased significantly, 
and would alternative therapy be appropriate. 
Pages 311 
Q. In your expert opinion, given Mrs. George's ability to 
inspire at 5:30 and 9:45, when Mr. Wilkerson evaluated her -
A. Yes. 
Q0 —Would that have had an effect on whether that 
atelectasis got better or worse or stayed the same? 
A. Her ability to inspire would probably contribute to her 
atelectasis becoming worse. 
Q. If that condition were not treated for an extended 
period of time, what would the effect be? 
Ao In my opinion, it would continue to worsen. 
Pages 315-317 
Qe What should Mr. Wilkerson have done, if anything, at the 
end of his shift? 
A. He should have at least notified the physician of the 
patient's deterioration, from the stated goals; notified the 
nurses, primarily in care/ passed along to the oncoming 
shift therapist of the patient's lack of achievement of the 
goals in maintaining ventilation; and if supervisory 
personnel were available, notify them. 
Q. What was the purpose of that notification? 
A. To get something done for the patient at that time. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether the failure of Mr. 
Wilkerson to conduct himself in that fashion at the end of 
his shift contributed to the cause of Mrs. George's arrest 
the following day? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, competency and foundation. 
The Court: Overruled. Read the question back. 
(The pending question was read back by the court reporter.) 
The Court: You may answer. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is your opinion? 
A. My opinion is that it did contribute to the arrest the 
next day., 
Q. How did it contribute to the cause of the arrest? 
A. The patient's continued lack of oxygen had a detrimental 
effect on all the body organs, the cells, specifically the 
heart, brain, kidneys, liver. All of them ~ oxygen is 
necessary for those to function. Her lack of ventilation 
and being able to take in adequate amounts of oxygen would 
result in a continued deterioration of those organ's 
functions. 
Note: Emphasis added where the trial court specifically allowed 
appellant's respiratory therapy expert to testify as to proximate cause. 
Pages 319-320 
Qo According to your review of this record and the 
deposition of the respiratory therapist who responded to the 
code, what time was ventilatory assistance initiated? 
Ac Approximately 1913, 13 minutes after seven. 
Q. How long is that after the code was called? 
A. Nine to ten minutes. 
Q. Based on your knowledge, training and experience, if a 
patient stops breathing and ventilatory assistance is not 
provided for nine to ten minutes, what will the effect be on 
the patient? 
OR 
A. Anoxic brain damage. 
Q. What is that? 
A. The lack of oxygen to the brain. 
Pages 323-325 
Q. Have you reviewed the autopsy report that is included in 
the medical record in front of you, pages 3-10? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does that report contain any evidence that the patient 
was indeed deprived of oxygen to the brain? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, your Honor. The document speaks 
for itself. 
The Court: It is in evidence isn't it? 
Mr. Russell: No. Mr. Burbidge — 
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
Q. Have you, in formulating the opinion that you just gave 
us — that is, that the ventilatory assistance, the lack of 
ventilatory assistance contributed to the coma and death-
did you rely in part on the autopsy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What in that autopsy supports your opinion? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, again, hearsay. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Russell: Your honor, an autopsy — 
The Court: Would you like to approach the bench? 
(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
Q. Mr. Owings, would you look at page 80 of the medical 
record, which is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Those records are blood gas reports? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Qo Do you see the report at 7: 12, at the bottom of the page? 
Ac It says 1912. 
Q„ That's 7:12 
A. Right. 
Q. That would be during the code procedure? 
A. According to the record, yes. 
Qc What does that indicate about whether or not the patient 
was receiving oxygen? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, foundation. 
The Court: Overruled. 
A. It indicates that the patient is not ventilating, and 
that their oxygen is below normal values, severely hypoxic. 
Qc Is that proof, in your opinion, that lack of oxygen 
caused Mrs. George's arrest and death? 
Ac Yes. 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, your Honor, competency and 
foundation. 
The Court: Sustained. Is there a motion to strike? 
Mr. Burbidge: Yes, your Honor. 
The Court: Granted. 
Mr. Burbidge: If we please the Court, could we have the 
witness wait until an objection is entered, before the 
response comes back? 
The Court: The Court is going to take a five minute recess. 
The Court will see counsel in chambers, on the record. 
(The following proceedings occurred in chambers.) 
The Court: The record will reflect that counsel and the Court are in 
session, out of the presence of the jury. For the record, the Court has 
previously ruled that the cause of death may not be testified to 
on 
except for someone who in and official capacity participated in 
determination of cause of death. You may proceed. 
Page 327-331 
Mr. Russell: The way I understand it, the Court is 
requiring us to bring such a person in here to testify about 
it. Mr. Owings, by his training and experience, can look at 
the record, can look at the autopsy, and he knows — he can 
form an opinion that lack of oxygen was the cause of death. 
The Court: Not the cause of death. He had already 
testified, and the Court has listened carefully to the 
framing of the question and to the responsive answer. The 
question was, did it contribute? The answer was, in his 
opinion, it did contribute. There is nothing wrong 
with the question or the answer. The last question 
posed to the witness was, in your opinion, did it cause the 
decedent's death? It is an inappropriate question, and the 
Court has previously ruled on it. That's the reason the 
Court sustained the objection and granted the motion to 
strike. 
The Court: The Court is not suggesting that, A, 
cause of death is an issue in this case. The Court 
has never taken that position. But if you contend 
that it is an issue, the Court has ruled that in order for 
competent testimony to be presented to the trier of fact, 
someone who is competent to so testify must come into court 
and testify. And a nurse from Long Beach State or a 
respiratory therapist from Long Beach State is not competent 
to testify as to the cause of death of the decedent. They 
can say that I would expect if this and this and 
this and this and this were present in this woman' s 
life, that she would die. She didn't get enough 
oxygen, she quit breathing, she was brain dead, and 
she would die. And that's their opinion. And that's 
based on everything they have heard and read about the case. 
But they can't say that, in their opinion, she died solely 
and exclusively for that reason. If that is an issue — 
Mr. Russell: I don't think it is. 
The Court: I don't think it is either. I don't 
think it is an issue. 
Mr. Burbidge: May I be heard on the matter, your Honor? 
The Court: As opposed to a contributing cause. 
Ms. Collard: We are talking about the cause as opposed to a 
contributing cause? 
r\ r\ 
The Court: The Court has permitted counsel to ask that 
question. 
Mr. Russell: My concern is that when we get done with our 
evidence, defense counsel is going to jump up and move for a 
directed verdict because nobody has said that anything that 
someone did caused or contributed to the cause of death. We 
have that now through Mr. Owings and we will have it through 
Nurse Gillerman. To tell you the truth, I am just unsure in 
these discussion we have about whether the Court is saying, 
in order to -- because we do have the burden to prove that, 
that violations of the standard of care contributed to the 
cause. 
The Court: The record is replete at this point with 
both of our expert witnesses on that. 
Mr. Russell: I want to make sure that — 
The Court: Isn't it? 
Mr. Russell: I think so. 
The Court: The Court is not suggesting to either Counsel 
how they proceed with their case in chief or their defense 
or rebuttal. The Court is suggesting, in its own 
opinion, the cause of death is not an issue. You 
have talked all along in this case about standard of care, 
and that's the basis that these two experts you have called 
from Southern California have been designated or 
acknowledged by the Court as experts. They are dealing with 
the standard of care. And they are perfectly within 
their right as an expert witness to say if the 
standard of care in not adhered to, I would expect 
as an expert, that this is what would occur. But 
they can't say with specificity that that's in fact what did 
happen to this particular woman. 
Mr. Burbidge: May I be heard, please, your Honor? 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Burbidge: I would move for a mistrial at this time, and 
the basis of the motion is that prejudicial testimony, 
incompetent testimony, and testimony without foundation has 
come in with regard to the cause of death and the 
contributing causes of death. In the State of Utah, medical 
doctors are restricted — such issues are restricted to the 
testimony of medical doctors. They are the only authority 
to treat and to diagnose. And the diagnostic function of a 
medical doctor is the exclusive -— or the determination of 
cause of death or contributing cause of death is in the 
exclusive province, pursuant to statute and case law, of 
medical doctors. And the Court's ruling, allowing 
o n 
these unqualified experts to testify as to a 
contributing cause of death, is a prejudicial error 
that cannot be corrected through any kind of instruction to 
this jury, and I would move for a mistrial at this time, and 
request the Court give direction to counsel for the 
plaintiff that he is not to pursue that line of questioning 
with these witnesses again. 
The Court: The motion for mistrial is denied. The 
Court has previously ruled that this witness nor 
any other expert witness who was not involved in 
determination of cause of death could not so 
testify. And the Court has granted defense counsel fs 
motion to strike. Further, if there is a problem, and 
should cause of death become an issue in this case, the 
Court is of the opinion that the error made, if in fact it 
occurred, is not prejudicial, and is curable. 
Anything further? 
Mr. Russell: No, your honor, thank you. 
The Court: The Court will, on the record instruct 
counsel not to ask this witness not any other 
expert witness as to the decedent's cause of death, 
who did not participate in making that 
determination, so that there is no misunderstanding 
on that part. And the Court has stated previously, on the 
record, out of the presence of the jury, that that's the 
Court*s position, and so instructs counsel for the plaintiff 
again. 
Page 348 
Q. If the respiratory therapy department has established a 
therapeutic objective, and the therapy being provided by the 
respiratory therapists is not achieving the objective, does 
the standard of care require the therapist to do anything? 
A. The standard of care would be to do something for that 
patient, whether it be contacting a physician, contacting 
the nurse, notifying their supervisor, notifying their 
medical director. Something — if the goals are not 
attained, to try to do something for the patient. 
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., was Mrs. George's treating physician. He was 
called by appellant as a fact witness. His testimony appears in R-7 65, pp. 
351-411, and in R-767, pp. 632-636, and includes the following: 
Pages 357-359 
Q. You, as an outside physician, [with] a practice of your 
own and a family of your own, depend on the hospital 
personnel to tell you what is happening with your patient 
when you are not there, don't you? 
A. Yes. I do. 
Q. You have to depend on them for that, don't you? 
A* That's correct. 
Qc You have to depend particularly on the hospital to tell 
you about changes in your patients' condition? 
A c 1 6 3 e 
Q0 Because a change in the patient's condition may signify 
an event that you have to respond to? 
Ac Yes. 
Q. The hospital staff has the benefit of continual 
observation of the patients you have admitted? 
A. Yes. 
Qc The point being, i f you are unava i l ab le , and your 
p a t i e n t needs some a t t e n t i o n , i t i s the h o s p i t a l ' s 
r e spons ib i l i ty to see that someone i s not if ied? 
A. That 's cor rec t . 
Q. You would not expect, would you, that a pa t ien t tha t you 
admitted t o L.DoS. Hospi ta l would be l e f t alone in an 
emergency s i tua t ion? 
A. No, I would not expect t h a t . 
Pages 360-362 
Qc When you have a patient admitted to a hospital like 
L.D.S. Hospital, your role as the attending physician is 
basically to react to changes that occur in your patient's 
condition? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You can't address a problem that you are not 
aware of, can you? 
A. No, I can't. 
Pages 371-373 
Q. In the meantime, these orders dealing with what the 
nurses were to do with the respiratory status were still in 
effect, weren't they? 
A„ Yes. 
Q. You expected them to be done? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You expected when the nurse did them to write it down in 
the chart, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If the nurses weren't going to do that, you wanted them 
to talk to you about that? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. In any event, as of the 1st, the functions that the 
hospital personnel were to perform were that much more 
important because of the patient's respiratory status; is 
that correct? 
A. Yes, they were very important„ 
Page 374-375 
Q. You do expect, when respiratory therapists interact with 
your patients, that they write down what they do and what 
the effect of what they do is, so that you can get some 
information from them? 
A. Yes, they know that. 
^o 
Qe In July and August of 198 6, the respiratory therapy 
department was utilizing computer-generated records, weren't 
they? 
A. That's what I understand, yes. 
Qe No one told you about that, though, did they? 
A. I was not aware of it at the time, 
Q. Nobody from the respiratory therapy department told you, 
if you want to know what we are doing and what the result 
is, this is where you need to look? 
A. Yes, I didn't know that at the time. 
Qe So you never saw any of the notes that the respiratory 
therapy department generated, did you? 
A. No. Only subsequent to her hospitalization. 
Qe During the entire time that Betty George was in the 
hospital, you never spoke to any of the respiratory 
therapists, did you? 
A0 I didn't 
Q„ Nobody from the respiratory therapy department ever 
contacted you about anything, did they? 
A. Not that I am aware of. 
Pages 380-382 
Q. Did Nurse Schnabel inform you that the patient had 
indicated she wasn't able to get enough oxygen? 
A. I don't know who Nurse Schnabel is. 
Q0 Did any nurse inform you of that on the morning of the 
2nd? 
Ao I don't recall that specifically being mentioned. 
Qo You learned on the morning of the 2nd that Dr. Bearnson 
had determined that Mrs. George should be transferred to the 
intensive care unit? 
A. Yeso 
Q. You agreed with that, didn't you? 
-^ 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. As you say, you still were worried about the pulmonary 
embolism? 
A« That ' s correct. 
Qo It is also because nurses Terry and Schnabel felt 
inadequate to take care of the patient, didn't they? 
A. I think they felt like they would prefer that 
she not be on the gynecology floor, and there was 
no question there was some nursing input into that. 
I agreed with that. If a nurse would suggest to me that she 
didn't feel she could adequately take care of a patient, I 
think a step would be done to correct that. 
Q. That was another good reason to send the patient to ICU, 
wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Pages 385-391 
Qo When you left, though, no one told you that Mrs. 
George's transfers to the ICU were going to be handled by 
volunteers with no medical training, did they? 
A. No, 
Q. When you left the hospital on Saturday morning, no one 
told you that there was going to follow a four-hour period 
in which no information about the patient's condition would 
be entered in the record, did they? 
A. No. 
Q. And you have subsequently reviewed the record, haven't 
you? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Other than the fact that Mrs. George did not 
have a pulmonary embolism, as shown by the 
angiogram, you don't know what her condition was 
from 10:20 to 2:20, do you? 
A. No. 
Q. When you made that call, you believed that your patient 
went to the ICU after the test, didn't you? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And was admitted? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you later get a call at your home, from a nurse in 
L.D.S. Hospital? 
A. Yes, 
Q. Was that approximately 3:00? 
A. 3s00 or 3s30, but right around that time. 
Q. That was Nurse Terry, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Nurse Terry told you that the hospital had not had a bed 
available in the ICU for your patient, didn't she? 
A8 Yes, she did. 
Q. So she told you that Betty was back on her floor? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Go So you asked Nurse Terry haw Betty was doing, didn't 
you? 
Ac Yes, I did. 
Qc And Nurse Terry told you that Betty looked fine, didn't 
shec 
A. She said about the same. She was still breathing 
rapidly, but she looked about the same. 
Q. She conveyed the impression to you that Betty 
was in no worse condition than the last time you 
had s^Bn her? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Nurse Terry didn't tell you that your patient 
was very distant, did she? 
A. No 
Q. Nurse Terry didn't tell you that your patient 
was responsive but incoherent at times, did she? 
A. No. 
Q. Those are changes in Betty's condition that you 
expect to be told about by the nurses, aren't they? 
A. Yes. 
Q, Those are the kind of changes that you have to 
be told about by the nurses, in order to make 
decisions? 
Mr. Burbidge: Argumentative, your Honor, asked and 
answered. 
The Court: Overruled. 
A. Yes, the nurses will inform a physician. I am perhaps 
out of line in suggesting that the nurses will contact a 
physician, but it might not necessarily be the attending 
physician, because of the nature of a teaching hospital at 
LDS Hospital. They will go through the house staff first 
with many things, and then the house staff will then contact 
me, in turn. Or if they are not able to reach the house 
staff, they may call me directly. 
Q. Nurse Terry had you on the phone? 
A. But she had me on the phone. 
Q. Here is a change in your patient's condition 
that she didn't tell you about, right? 
A. No, I was reassured that she was doing the 
same * 
Q. Did Nurse Terry inform you that your patient was 
exhausted? 
A. I don't believe so. 
Q. For a patient who has had preexisting respiratory 
problems, a change in mental status can indicate that oxygen 
is starting not to be delivered to the vital organs; is that 
correct? 
Ac Yes, it can mean that. 
Q. You later heard from the resident Carol Adams? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She called you at home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She gave you the same kind of information that Nurse 
Terry did, didn't she? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She didn't say anything about your patient's change of 
mental status, either did she? 
A. No, she didn't. 
Q. Would you look at page «— we are still on page 169 of 
the medical record. Dr. Adams called you at what time? 
A. I believe about 4:00. 
Q. Had you received any calls from other nurses? 
A. No. 
Q. Did Dr. Adams inform you that at 3:30 your patient was 
lying supine in bed, disoriented? 
Ac No. 
Qc Did she inform you that Betty was responding "yeah" to 
every question, and then only after vigorous rousing? 
Ac No. 
Qe Did Dr. Adams tell you that your patient's blood 
pressure ~ she couldn't hear your patient's blood pressure? 
A. No. 
Qc That's all important information, isn't it? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. That indicates the possibility that a very serious 
complication is occurring with you patient, doesn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. They had you on the line, and they didn't say anything 
about it, did they? 
A. No, not about her mental status. 
Q. They did tell you, though, that your patient had an 
increased temperature? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that made you think Mrs. George was starting to have 
an infection? 
A. Yes. 
Pages 393-395 
Q. Would you look at page 118 of the record. Excuse me. 
That's a mistake, Dr. Lloyd. Look at page 32. 
A. I have it. 
Q. That page contains a progress note that Dr. Adams wrote, 
time listed is 5:00 p.m., isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Subsequent to Mrs. George's arrest, you appended a note 
to it, didn't you? 
Ac Yes, I did. 
Q. That one note that you wrote says, "Suspect urinary 
tract infection," doesn't it? 
Ac Versus cuff cellulitis. 
Q. You suspected a urinary tract infection? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you suspect to the the source of the urinary 
tract infection. 
A. In most postoperative patients, it is secondary to 
catheterization. I suspected that was a possible source of 
her infection. 
Q. Mrs. George had had such a catheter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On the 29th of July? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Four days ago? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Didn't L.D.S. Hospital at the time when the catheter was 
removed — weren't they supposed to do a culture on that and 
put it in the record? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That happened with everybody, didn't it? 
A. I believe everybody was being — was part of a culture 
study that the infectious disease department was doing at 
that time. 
Q0 The purpose of that culture is to determine whether or 
not an infection exists or might develop? 
A. Correct. 
Q. LeDcS. Hospital never did that in Mrs. George's case, 
did they? 
A. I couldn't find a record on that. 
Q. If your suspicion about the source of this 
infection was correct, then you didn't get the 
information that would have told you about that, 
true? 
A o That's correct. 
Q. It was the hospital's responsibility to do that? 
A. The infectious disease department was the one that was 
doing the study, I believe. 
Pages 395-397 
Q. Did you learn from Nurse Terry, when you spoke with her, 
that the hospital was going to provide a one-on-one, special 
duty nurse for your patient? 
A» Yes. She said they were going to try to arrange 
for a one-on-one, private nurse, so that she could 
get continual nursing care. 
Q. The purpose for providing that nurse was because the 
hospital hadn't had space available in the ICU, wasn't it? 
A. I believe it was considered to be the next best thing. 
Q* With that information, you assumed that your 
patient was going to be watched at all times, 
didn't you? 
A. Yes, I did* 
Q. And that any change in your patient's condition 
would be immediately relayed to you or someone 
appropriate, who could deal with it? 
A. Or someone appropriate, correct. 
Q. But you had had contact with the hospital nurses by that 
time? 
Ae Yes, 
Q. They knew where you were and they knew how to get a hold 
of you? 
Ac Uh-huh (Affirmative). 
Q. Yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever hear from Nurse Soraghan, the one-
on-one, special duty nurse, at all? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. At any time on the afternoon of August 2 did you get a 
message from anyone at the hospital, conveying to you that 
there was a sense of emergency, or that something needed to 
be done quickly? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. You relied on L.D.S. Hospital to supply a competent 
well-trained and experienced nurse for your patient in this 
situation, didn't you? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Pages 399-400 
Q. . . .what I am trying to get at is that no one said 
anything to you, no nurse said anything to you, that made 
you think anything other than your patient was going to get 
better; is that right? 
A. Yes, I think that's righto 
Q. Did any nurses call you and tell you that at 
5:00 your patient's respirations had slowed to 
blank? 
A. No. 
Q- If you have a patient whose pulse rate is in the 150 
range for 24 hours, and whose respiratory rate is in the 
range of 28 to 32 for 24 hours, and then all of the sudden 
their respiration slows to blank, would that indicate that 
the patient has become so tired that they can't maintain 
that respiratory rate anymore? 
A. That may be one reason. 
Q. That would be a reason you would want to consider, 
wouldn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Because if that's happening, that means your 
patient might stop breathing, doesn't it? 
h. That's correct. But the respiration slowing 
down may also be an indication she is improving. 
Q Granted. But you didn't get the information — 
I,., But I didn't get the information. 
Q< And you know now that your patient was not 
improving? 
Jko She was not improving. 
Pages 401-407 
Q This Note, Dr. Lloyd, at 3:30 in the afternoon 
on August 2, "Patient lying supine in bed, 
disoriented, responds 'yeah1 to every question, and 
only after vigorous rousing," that is a substantial 
change in her mental status, isn't it? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And that — this is on page 118, I think. 
A. Okay. 
Q. And that is a pretty good indication that Mr. George's 
vital organs, including her brain, are being deprived of 
oxygen, aren't they? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, your Honor, form of the question. 
The Court: If you know. Overruled., 
A. Certainly that's a possible explanation. 
dl 
Q. If you were informed of that information, that 
explanation would have occurred, itself, to you, wouldn't 
it? 
A. Well, that thought plus a drug-induced narcosis plus 
other things I would have considered. 
Qe That kind of change in mental status indicates 
the need for some action to be taken, doesn't it? 
X. Yes, it does. 
Q. You were not given the opportunity to take any 
action for Mrs. George, were you? 
A. I didn't know she was unresponsive. 
Qe Based on what you can see in the record, in your review 
after the fact, you can see that your patient was not longer 
an uncomplicated post-op patient, can't you? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You expected Nurse Soraghan to be with your patient all 
the time? 
A. Is she the one-on-one nurse? 
Q* Yes 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. If she wasn't there, that she was going to make sure 
someone else was there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You received a call from Dr. Adams at you home sometime 
shortly after 7;00, informing that your patient had stopped 
breathing and suffered an arrest, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you went to the hospital? 
A. Yes. 
Qc And you were involved with the remaining course of Mrs. 
George's care, weren't you? 
A. Yes. 
yio 
QD As her attending physician, you attempted to determine 
what had happened, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q6 It was your conclusion that Mrs. George arrested because 
of hypoxia, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Hypoxia means lack of oxygen, doesn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It is your opinion, as a physician, who admits 
patients to L.D.S. Hospital very often, that nurses 
who were taking care of your patient on August 2, 
should have told you the information that we have 
gone over, isn't? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And their failure to do that precluded you from taking 
action on behalf of your patient, didn't it? 
A. I believe they were informing Dr. Adams, which is the 
approach that you would expect to see with the nurses 
interacting with a patient who is sick and experiencing 
complications, that they would go through the resident 
physician, who at that time was Dr. Adams. So I assume that 
they were informing someone. But I have testified as how 
much I was informed. 
Q. Dr. Adams called you, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She wanted your input, too? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She was worried about the patient, too, wasn't she? 
A. Yes 
Q. She didn't tell you this information either, did she? 
A. Not about her mental status change, no. 
Q. You found out, after Mrs George's arrest, that 
Dr. Adams hadn't seen her for the last several 
hours prior to her arrest, didn't you? 
A *3 
A. Yes. 
Q. That indicates, or is an indication that the nurses 
didn't call Dr. Adams in those last two hours, doesn't it? 
A. I don't recall hearing that specifically, but I saw 
nothing in the note, either the nurse's notes or Dr. Adams' 
notes, to suggest that she had been in to see her between 
5:00 and 7:00. 
Q. Based on your medical training and experience, 
education and knowledge, if a patient is deprived 
of oxygen to their brain, a serious complication 
can occur in a matter of minutes, can't it? 
A. Yes, it can. 
Pages 409-410 
Q. Dr. Lloyd if you have a patient who is hypoxic, to the 
point where the hypoxia might affect their brain and cause 
them to have an arrest and coma and die, you treat the 
hypoxia, and then worry about what is causing it, don't you? 
A. I don't think there is a sequence you can put on that. 
I think you treat the hypoxia and the — as to whatever is 
precipitating the hypoxia. I think you have to treat 
everything. And I don't think you can give a sequence. 
Obviously, if you suspect a patient is hypoxic, the first 
thing you do is initiate oxygen therapy. And then you 
continue to resolve the thing that's causing her hypoxia. 
Q. On the afternoon of the 2nd, you didn't know 
Mrs. George was hypoxic to the extent that the 
records show, did you? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. You didn't know what was the underlying 
problem, did you? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Had you known the extent of the hypoxia that 
was occurring, you would have initiated measures to 
make sure that she was adequately ventilated, or 
try to, so she didn't stop breathing, wouldn't you 
have? 
A. In addition to other things, yes, I would. 
Q, Sure When you had the patient breathing, then 
you would go in and find out what was causing the 
problem, wouldn't you? 
A. Yes, 
Pages 635-636 
Q0 [Do] you remember your prior testimony about the nurses1 
notes that I held up for the jury? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That you were not aware of? 
Ao Right. 
Q. You would expect the nurses in L.D.S. Hospital 
to be able to recognize when a p a t i e n t i s so 
hypoxic t h a t major organs may be a d v e r s e l y 
a f fec ted , wouldn't you? 
ho Yes, I think so. 
Qc That's all you expect. You don't expect them to be able 
to tell you why, do you? 
A. No. 
Qo You don't care if they know why, do you? You 
just care that they tell you, right? 
A. Yes. You need their input. 
Qo On the afternoon of August 2nd, you didn't get any 
information from any nurse, any respiratory therapist, or 
the second-year resident Carol Adams, that immediate action 
was necessary for your patient, did you? 
A. Not other than what I have testified. 
Q. You heard about her temperature? 
Ac Yes. 
Q. And you thought maybe an infection [was] beginning? 
A. Yes. 
Q„ You were not given any information that caused you to 
become alarmed, were you? 
A* No. 
Q. You ordered some tests,- and you planned on going in 
later that evening to see the patient, didn't you? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You expected when you got there that the patient would 
be there and you would be able to evaluate her? 
A. That's correct. 
A c 
JOHN TROWBRIDGE, M.D., testified as an expert for LDS Hospital. His 
testimony is set forth at R-766 at pp. 518-547. It includes the following: 
Pages 519-520 
A. I generally provide care for very ill individuals with 
extremely complex medical disorders. I spend a great 
deal of time in the intensive care unit, with very 
ill patients in multiple settings. And I am usually 
called in response to a problem, an unclear case, to assist 
in the diagnosis and management of infectious process. 
Pages 521 
Qe They [physicians] receive information from respiratory 
therapists, nurses, other health care team members, and then 
make their diagnosis based on the information they receive, 
correct? 
A. And the patient, correct. 
Pages 540-541 
Qc If she had been given some kind of mechanical therapy 
with increased oxygen levels on the afternoon of the 2nd, 
198 6, do you have an opinion, based on reasonable medical 
probability, as to whether or not the cardiac arrest would 
still have occurred? 
A. My opinion is that this data that we have reviewed and 
that I have described in terms of — suggests such a 
profound involvement, I believe she had a condition called 
acute respiratory distress syndrome, that at that time 
probably and intervention would no longer been successful. 
Pages 544-547 
Qc In fact, on the day of her arrest, all of these things 
[signs and symptoms of sepsis] according to the doctors, 
were negative? 
A. Right. 
Qc You said that you reviewed the testimony of Dr. Lloyd in 
preparing to give your opinion? 
A. Correct. 
Qc Did you see where Dr. Lloyd stated that after the arrest 
he went and examined Mrs. George for the presence of an 
infection? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he found there was very l i t t l e ev idence of an 
i n f e c t i o n when he looked at her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it was Dr. Lloyd's opinion, who was in the hospital 
examining the patient, that she didn't have an infection 
that was fulminant or snowballing or however you would like 
to describe it, until after the arrest? That was his 
opinion, wasn't it? 
A. That is the problem of clinical medicine. That is his 
opinion. 
Q. He was there, and he looked? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. You say that you have a lot of practice in dealing with 
complex cases, very sick patients, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. Do you have a private practice? 
A. Yes, 
Q. Do you admit patients to hospitals? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you have a patient in the hospital, do you rely on 
the hospital staff to tell you things about your patient? 
A. Certain things. 
Q. Important things? 
A. I am not sure what you are getting at, but of course. 
Q. Changes in the patient's condition? 
A. Sure. 
Q. If you had a patient in the hospital, and the hospital 
had assigned a one-to-one special duty nurse to your 
patient, and the one-to-one, special duty nurse was standing 
right in front of your patient, and she was incoherent, 
semicomatose, would you expect to be told about that? 
A. Well, about ha l f of my p a t i e n t s are on 
v e n t i l a t o r s in the ICU, incoherent , semicomatose. 
I t depends on in the context i f there was a sudden 
change . 
Qc Le t ' s assume she wasn't l i ke tha t before. You would 
expect t o be t o l d about t h a t ? 
A. Yes 
Q. So you could do something about it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you have a patient who is in severe respiratory 
distress, gasping for air, and you don't know what the 
problem is, do you provide ventilatory support first, and 
look for the problem, or do you look for the problem first, 
and take the chance that the patient stops breathing? 
A* It is not that simple. As I said, the reason it takes 
ten years to figure out all this is sometimes you would and 
sometimes you wouldn't. It depends on one's judgment as to 
whether the person needs ventilatory support or not. That 
can be frequently a very difficult call, because you have to 
look into the future. And obviously she got put on a 
ventilator, you know, after it became very evident 
that she needed one. 
Q. After she stopped breathing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You would like to be in a position to make that 
call before a patient stops breathing? 
A. And it is frequently difficult, but you 
certainly do. 
From this testimony, it is evident that sepsis, assuming it existed in 
the patient on August 2, 1986 is treatable; that a physician requires prompt 
notification of relevant signs and symptoms in order to be able to treat it; 
and the necessary measures for Mrs. George were not taken until too late, 
i.e., after she stopped breathing. 
Dr. Trowbridge's test imony c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s how the h o s p i t a l ' s 
negligence deprived Mrs. George of an opportunity to be saved by appropriate 
diagnosis and t reatment . 
TRAGI LEE HUBER, is a daughter of Betty George. She was personally 
present in LDS Hospital on August 2, 1986. Her testimony appears in R-766 at 
pp. 548-555, and includes the following: 
Pages 553-555 
Q. Did you go with your mother to the eighth floor [on 8-2-
86]? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you have a conversation with any of the nurses there 
about your mother when you got back to the floor? 
A. There was awhile there before I had any kind of 
conversationc We were standing in the hall, waiting to get 
her into the room. When she had finally gotten into the 
room, there was a lady there. I don't know what her name 
was. But she was pretty. I was talking to her, and Dad was 
there, and she said that she was very nervous to have 
somebody that sick on the eighth floor, that they 
didn't think they could handle having a lady that 
sick on the eighth floor. She really should be in 
ICUo 
Q. Did you meet the nurse that was assigned by the hospital 
to be the one-on-one, special duty nurse to be with your 
mom? 
A. Yes, I met her. She was very young, and, I hate to say 
it, kind of flaky. She didn't seem very sure of herself. 
She went in there, and pulled up her pillow a little bit. 
fluffed up her pillow . . . That's all I ever seen her do. 
Q. What period of time were you in your mother's room on 
eight east on the afternoon of the 2nd? 
A. I was there up until about 6:15, something like that. 
Q. The same time as your dad? 
A. Yes. We had kind of stood there and tried to con 
ourselves into maybe she might be breathing a little bit 
better, trying to think of an excuse to go home, because we 
were both very tired. I wanted Dad to eat something. He 
was very upset, and hadn't eaten for a long time. 
K1 
Q„ From the time Nurse Soraghan, the one-on-one nurse took 
over, did you see Dr. Adams after that? 
A. I don't recall seeing Dr. Adams at all. 
MICHAEL LAHEY, MeD., was an internal medicine specialist called in by 
Dr. Lloyd to consult with respect to Mrs. George's respiratory complications. 
Dr. Lahey was called as a witness by LDS Hospital. His testimony appears in 
R-767 at pp. 566-632, and contains the following: 
Pages 570-71 
By Mr. Burbidge - Q. The question is, does a nurse 
diagnose a patient's condition, in your experience? 
A. The better ones. 
Q0 Does a respiratory therapist diagnose a patient's 
condition? 
A„ Cane 
Q, In the normal course of your care and treatment, do 
these nurses and respiratory therapists provide input to a 
physician, who, in turn, makes the diagnosis, makes the 
differential diagnosis? 
Ac Yes. I think that would be a better way of stating the 
processc The respiratory therapist might, for example, come 
to me and say - These are the facts, and I think this is 
what the diagnosis is. Really, it is up to the 
physician to put that together and come to the diagnosis. 
Q. The role of a nurse, providing information to a 
physician, as a member of the medical care team, and then 
what does the physician do with that information? 
A. Puts the facts together, and come to a diagnosis. 
Q. Is that what you were doing in this particular case with 
Betty George? 
Ac Yes, it is. 
Pages 591-593 
Q. In what condition did you find her in the intensive care 
unit, when you completed your examination? 
A. Again, very much as I had found her the previous 
evening. 
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Q. Was there anything else about her condition that you 
felt warranted continued care and treatment in the intensive 
are unit? 
A. No, there was note 
Pages 595-596 
Q. What is a mechanical ventilator? 
A. ... It is a very effective means of providing oxygen. 
Q. Was a mechanical ventilator indicated for Mrs. George 
[when you saw her in the ICU]? 
A. Not at all. 
Q. What did you find [the next time you saw Mrs. George]? 
A. Indeed, that she had had a cardiac arrest, and was 
clearly septic at that time, was requiring an awful lot of 
medication to maintain her blood pressure. A cardiologist 
was involved in assisting in administrating — administering 
those drugs. She was at that time being ventilated 
by a machine totally. 
Page 606-607 
A. c . . But as a physician, I assessed her condition, and 
said she does not need this intensive care unit. It was not 
simply because I thought heparin wasn't routinely used up 
there. I just did not think she needed it, either. I made 
some assumptions, yes, about what they did and did not do, 
up on the gynecologic floor. But at the same time, I was 
also responsible for assessing a patient. And if my 
assessment was that she was ill and she needed to 
be in the intensive care unit, or if anybody else, 
any of the nurses or Dr. Adams or any of the others 
felt that she needed to be there, they would have 
spoken up. 
Q. Since you brought up the subject — I appreciate the 
fact that you did «— that's the way you operate in a 
hospital, isn't it? You assume the people involved 
in the patient' s care are going to let you know if 
they think you do something wrong? 
A. Yes, I do assume that. 
Q. If they think the patient needs something you haven't 
ordered? 
A. Yes. I appreciate that. I try not to intimidate 
people. I think I have good communication with various 
people around the hospital. They will let me know. 
Q. If the patient needs some help? 
A. You bet. 
Q. You have to rely on the hospital staff to do 
that, don't you? 
A. Yes. 
Pages 609-611 
Q. When you saw Mrs, George in the ZCU, she looked 
all right to you, didn't she? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She appeared to be nice and stable? 
h0 Yes, I believe I used those words. 
Qo That her condition was unchanging? 
A. With one exception, as I pointed out in the deposition. 
She now had a temperature. But other than that, unchanging 
is a stable «— is a fair assessment. 
Qc No sign that Mrs. George was in shock, was 
there? 
Ac Not that I was aware of, no. 
Q. You didn't even consider her at the time to be 
very sick, did you? 
A, No, I did not. 
Qo Not sick enough, as you have said, to be admitted to the 
ICU? 
A0 Precisely. 
Q. At that time she certainly wasn't septic, was she? 
A. Different people use that term different ways. How 
would you define your term? 
Q. From your evaluation of her, you did not 
conclude at the time that she was septic, did you? 
RR 
A. Septic shock, no. Septic in the sense of having 
infection — some people will say that that wound looks 
septic, because it is a little bit red. some people will 
say —> they will use the word "septic" when a person has a 
temperature. So that's why I asked you to define your term. 
I usually use the term when I mean the bacteria is 
in the bloodstream and the person's blood pressure 
is low. In that sense, no, she was not septic at 
that time. 
Q. Let's put it this way. You didn't think, when you saw 
Mrs. George, that she was in any kind of critical condition 
from which she might die later on that day? 
A. By no means. Had Z thought that, I would have 
left her in the intensive care unit, and formulated 
some plan about how we were going to use that 
intensive care unit. 
Q. You are the type of doctor, aren't you, that if 
you have a suspicion about a change in patient's 
condition, you want to go right in and try to find 
out what that is? 
A. I believe so. 
Pages 613-615 
Qc ««. You thought she needed to be closely observed, didn't 
you? 
A. Yes, in that context. 
Q. By the nurses? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Because of her vital signs and her respiratory rate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the time you saw her, Mrs. George's 
respiratory status appeared stable to you? 
A. Indeed, it did. 
Q. If that changed at all, you wanted to know 
about it immediately, didn't you. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Because you know that if a patient is using too 
much of their energy just to breathe, that you may 
have to go in and assist the patient to breathe? 
C £ 
A Yes. 
Q. Correct? 
A. Yes, 
Q. If it seems to you, if you got a call from a nurse say, 
that a patient was working too hard to breathe, if if seemed 
to you she was becoming too tired from that effort, you 
would then rush in and use a ventilator to support her 
respiratory system, wouldn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. A patient will not stop breathing if they are on a 
ventilator, will they? 
Ac That's the purpose of putting them on a ventilator. It 
breathes for them, whether they do or not. 
Q. At the time, when you saw Mrs. George in the ICU unit, 
if you had thought that she was septic then, you would have 
made some appropriate orders and done something about it 
wouldn't you? 
A, Precisely. 
Qc You would have kept her in ICU, wouldn't you? 
Ac Among many other things, yes. 
Q. Among many other things designed to take care of that 
situation? 
A» Right. You don't just put somebody in the ICU. You use 
that unit to do something, to treat somebody whose blood 
pressure is low, or some such thing. 
Q. That sort of therapy? 
A. Right. 
Q. You would do whatever you thought was necessary 
to make sure that that sepsis didn't proceed, say, 
to an arrest, wouldn't you? 
A. Precisely. 
Qe From the time that Mrs. George was sent back to 
the eighth floor, until the time that she arrested, 
you nearer received a call from any of the nurses 
down there, did you? 
A. I received no calls. 
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Pages 619-622 
Qc You were involved with her care, weren't you? 
A. Yes. 
Qe And the nurses knew that, didn't they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they didn't call you? 
A. But they wouldn't usually. You are right. No they did 
not call me. 
Qe Would you agree that Mrs. George was having 
some respiratory complications on the afternoon of 
the 2nd? 
A. Indeed, she was. 
Q. Would you agree with me that a change in 
mentation, confusion, disorientation, is a sign, a 
possible sign that oxygen is being deprived to the 
brain? 
A. Yes it is. 
Q. And that is the kind of change, for a patient 
with a respiratory difficulty, that you would 
expect a nurse to convey to someone? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have Exhibit 1 there is front of you, Dr. Lahey, 
the hospital record? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you refer to page 169. Do you have that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. I have a blow-up of that, part of that page. Do you see 
the nurse's note at 2:20 in the afternoon, right after Mrs. 
George got back, describing her as very distant and 
incoherent at times? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. That's the kind of change that we are talking about, 
isn't it? 
A. Yes, I believe it is. 
Q. That13 the kind of change which, if made known 
to you, you would take action on, wouldn't you? 
Jk. Yes, 
Q. You would want to know what was causing that 
potentially dangerous change in condition, wouldn't 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Qc If, Dr. Lahey, you had been made aware of this change in 
MrSo George's condition that you have just discussed — if 
you had ~ you would have had four and a half hours prior to 
the time she arrested to investigate the reason for that 
change, wouldn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Qc The last time you saw Mrs. George, the thought 
did not occur to you that she might be brain dead 
five hours later, did it? 
Ac Didn't occur to me in the least. 
Q If you had suspected that she had a respiratory 
condition or an infectious condition that might 
result in that, you would have navaz let her out of 
ICU, should you have? 
A. I shouldn't be practicing medicine right now. 
Pages 623-630 
Q, You have already testified on direct that that oxygen 
level of 50-51 is low, below normal? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. When you saw Mrs. George in the ICU, you weren't 
thinking that that was going to get worse, were you? 
A. No, I had no reason to believe that it was going to get 
worse. 
Q. Because you know that if a P02 drops below 50, that a 
patient can have permanent damage to their heart, brain or 
lungs? 
A. If it stays below 50 for very long, indeed. 
SQ 
Q. So a patient who has a base line of 50-51, it 
is particularly important for changes in her 
condition to be communicated? 
A. That's a fair statement. 
Q. There has been a lot of talk about the ability of nurses 
to diagnose, whatever that word means. It is true, isn't 
it, that you wouldn't expect a nurse to be able to look at a 
patient like Mrs. George, when you saw her in the intensive 
care unit, and be able to rattle off a differential 
diagnosis, including infection, atelectasis, poor lung 
volumes and all that kind of thing? 
A. I would not expect her to be capable of doing that — 
her or him. 
Q. You do, though, expect the nurses to be able to 
look at a patient, and report what they see? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And whether or not a nurse knows what the 
particular cause of a change in a patient's 
condition might be, you still expect her to report 
those changes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Because that' s the only way that you can figure 
out what's causing the change, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And i f there i s a s i g n i f i c a n t change in a 
p a t i e n t ' s condi t ion , and i t i s not reported to a 
p h y s i c i a n , then the phys i c ian might not ge t a 
chance to diagnose and t r e a t , correct? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. Did anyone call you at 3:30 in the afternoon of 
August 2, and inform you about Mrs. George's vital 
signs? 
A. No, they did not. 
Q. Did anyone call you at about between 3:00 and 3:30 on 
the afternoon of August 2, and tell you that the nurses had 
been unable to get Mrs. George to bleed for a glucose test? 
Ac No, they did not. It would surprise me if they had. I 
would not have been the appropriate person to say such 
things to. 
Q0 I understand your testimony about that. So you didn't 
know, from any source, that at 3:30 in the afternoon of the 
2nd, that Mrs. Georgefs blood pressure was 110 over question 
mark? 
A. No, I did not know that. I found that out later on. But 
I did not know at the time. 
Q. You have stressed here several times the importance of 
the blood pressure in making the diagnosis of sepsis, 
havenst you? 
Ac Yes. 
Q And t h i s blood pressure would be a very 
important p iece of information for a physic ian to 
have in order to make that diagnosis , wouldn't i t ? 
Ac Y e s . 
Q. That was a very critical piece of information? 
A. But that's not when she arrested. Zt is a very 
critical piece of information. 
Q She didn't arrest for three and a half more 
hours, did she? 
A o That *s correct. 
Q. If you had been aware of this blood pressure at 
3:30, you would have done what was necessary to 
find out why her blood pressure was in that 
condition, wouldn't you have? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, calls for speculation. 
The Court: Overruled. Do you understand the question? 
The Witness: Yes, I do. 
The Court: You may answer. 
A. Again, the primary change of command would have gone 
from the nurse that detected that, to the house officer, the 
resident who was on call for the gynecologist, and then 
probably to the gynecologist. And if they saw a need to 
bring me in, they would have promptly. So it would be 
unlikely for them to have informed me of that. 
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Q. I r e a l i z e t h a t ' s your p o s i t i o n . But i t i s not the 
ques t i on . I am just asking you, as a physician, i f 
you had been g iven t h i s c r i t i c a l p i e c e of 
information, that would have been something that 
would have motivated you to act? 
A. Yes, I am sorry . I misunderstood the quest ion. 
Q. This i s the kind of thing tha t you previously t e s t i f i e d 
would induce you to keep the pa t i en t in ICU, i f you were 
aware of i t ? 
Ac Yes. 
Q. In your review of this case, your detailed review, and 
your involvement in it, you don't know what happened to Mrs. 
George for that next three and a half hours, do you? 
A. I have read through the notes, and I now know what the 
nurses say, what the physicians have said. So, sure, I have 
read it since. At the time that they called me, they told 
me what had happened. But at 3:30 that afternoon, when they 
found that, I didn't know that piece of information. I 
guess I really didn't understand the question. 
Qo You knew she arrested at 7:00? 
A, Yes. They called me shortly after. 
Q. You didn't have any information about the 
intervening three and a half hour period, form 3:30 
to 7:00, about Mrs. George's condition. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. There has been some discussion about blood gases. I 
would like you to refer to them. specifically, page 80 of 
Exhibit 1. Are you with me? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The blood gas at the very bottom of that page was taken 
at 7:12 p.m.? 
A. Yes. 
Q. From the record and from the testimony, we know that 
that was during Mrs. George's code. 
A. Exactly. 
Q. The information from that blood gas reveals a 
drastic change in her condition from the last time 
you saw her, doesn't it? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. It indicates a level of oxygen, 40, which is below the 
point which you have testified can cause permanent damage to 
the heart and the brain? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As between the time that you last saw Mrs. George and 
7:12, during code, you can't say when that change took 
place, can you? 
A. No, I cannot. 
Qe You know that although Mrs. George did not die at 7:00, 
that when the code was finished she was brain dead? 
A. That's what most of us thought at the time. 
Q. And the fact that she had suffered brain death made it 
inevitable that she was going to die in the near future, 
didn't it? 
Ac Yes. 
Q. You have been practicing for how long Dr. Lahey? 
Ac I finished my residency in 1981. Eight years ~ seven 
years. 
Q0 During that period of time, you have had patients who 
have been infected or septic before, haven't you? 
Ac Yes, many* 
Qo Several of them? 
Ac Many. 
Q. You have had patients who have been in much 
worse condition than Mrs. George was in last time 
you saw her, haven't you? 
A. Many. 
Q. And they didn't all die, did they? 
Ac God forbid. No, they did not. 
Qo The vast majority of them didn't, did they? 
Ac Exactly. 
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Q. There is not one of those patients that you ever gave up 
on, is there? 
A. That's right. 
Page 631 
Q. With regard to the bLood pressure at 3:30 in the 
afternoon, you would expect the resident to be aware of that 
blood pressure, wouldn't you? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. And then to take appropriate action based on that 
knowledge? 
A. Yes, that's exactly what I would assume. 
£A 
LEWIS WEINSTEIN, M.D., testified as an expert on behalf of LDS hospital. 
His testimony is set forth at R-767 at pp. 637-660. His testimony includes 
the following: 
Page 639 [Questions by Mr. Burbidge] 
Q. Have you treated patients with sepsis? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Pages 642-644 
Q. Mrs. George then, during the afternoon of August 2, 
198 6, experienced a change in her condition, and ultimately 
a cardiac arrest; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q0 Based on you review of the record, your background and 
experience in the area of infections in gynecological 
patients, do you have an opinion as to what caused that 
arrest? 
Ae I believe I do* 
Q„ What is that opinion? 
A. I think it was related to severe, overwhelming, 
bacterial sepsis. 
Q. On the afternoon of August 2, 198 6, do you have an 
opinion as to whether or not mechanical ventilation, if 
instituted in the ICU unit or upon return to the eighth 
floor that afternoon, would have altered the course that led 
to the cardiac arrest? 
Mr. Russell: Objection, foundation. Could we approach the 
bench, your Honor? 
The Court: You may. 
(An off-the-record discussion at the bench) 
The Court: Read back the last question, please. 
(The pending question was read back by the court reporter) 
The Court: Do you understand the question? 
The Witness: Yes, sir 
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The Court: You may answer it. 
A. Yes, I do have an opinion. 
Q. What is that opinion? 
Ac That use of mechanical ventilation would not have made 
any difference in the outcome to Mrs. George. 
Q. Would the use of incentive spirometry have altered the 
outcome? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Would the use of IPPB therapy have altered the outcome? 
Ac No, sir. 
Q. Would the institution of turning, coughing and deep 
breathing with Mrs. George during that period of time have 
altered the outcome? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Why? 
A. This patient, because of the profound bacterial sepsis 
that she had, was at a point that there was no therapy that 
would have helped her. 
Q. Explain, if you will, the reason for that opinion. 
A. When a patient like this experiences such profound 
bacterial shock, which affects all organs in the body, the 
use of ventilation or the use of any of the different tests 
that were mentioned would not make any of difference, 
because one cannot alter the course. The course is 
essentially set at that particular time. 
Q. Would an increase in oxygen during that period of time, 
from three liters to six liters, on the afternoon of August 
2, 1986, have altered the course of her illness? 
A. No, sir. 
Pages 645-647 [Questions by Mr. Russell] 
Q. Do you treat patients with infections? 
A. Yes, sir, I do. 
Q. Do you treat patients with sepsis? 
CC 
Ac Yes, sir, I do. 
Q. Are you aggressive, when you have a septic patient, in 
their treatment? 
A. I am sorry, I don't know what you mean. 
Q. Do you try to take care of the problem? 
A. I try to take care of the problem as I see it, 
yes, sir. 
Q0 You try to get rid of the sepsis, or whatever is causing 
it? 
A. It is very difficult to get rid of it. Sometimes it 
requires extensive surgery. Z try to offer the best 
treatment I can. 
Qc The patients that you have with infection or sepsis 
don't all die, do they? 
Ao Most patients I have do not have bacterial shock. It is 
an extremely uncommon condition. 
Q. All your patients who have infection or sepsis don't all 
die, do they? 
A6 Those patients don't have bacterial shock, and very few 
of them ever die* 
Q, If you have a patient with bacterial sepsis, do 
you simply not treat them, because they are doomed? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. B a c t e r i a l s e p s i s d o e s n ' t happen 
instantaneously , does i t ? 
A. No, s i r . 
Pages 651-655 
Q. Isn't it true Dr. Weinstein, that in patients 
who become septic, particularly a serious sepsis 
condition like bacterial sepsis, the sooner that 
treatment cam be provided, the better the chance 
that the patient will recover? 
A. That is true. That is correct. 
Q. If you, as a treating physician, had 
information that would lead you to believe that 
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your patient was septic, and you didn't know it 
before, and that it was having an adverse effect on 
her vital organs, like her brain, you could do 
several things to treat that condition, couldn't 
you? 
A. I could try, but it might not work. 
Qc ICU has specialized personnel, qualified personnel, and 
special equipment to deal with serious complications that a 
patient has, doesn't it? 
A. It does. That is correct. 
Q. For a patient who is septic, for a patient who is having 
changes in mentation, due to anoxia to the brain, you can 
provide ventilatory support, can't you? 
A. If I felt it was necessary, that is correct. 
Q. It is important, when a patient is severely infected or 
septic, to maintain the circulating volume in their 
bloodstream, isn't it? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And you would do that, too, wouldn't you? 
A, That is one of the things, yes, sir. 
Q. And would you start a patient on antibiotics, or some 
appropriate medication to attack the bacteria, wouldn't you? 
A. I might. It depends on if I knew where the source was. 
But I would add antibiotics sometime in the early course, 
yes. 
Qc If the infection was particularly severe, you can 
actually go in and operate on the patient, and remove 
infected tissue. Or if you know what the source of the 
sepsis is, you can take care of that surgically, or try to? 
A. One has to be very careful, because it is very easy to 
kill a patient by doing that. That is a very difficult 
decision to make. If you are sure, that's exactly the right 
thing to do. If you are wrong, that will be the terminal 
event. 
Q. You do treat patients? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Do you admit patients to the hospital? 
Ao Yes, I do. 
Q. Do you rely on hospital staff to take care of your 
patients when you are not there, and report things to you? 
A. It is a team approach. I use everybody that is 
available to me. 
Q. The hospital staff has a responsibility to report 
important things about a patient's condition to you, don't 
they? 
A. I think that is correct. 
Q. If you have a patient who experiences a severe change 
for the worse in their condition, while you are not there, 
if you get information about that, you will go right in and 
do something about it, won't you? 
Ac It depends. I would need to know more of the facts. 
Q. Have you ever had one of your patients assigned a one-
on-one, special duty nurse? 
Ac Yes, sir. 
Q* Have you ever had a patient who is being taken 
care of by such a nurse stop breathing, with that 
nurse looking right at her, and you never heard 
anything about it? 
A, I would expect her to take care of the problem 
before she would contact me „ But I would want to 
know about it, when whoever had time to tell me„ 
Pages 656-657 [Questions by Mr. Burbidge] 
Qo I believe in your testimony, Doctor, you indicated that, 
in treating someone that is septic, the course of action 
would — one of the first courses of action would not be to 
put the individual in the intensive care unit. Do you 
remember that question from Mr. Russell? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Qo Why would you not put that person in an intensive care 
unit? 
A. For several reasons. I believe that my people at 
my institution, on my floor, can take care of the 
lady. We understand OB/GYN diseases better than most 
people in other specialties. We can give the kinds of 
things that the lady needs. The time we would not 
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keep on the ward is when she would need mechanical 
ventilation. 
Q. In this patient did you see the need for 
mechanical ventilation on the afternoon of August 
2, 1986? 
A. Not until the time of the cardiac arrest. 
Dr Weinstein's testimony clearly indicates that the vast majority of 
septic patients are successfully treated. In fact, most of his patients are 
treated on the OB-GYN floor because the hospital staff knows what it is doing. 
Dr. Weinstein clearly assumes that the patient had no objective signs and 
symptoms until, virtually, the time of her arrest. The evidence clearly 
contradicts that assumption. Dr. Weinstein's testimony supports appellant's 
position that prompt action by the hospital staff was required, which, if 
given, would have most likely saved the patient. 
CAROL ADAMS, M.D., was the physician on call on the afternoon of August 
2, 1986 when Mrs. George arrested. She was called as a fact witness by LDS 
Hospital. Her testimony appears in the record at R-768, pp. 679-739, and 
includes the following: 
Page 695 
Q. Were you comfortable with the patient going back to the 
8th floor? 
Ac YeSo 
Q. Why? 
A- In the midst of all this, the nursing 
supervisor had come down to the Intensive Care 
Unit, to discuss nursing care for the patient, and 
she assured us that she could obtain a one-on-one 
nurse, who could be with the patient at all times, 
and provide constant care for her. 
Dre Adams is testifying about her initial impression of Betty George 
after her return to the 8th floor on the afternoon of 8-2-86, NOTE: These 
should be contrasted with the specific nursing notes for the same afternoon at 
R-270, P's Exh. 1, pp. 169-171. 
Page 697 
A. She appeared the same as she did in the intensive care 
unit. She appeared tired, sleepy. But if you shook her 
shoulder and asked her a question, she would answer it. 
Q. Did she appear incoherent to you? 
A. No. 
Page 703 
Q. How did you find the patient when you evaluated her at 
4:15 p.m.? 
A. She appeared the same as when I had seen her in the 
intensive care unit, and when she arrived on the 8th floor. 
Q. Was she incoherent in your opinion? 
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A. No. 
Q. [Did she] respond appropriately to questions? 
A. Yes. 
[cf. p.719-20] Q. Nurse Soraghan notes at 3:30 that Betty 
is lying supine in bed, disoriented. . . You didn't think 
that, did you? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. And Nurse Soraghan writes, "Responds 'yeah' to every 
question, and only after vigorous arousing." That was not 
your observation was it, doctor? 
A. No. 
[and at p.722] Q. You say that you called Dr. Lloyd between 
4:00 and 4:15? 
Ao Yes. 
Q„ And at that time you didn't tell Dr. Lloyd about this 
3:30 to 4:00 note of Nurse Soraghan's did you? 
A* NOc 
Q0 You didn't know about the note when you talked to Dr. 
Lloyd, did you? 
Ac I knew about the temperature elevation. 
Page 708 
Q. When was your next contact with Mrs. George? 
A. Around 5:00 in the afternoon. 
Qe You evaluated her respiratory status? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there anything in that evaluation that indicated to 
you the need for additional oxygen? 
A. No. 
Q. And her mentation, was she coherent or incoherent? 
A. She was sleepy, but if you shook her shoulder and asked 
her questions, she would answer the question. 
Qc Did she answer appropriately? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In your view, at 5:00 in the afternoon, did she have 
diminished mentation? 
A. No. 
Page 710 
Q. Was Nurse Soraghan present when you did your evaluation 
at 5:00? 
A. As I recall, yes. 
RE: Dr. Adams1 Progress Note at 5:00 p.m. [R-270, P's Exh. 1, 
Pages 724-26 
Qc That information had been available at 3:30? 
A. Yes, 
Qc Because all you did at 5:00 here was write down things 
that you had already known, isn't that true? 
A. No. I believe I reexamined the patient at that time. 
Q. You wrote down that the respirations are 32. That's 32 
per minute, right? . . . There is a contemporaneous note, 
there is a note that Nurse Soraghan wrote as well. That 
appears at page 170 [R-270, PI. Exh 1] of the medical 
record. . . . It talks about what you did. 
A. Yes. 
Q. It says that you discussed the patient with the family. 
A. Yes. 
Q. It doesn't say anything about doing an evaluation, does 
it? 
A. No. 
Q. And the family was very upset about Betty's condition 
weren't they? 
A. They were concerned. 
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Q. Very concerned? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Nurse Soraghan then writes, "Respirations slowed to 
blank." Slowed to blank. That's not in your note at 5:00, 
is it? 
A. No. 
Q. You have respirations at 32? 
Ao Yes. 
Qo You didn't know about the fact that Nurse Soraghan had 
written in the record that the patient's respirations were 
slowed to blank, did you? 
A. She would have been writing that note at the same time I 
was writing mine. So, no, I would not have been able to 
read that at that time. 
Pages 709-10 [Referring to R-270, P's Exh, 1, pg. 126] 
Q. There is a notation 110 over question mark for the blood 
pressure? 
A, Yes. 
Q. Did you discuss that with nurse Soraghan? 
A. That was a blood pressure reading I had taken. 
Q. You took that blood pressure reading yourself? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you able to get a reading on the diastolic 
pressure? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you know why? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you pursue it further? 
A. No 
Previously, at page 687, Dr. Adams had testified: 
Q. What was your understanding as to the signs and symptoms 
of sepsis at that time? 
Ac Similar to the signs of infection . . . The patient can 
also appear with a very low blood pressure, as if they are 
going into shock. 
Pages 711-712 
A. . . . I asked her [Soraghan] how the patient was doing 
at 6:30 p.m. 
Q0 What did she report to you as to how the patient was 
doing? 
A. She said the patient was the same as when I had seen her 
last. 
[cfc Pages 727-28] 
Qo When you called Nurse Soraghan at 6:30, and you asked 
her about the patient's condition, you testified that Nurse 
Soraghan told you that she appeared the same as she had been 
before; is that correct? 
A* The same as when I had seen her last, yes* 
Q. 5:00 . . . So her respirations at that time must have 
still been slowed to blank. Correct? 
A0 They were within normal range when I had seen her last. 
Q. I am talking about what Nurse Soraghan knew. And the 
same as before, to Nurse Soraghan, would mean disoriented 
and responding inappropriately, and incontinent of urine, 
which she wasn't measuring, wouldn't it? . . . Nurse 
Soraghan didn't give you any specific information? She said 
she looked the same as last time you saw her? 
A. As I recall. 
Pages 715-16 
Q. [After the patient's arrest] You called Dr. Lloyd. Did 
you have a discussion with the nurse about the patient's 
condition? 
A. . . . I asked the nurse, "What happened?" 
Q. What did she say? 
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A. She said, I don't know. When you walked in the room, 
the patient was breathing. She must have stopped breathing 
when you walked in the room. 
Pages 726-27 
Q. You didnft see the patient again [after 5:00] until 
after she stopped breathing, did you? 
A. The nurse told me she must have stopped breathing as I 
walked in the doorway. So I probably saw her at the instant 
she stopped breathing. 
Q. When you came through the doorway, and you looked across 
the room and saw Betty George, you could see from the 
doorway that she was blue? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long does it take for a person to turn blue from 
lack of oxygen? 
Ac A minute or two. If you are holding your breath, you 
can start to turn blue. 
Q. Was Mrs. George holding her breath when you went over? 
A. No. 
Qe What was Nurse Soraghan doing — I think you testified 
when you got there Nurse Soraghan was standing at the left 
side of the bed? 
A. Yes. 
CHARLES GREGORY ELLIOT, MoD. testified as an expert witness on behalf of 
LDS Hospital. His testimony appears in R-768 at pp. 739-782. His testimony 
includes the following: 
Page 741 
Q. Have you treated patients with sepsis? 
A. Yes. 
In pages 753-760, Dr. Elliot opines that Mrs. George's arrest was the 
result of overwhelming sepsis. He is led through a litany of individual 
measures and states that each would not have affected the outcome. He 
contradicts the other defense experts by saying mechanical ventilation would 
have been ineffective* [Recall that many of Drc Trowbridge's patients are in 
the ICU on ventilators. (R-766, pp. 519-20) Dre Weinstein uses mechanical 
ventilation as soon as it appears necessary. (R-767, ppc 651-52) Dr. Elliot 
did not say that all of the measures taken together would have been 
ineffective, nor did he say that there was nothing a competent physician could 
do, assuming prompt notification of signs and symptoms upon the patients 
return to the 8th floor on the afternoon of August 2, 1986. Dr. Elliot never 
says the patient was irretrievably doomed at any specific time. In fact he 
testified at page 770: 
Q» Overwhelming sepsis is a dangerous condition for a 
patient, isn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Qc Potentially fatal condition? (emphasis added.) 
A, Yes, sir. 
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Q. And respiratory distress and complications to the point 
of respiratory failure is also a dangerous condition, isn't 
it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Qc You are a doctor, correct? 
A. That's correct, 
Q. You diagnose and treat, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. If you don't have information, you can't 
diagnose and treat, can you? 
A. HO. 
Pages 773-74 
Q. What is the extent of your knowledge to the information 
that the doctors who were there and in a position to do 
something, not like yourself — what information did they 
get about the patient on the afternoon of the 2nd, do you 
know? 
A. I don't, without reviewing the details of the record 
with you, which I would be happy to do* 
Q. You have had patient's with sepsis before? 
A. Yes. 
Q9 I guess they're all dead now? 
A. No • . o But many of them are dead. That's the nature 
of sepsis. 
Q. You don't automatically die from sepsis? 
X* You don't automatically die from sepsis. 
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DAVID GEORGE, was the named plaintiff and husband of Betty George. 
George was personally present at LDS Hospital at all times relevant to 
action. He testified several times during the trial. See, R-766 at ppe 
504; R-767 at pp. 667-675; and R-768 at pp. 783-786. His testimony inc 
the following: 
Pages 489-493 
Q. What happened in the ICU? 
A. Well, we got there. I was anxious to get her there. I 
knew she was breathing very irregular. I knew that she 
wasn't getting as much oxygen as they had her on in the 
room. It seemed like a long ways. We had to up hallways, 
up little ramps. Finally we got to ICU. As soon as I got 
there, I went over to the nurse at the station. I told her 
who I was, and I had Betty here, We just came from 
angiogram, and that she was to be here in ICU* She looked 
through her paperwork. She said, yes, she is supposed to be 
heree She gave me the room number, which was exactly where 
we were headed when we first got there, towards this room. 
So I said, Can we get her into bed? We have to get her on 
oxygen, because she is not getting as much as she was 
getting as when she was in her room. And she has been on it 
a long time this morning, because of angiogram, 
transporting, that sort of thing. She said, You are going 
to have to wait until Dr. Lahey examines her. I said, Well, 
can we get that done? She said, Well, he is on the phone 
now. You will have to wait until he comes down to examine 
her. 
So we were just standing there, and Betty was motioning to 
me or gesturing. I got close to her, and she said that she 
had to use the bed pan. I asked a nurse, I said Betty says 
she needs a bedpan. Can we get her one? And she said she 
has not been admitted to that room, and you will just have 
to waito I said, Look, my wife needs a bedpan. I want a 
bedpan right now. 
She went into the room that we — she said Betty was to be 
admitted to . She got the bedpan from the little stand 
right beside the bed. Still had a wrapper across it. She 
took the wrapper off, and put the bedpan on Betty's gurney, 
and walked away. The two girls that were with me, and me, 
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put Betty on the bedpan. She wasn't there long at all. She 
said she was finished. 
I told this nurse. She said, Mr. George, I am very busy. 
You are going to have to wait until I can get there. I 
started getting mad, very upset. I know I was. I started -
- I guess I hollered at the nurse. I told her to get over 
here, and help me get Betty off this bedpan. She finally 
did. She came over, We took her off the bedpan, and she 
done her thing with the bedpan. 
As soon as she left, the two girls that were with 
me, she said, Mr. George, it is the only way you 
can get anything done around here is by raising 
hell. So at that point I guess maybe I wasn't too far 
wrong in what I was hollering about. 
Q. Did Dr. Lahey ever come down and evaluate Betty? 
A. Yes, finally. I really, in my mind, I never met Dr. 
Lahey. I didn't even know that was him on the phone when I 
first came in. But finally he came down. Betty was laying 
on her right side. I was facing her, standing there, facing 
her. He came down. He pulled the blanket down from her 
back. He listened to her back with his left ear. He walked 
around the bottom of the gurney, felt her big toe. And he 
walked away. 
Qc Did he say anything to you? 
A. He never said a word to me. 
Qe What happened next? 
Ae I got this nurse. I said, You said that he was going to 
examine Betty. I said, I don't think that is much of an 
examination. But can we get her into bed? She told me that 
they only have one room in ICU. They are going to keep that 
for an emergency. And Betty is not sick enough to be in 
ICU. So they weren't going to admit her. 
Q. What were they going to do instead? 
A. Going to send her back again to the eighth floor. 
Q. What was your reaction to finding out that she was not 
going to be admitted? 
A. I was ready to start throwing things. I started raising 
hell. 
Page 495-496 
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Q. Were you concerned about your wife's condition? 
A. Very much. 
Qe Did you ask the nurses to get Betty some help? 
A. Yes, I did, several times. 
Q. Tell the jury about what response you got. 
A. Well, the main answer I got was I told them, why wasn't 
somebody here to — that could go ahead and diagnose this, 
to do something to help Betty in some way, that it seemed 
like these people that were dealing with her were just doing 
a routine thing, to me. Simply taking vital signs, and if 
she was to get a shot, they would give it to her. If she 
had to give blood, they would take it. But that's all that 
was being done, was vital signs, in my opinion. And I 
wanted Drc Lloyd there. I was really upset. 
Q0 Did you say that? 
A, Yeso I wanted Dr. Lloyd there. I wanted 
somebody that could make a decision and do 
something. 
Q8 What did the nurses say to that? 
Ac That was sort of bothering Nurse Terry. I sort of 
called her the head nurse. I didn't know exactly what her 
title was at the time. It seemed like she was running the 
nurses. I went out and I told her that I wanted Dr. 
Lloyd, I wanted somebody there with some authority. 
She said — I think she called him at that time. But she 
kept telling me that she knows where Dr. Lloyd is, but he is 
unavailable, was the words I goto She knows where he 
is, but he is unavailable. I couldn't see why not. 
Page 497-500 
Q. What time was that, the events that you have just 
described? 
A. Well, it was after we got back* It was probably around 
2:00 or 3:00, somewhere in there, I suppose. 
Q. Did you ever see the resident Carol Adams with 
your wife after that, on the afternoon of August 2? 
A. After she took her pulse? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, I don't think so. 
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Q. How long did you stay in the hospital on the afternoon 
of the 2nd? 
A, Until around 6:00, 6:30, somewhere in there. 
Q. Were you with you wife the entire time? 
A. I was in and out of the room, trying to get 
some help for her, talking to anybody that I could 
talk to, that would listen to me. Why isn't Dr. 
Lloyd here? Why is he unavailable? Can't you get 
another doctor here, somebody that can make 
decisions? So I was in and out of the room a good 
many times. 
Q. Did you meet the one-on-one, special duty nurse that the 
hospital had provided? 
A. Yes. She was sort of a quiet girl. She sort of stood 
back while the other nurses were doing their thing. Such as 
when Nurse Schnabel took a sugar count, she was on the left 
side, Betty's left side. She, with a needle, pricked her 
finger. She couldn't get any blood. And I noticed that she 
was rubbing her fingers real hard. She tried again. She 
finally got some blood. She put it on a strip. Then she 
has a little machine there of some type that she puts the 
strip in. She didn't know how to do it. And this -•- that 
was when I first not necessarily met — and I understood her 
name is Soraghan «— that she showed her how to put this 
strip into the machine. But she was a quiet-type girl. She 
sort of stood back. 
Q. If you left the hospital at 6:00 to 6:30, then you would 
have been there for three to three and a half hours of Nurse 
Soraghan's shift? 
A. Approximately. 
Q. Was Nurse Soraghan in your wife's room the 
entire time? 
A. X think she was. 
Q. What was she doing? 
A. Like I say, I didn't see her do anything. Sort 
of stood there, and looked at Betty. She might 
have fluffed her pillow or tried to pull her up or 
something like that. I am not exactly sure. I 
don't think she done much of anything. 
Q. Did you ever ask Nurse Soraghan to get your 
wife some help? 
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A. Yes. 
Qc More than once? 
A. She said — well, I don't know if it was more 
than once. I know it was sort of continuous. That 
was as it was with other nurses that I had talked 
to. Z don't know how many times I asked them, but 
I know I asked them several times. I did the same 
with the one-on-one nurse. 
Q How was your wife doing during Nurse Soraghan's 
shift? 
Ac Betty was real bad. Her breathing was worse 
than it had been before, even though she was back 
on oxygen o She was very quiet, very distant. I 
couldn't really talk to her and hold a conversation 
with her. She would just say maybe some words that 
was hard to distinguish, and then she would fall 
back to sleep or go back into her coma, which I 
think is what it was. I don't know, it seemed like 
she kept drifting in and out. 
Q. Were you concerned about your wife's condition? 
Ac Very much. 
Q0 Why did you leave? 
A. I said to myself I knew Betty wasn't going to make it. 
I knew my wife was going to die. I left the hospital. 
I always parked Betty's car in the parking lot across from 
the hospital. Walked over there, got in the car, and I just 
sat. I don't really know how long it was. But I finally 
snapped out of it, I guess, and drove home. 
Q. What is the next thing that happened? 
Ac When I got home, 1° come in the back of the house. I 
heard the phone ringing. I got in, and I answered it. It 
was my daughter Cynthia. She told me that she went up to 
visit her mother. I could hear some background noise. She 
told me her mother wasn't breathing. I don't know what all 
was said after that. It was enough for me. I just hung the 
phone up and went back up to the hospital. 
Pages 783-784 
Q. Would you describe for the jury what the condition of 
your wife was from 5:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., when you left the 
hospital on the afternoon of the 2nd? 
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A. As I mentioned earlier, my wife's condition at that 
time was the worst I had S&BII it since she had been 
in the hospital. Her breathing was very shallow. Her 
color was pale, towards white, very pale, I will put it that 
way. She would just lay on her right side. Her eyes were 
closed. I tried talking to her, which I couldn't do. I 
really couldn't arouse her and get her attention to talk to 
her, which I wanted to do very badly at that time. I also 
know that my impression was, when I left at 6:30, that I 
knew my wife was going to die there. 
Q0 Was your wife responsive to you at all? 
A. No, she wasn't. 
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Addendum 2 
APPEND™ I I 
The following portions of the record support appellant's position that 
the trial court repeatedly ruled that proof of the medical cause of death (as 
opposed to proof that the conduct of the hospital staff contributed to the 
cause of the patient's initial cardiac arrest on August 2, 1986) was not at 
issue or irrelevant. This section also demonstrates how the trial court 
violated its own ruling. After specifically instructing appellants' counsel 
not to ask his experts their opinion on cause of death, the Court later 
allowed respondent's experts, who were not involved with Mrs. George's care or 
the determination of her cause of death, to testify on that subject. The 
narrow medical cause of death, separate and apart from the conduct of the 
hospital staff as a contributing cause, became, in fact, the focus of 
respondent's defense. 
R-7 65 at 323-25: (Testimony of appellant's expert Don Owings.) 
Q. [Russell] Have you reviewed the autopsy report that is 
included in the medical record in front of you, pages 3-10? 
A. [OwingsJ Yes. 
Q. Does that report contain any evidence that the patient 
was indeed deprived of oxygen to the brain? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, your Honor. The document speaks 
for itself. 
The Court: It is in evidence isn't it? 
Mr. Russell: No. Mr. Burbidge — 
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
Q. Have you, in formulating the opinion that you just gave 
us — that is, that the ventilatory assistance, the lack of 
ventilatory assistance contributed to the coma and death-
did you rely in part on the autopsy? 
A. Yes. 
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Qo What in that autopsy supports your opinion? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, again, hearsay. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Russell: Your honor, an autopsy — 
The Court: Would you like to approach the bench? 
(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
Q. Mr. Owings, would you look at page 80 of the medical 
record, which is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Those records are blood gas reports? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you see the report at 7:12, at the bottom of the page? 
A. It says 1912. 
Q. That's 7:12 
A. Right. 
Q. That would be during the code procedure? 
A. According to the record, yes. 
Q. What does that indicate about whether or not the patient 
was receiving oxygen? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, foundation. 
The Court: Overruled. 
A. It indicates that the patient is not ventilating, and 
that their oxygen is below normal values, severely hypoxic. 
Q. Is that proof, in your opinion, that lack of oxygen 
caused Mrs. George's arrest and death? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, your Honor, competency and 
foundation. 
0 
The Court: Sustained. Is there a motion to strike? 
Mr. Burbidge: Yes, your Honor. 
The Court: Granted. 
Mr. Burbidge: If we please the Court, could we have the 
witness wait until an objection is entered, before the 
response comes back? 
The Court: The Court is going to take a five minute recess. 
The Court will see counsel in chambers, on the record. 
(The following proceedings occurred in chambers.) 
The Court: The record will reflect that counsel and the 
Court are in session, out of the presence of the jury. For 
the record, the Court has previously ruled that the 
cause of death may not be testified to except for 
someone who in and official capacity participated 
in determination of cause of death. You may 
proceed. 
R-7 65 at 327 
The Court: Is Counsel suggesting, by virtue of that 
argument, that if cause of death becomes an issue, one who 
signs a death certificate is competent to testify as to 
cause of death? 
Mr, Russell: Not necessarily, your Honor. I think there 
would be a lot of circumstances where the person who signs 
the certificate doesn't know. Was just told, wrote it down 
and signed it. 
The Court: That's the Court's precise observation. 
Mr. Russell: The way I understand it, the Court is 
requiring us to bring such a person in here to testify about 
it. Mr. Owings, by his training and experience, can look at 
the record, can look at the autopsy, and he knows —• he can 
form an opinion that lack of oxygen was the cause of death. 
The Court: Not the cause of death. He had already 
testified, and the Court has listened carefully to the 
framing of the question and to the responsive answer. The 
question was, did it contribute? The answer was, 
in his opinion, it did contribute. There is 
nothing wrong with the question nor the answer. The 
last question posed to the witness was, in your opinion, did 
it cause the decedent's death? It is an inappropriate 
question, and the Court has previously ruled on it. That's 
the reason the Court sustained the objection and granted the 
motion to strike. 
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R-7 65 at 328-331 - Conference in Chambers: 
The Court: The Court is not suggesting that, Af 
cause of death is an issue in this case. The Court 
has never taken that position. But if you contend 
that it is an issue, . . . 
Mr. Russell: I don't think it is. 
The Court: I don't think it is, either. I don't 
think it is an issue . . . as opposed to a 
contributing cause. 
Mr. Burbidge: May I be heard on the matter, your Honor? 
The Court: As opposed to a contributing cause. 
Ms. Collard: We are talking about the cause as opposed to a 
contributing cause? 
The Court: The Court has permitted counsel to ask that 
question. 
Mr. Russell: My concern is that when we get done with our 
evidence, defense counsel is going to jump up and move for a 
directed verdict because nobody has said that anything that 
someone did caused or contributed to the cause of death. We 
have that now through Mr. Owings and we will have it through 
Nurse Gillerman. To tell you the truth, I an just unsure in 
these discussion we have about whether the Court is saying, 
in order to — because we do have the burden to prove 
that, that violations of the standard of care 
contributed to the cause. 
The Court: The record is replete at this point 
with both of your expert witnesses on that. 
Mr. Russell: I want to make sure that — 
The Court: Isn't it? 
Mr. Russell: I think so. 
The Court: The Court is not suggesting to either Counsel 
how they proceed with their case in chief or their defense 
or rebuttal. The Court is suggesting, in its own 
opinion, the cause of death is not an issue. You 
have talked all along in this case about standard of care, 
and that's the basis that these two experts you have called 
from Southern California have been designated or 
acknowledged by the Court as experts. They are dealing with 
the standard of care. And they are perfectly within 
their right as an expert witness to say if the 
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standard of care in not adhered to, I would expect 
as an expert, that this is what would occur. But 
they can't say with specificity that that's in fact what did 
happen to this particular woman. 
MrD Burbidge: May I be heard, please, your Honor? 
The Courts Yes. 
Mrc Burbidge: I would move for a mistrial at this 
time, and the basis of the motion is that 
prejudicial testimony, incompetent testimony, and 
testimony without foundation has come in with 
regard to the cause of death and the contributing 
causes of death. In the State of Utah, medical doctors 
are restricted —• such issues are restricted to the 
testimony of medical doctors. They are the only authority 
to treat and to diagnose. And the diagnostic function of a 
medical doctor is the exclusive ~ or the determination of 
cause of death or contributing cause of death is in the 
exclusive province, pursuant to statute and case law, of 
medical doctors. And the Court's ruling, allowing these 
unqualified experts to testify as to a contributing cause of 
death, is a prejudicial error that cannot be corrected 
through any kind of instruction to this jury, and I would 
move for a mistrial at this time, and request the Court give 
direction to counsel for the plaintiff that he is not to 
pursue that line of questioning with these witnesses again. 
The Court; The motion for mistrial is denied. The 
Court has previously ruled that this witness nor 
any other expert witness who was not involved in 
determination of cause of death could not so 
testify. And the Court has granted defense counsel's 
motion to strike« Further, if there is a problem, and 
should cause of death become an issue in this case, the 
Court is of the opinion that the error made, if in fact it 
occurred, is not prejudicial, and is curable. 
Anything further? 
Mr. Russell: No, your honor, thank you. 
The Court: The Court will, on the record instruct 
counsel not to ask this witness nor any other 
expert witness as to the decedent's cause of death, 
who did not participate in making that 
determination, so that there is no misunderstanding on 
that part. And the Court has stated previously, on the 
record, out of the presence of the jury, that that's the 
Court's position, and so instructs counsel for the plaintiff 
again. 
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NOTE: Following the repeated assertions of this position, the Court 
subsequently allowed Dr. Trowbridge, Dr, Weinstein and Dr. Elliot - none of 
whom had provided any care to the patient, nor did they have any involvement 
with the determination on cause of death - to offer their purely speculative 
opinions on that very subject. Worse, in instructions 16A, 21A and the 
Special Verdict Form, the Court required plaintiff to prove the cause of death 
through a physician or recover nothing. 
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Addendum 3 
ADDENDUM III 
The following portions of the record prove that appal lant's nurse and 
respiratory therapy experts were qualified by the trial court to render their 
expert opinions as to whether the conduct the hospitaJ staff was a 
proximate cause of the arrest .^* •: -u.f.M-o •*.--;t- *~- -•*-. *- >-«. 
HARRIET GILLERMAN,r R.N. - W -c. -*t. * 13-215: 
Q„ What would be the effect on the patient, of the nurses 
not performing those orders, on the atelectasis condition? 
Mrc Burbidge: Objection on the basis of competency, your 
Honor„ 
The Court: Counsel will approach the bench. 
(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
The Court; Re phra s e yo ur que s t ion. 
Q. The question, Nurse Gillerman, on a patient with 
existing atelectasis, and orders to do the functions that we 
have talked to, if the nurses do not perform those orders, 
what would you expect to be the effect on that patient? 
Mr Burbidge: Objection to the f.orm, your Honor. 
The Court: Overruled, 
A I would expect that the atelectasis would increase, that 
the patient would be receiving less oxygen for the needs of 
his or her body, and that the condition would perpetuate 
itself. 
Q. In you review of Mrs. George's medical record and 
testimony you have heard in this courtroom, does that appear 
to be the case with Mrs,, George? 
Mr Burbidge: Objection, your Honor. She isn't competent 
to provide that testimony, 
The Court: Read the question back please. 
(The pending o-i**sr ;
 t>n ^ s &*.$ oa, * t - .,*• -^  .-.x;, tepoeve* ) 
Mr„ Russell: Your Honor, the medical record talks about the 
condition. The nurses that testified this morning talked 
about her condition,, And they were there<> 
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Mr. Burbidge: Your Honor, it is a matter of competency. 
She is not competent to provide testimony as to what the 
cause was in this particular case. 
The Court: Read the question one more time please 
(The pending question was read back by the court reporter.) 
The Court: The objection is overruled. You may answer it. 
A. Yes, it does 
765 at 282: By the Court: 
She (Harriet Gillerman) , for the record, is a much more 
impressive expert witness (than Don Owings). 
7 65 at 289: By the Court: 
She (Harriet Gillerman) is an impressive witness. 
DON OWINGS, R.T. - R-765 at 292 during a conference in chambers. By Mr. 
Russell: 
I am going to ask him if [violations of the] standard of 
care resulted in Mrs George stopping to breathe. If the 
violations of the standard of care allowed her respiratory 
condition to decline to such a state on the afternoon of the 
2nd that she had an arrest. Those things are crystal clear 
from the record 
We are going to look at Dr. Lahey's report and his 
testimony, severe bilateral atelectatsis, very poor lung 
volumes« Dr. Lahey described it as amazing atelectatsis. 
He (Don Owixxgs) knows what that ™ what the result of that 
is, if it Is not treated. He knows that perfectly well, 
R-765 at 301:. By the Court: 
The narrow issue for the Court and for the trier of fact 
will be the weight given to this witnesses' testimony versus 
its ultimate admissibility„ Plaintiffs motion to designate 
as an expert is granted. 
R-"?65 at .K'5 
Q. Do you feel comfortable in being able to testify what 
effect a severely diminished oxygen supply or a cessation of 
oxygen supply will typically have on a patient? 
A. Yes. 
R-7 65 at 311 
Q„ In your expert opinion, given Mrs. George's ability to 
inspire at 5:30 and 9:45, when Mr. Wilkerson evaluated her 
would that have had an effect on whether that 
atelectasis got better, worse or stayed the same? 
A. Her ability to inspire would probably contribute to her 
atelectasis becoming worse. 
Q. If that condition were not treated for an extended 
period of time, what would the effect be? 
A. In my opinion it would continue to worsen. 
R-765 at 315-17 
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Q„ What should Mr. Wilkerson have done, if anything, at the 
end of his shift? 
A. He should have at least notified the physician of the 
patient's deterioration, from the stated goals; notified the 
nurses, primarily in care/ passed along to the oncoming 
shift therapist of the patient's lack of achievement of the 
goals in maintaining ventilation; and if supervisory 
personnel were available, notify them. 
Q. What was the purpose of that notification? 
A. To get something done for the patient at that time. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether the failure of Mr„ 
Wilkerson to conduct himself in that fashion at the end of 
his shift contributed to the cause of Mrs. George's arrest 
the following day? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, competency and foundation. 
The Court: Overruled. Read the question back. 
(The pending question was read back by the court reporter.) 
The Courts You may answer. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is your opinion? 
A. My opinion is that it did contribute to the arrest the 
next day. 
Q. How did it contribute to the cause of the arrest? 
A. The patient's continued lack of oxygen had a detrimental 
effect on all the body organs, the cells, specifically the 
heart, brain, kidneys, liver. All of them — oxygen is 
necessary for those to function. Her lack of ventilation 
and being able to take in adequate amounts of oxygen would 
result in a continued deterioration of those organ's 
functions. 
R-765 at 319-23 
Q. According to your review of this record and the 
deposition of the respiratory therapist who responded to the 
code, what time was ventilatory assistance initiated? 
A. Approximately 1913, 13 minutes after seven. 
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How Jong is that after the code was called? 
A. Nine tc t *- . minuies. 
Q. Based on your knowledge, training and experience, if a 
patient stops breathing and ventilatory assistance is not 
provided for nine to ten minutes, what will the effect be on 
the patient? 
A Anoxic brain damage. 
Q. What is that? 
• *•• O r d x r: . 
„;. whoi wi,i o& tne result of anoxic brain damage? 
Mr, Burbidge: Objection, foundation and competency, your 
Honor. 
The Court: Sustained on foundation. 
Go What is anoxic brain damage? 
o< * - i oxyc«n i «. the cells of the brain. 
Qc Does lack of oxygen to the cells of the brains have an 
effect on the condition -r - .v.«r ftrain of the patient? 
Mr, Burbidge q^*-* , r , competency, your Honor„ 
The Court Should you i.ke to tdke the witness on voir dire? 
Mr. Burbidge: Sure. 
:-n*- .Jourt: The Court sustained the objection on foundation, 
BY MR. BURBIDGE: 
Q. Mr. Owings - you don f t hold a med i caJ , doctor * s 
certificate do you'1 
A, tfo sir. 
Q. nave you ever diagnosed * |»atieru in * h« State of Utah 
with anoxic brain damage? 
Ac I don't diagnose, sir. 
Q0 You have never make the personal diagnosis of anoxic 
brain damage? 
A , W'', sir. 
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Mr. Burbidge: Renew the objection, your Honor. 
The Court: Overruled. 
BY MR. RUSSELL: 
Q. Mr. Owings, does it take a medical license to know what 
the effect of anoxic brain damage has on a patient? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, your Honor, that's leading and 
argumentative. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Q. Does it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you learn about that as a respiratory therapist? 
A. Yes, sirc 
Qo Is that something you would expect any respiratory 
therapist to know? 
A. Yes, 
Q0 What is the effect of anoxic brain damage on a patient? 
A. Death. 
Q. Could it cause a patient to go into an irreversible 
coma? 
A. That would be an earlier stage, yes. 
Q. Do you have an opinion, based on your knowledge, 
training and experience, as to whether the delay in 
initiating ventilatory support for the patient during the 
code contributed to the cause of her coma and death? 
Mr. Burbidge: Objection, competency and foundation. 
The Court: Overruled. 
A. Would you repeat the question. 
Q. Do you have an opinion, based on your knowledge, 
training and experience, as to whether the delay in 
initiating ventilatory support for the patient during the 
code contributed to the cause of the patient's irreversible 
coma and death? 
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A. Yes, 1 believe it contributed to the irreversible brain 
damage and death. 
Addendum 4 
Not only was no testimony or evidence offered to establish, the standard 
of care appl I cable tc Dr Lloyd and Dr Lahey c r the breach of the applicable 
standard^ the testimony of defendants experts was unanimously favorable to 
the defendant physicians. 
nl TROWBRIDGE |B-76h|( p "J «. ' |l iesl;j.fie<j that Mie treatment if I' r . 
Lloyd and Dr. Lahey was appropriate. 
<*., Based on your background and experience, were the 
physicians attending to Betty George justified in their 
diagnosis of pulmonary embolism on the 1st of August, 198 6? 
A. Yes. 
Qc Did they institute appropriate procedures to treat and 
deal with this condition? 
Ao Yes, they did the tests which I have just described, 
which would be normal in any hospital in the country. 
DR WE INS TEIN [ R-"-' 8"? „ \jp h 4 0 - 41 j •• agreed t ha t t he de f e ndant phy s i c I a n s * 
working diagnosis of pulmonary embolism was correct. 
Q0 Would you please review for the Court and for the jury 
what your understanding of that record was with regard to 
diagnosis of pulmonary embolism and then, ultimately, the 
sepsis that she had. 
A. The patient entered the hospital the end of July for an 
abdominal hysterectomy, removal of the uterus, tubes and 
ovaries. Her early post-op course was essentially not 
unusual for somebody to have this kind of major surgery. 
But in the middle of the postoperative course, she started 
to demonstrate some findings that one could look at and 
imply that she was having something going on that was not 
usual, for the usual kind of outcome that one would expect 
in a patient that had this kind of surgery. And the 
diagnosis that would come to mind would be pulmonary 
embolus, because that is not a rare diagnosis in a patient 
that had surgery like this0 And a less common diagnosis 
would be bacterial shock, or severe shock, from some kind of 
organism invading the bloodstream. 
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Q. Doctor, I show you what has been marked defendant's 
exhibit F, and it is a list of the symptoms of a pulmonary 
embolus c Are these the symptoms you see with a pulmonary 
embolus? 
A. You can see all of those with a pulmonary embolism, yes, 
sir. 
Q. Were these symptoms present with Mrs. Betty George? 
A. At various times, yes, sir. 
DR. ELLIOT [R-768, p. 773] - saw no problem with the defendant 
physicians' conduct. 
Q. Assuming, without saying that it is true, that Mrs. 
George was dying of sepsis on the afternoon of the 2nd, what 
does your review of the record reveal that anyone was doing 
about it? 
A. That's an important question. The review of the record 
indicates that the staff did try to diagnose her sepsis. 
They did so with blood cultures. And they did make orders 
to initiate antibiotics, when they recognized that sepsis 
was likely what was happening with this lady. I think it is 
important that people understand that sepsis is often a 
difficult diagnosis for a physician, even a well-trained-
physician, to make, because other disorders, like pulmonary 
embolism, can be present with many of the same symptoms and 
signs. 
And I think that's what happened to the physicians in this 
case. They thought that this patient was having pulmonary 
embolism, to explain the symptoms and signs. So it was only 
late on the day of the 2nd that they began to recognize that 
sepsis was a more likely diagnosis. They drew the blood 
cultures, they started the antibiotics. 
2 
Addendum b 
ADDSNPyM Y 
The following are the Instructions given by the Court to the jury with 
resp<~- - *ry-*-• ;^:-< -1 b.i-if-n r
 L-u . ? *$ to causation. As explained below, 
irte instructions are contradictory, contusing, in many instances erroneous, 
and cumulatively constitute prejudicial error, requiring remand for a New 
trial agaiinst I I)S -••-> ;- . . 
INSTRUCTION -r {R-5101 provided: 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence each of the following propositions: 
1. That LDS Hospital, througn its employees, failed to 
comply with the applicable medical standard of care, and 
that in so acting or failing to act* LDS Hospital was 
negligent„ 
2. That the plaintiffs uu MJ.H -*;... *«;e ."I-L^: as a 
result of that negligence,: 
3* That the negligence of LDS Hospital, through its 
employees, was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by 
the plaintiffs. 
40 The nature and extent of the injuries and damage, and 
the amount thereof„ 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater 
weight of the evidence, that is, such evidence as, when 
weighed with that opposed to it, is more convincing as to. 
its truth. 
Instruction 16 is a correct statement of the law and appellant's burden. 
INSTRUCTION 16A [F-511] provided: 
The plaintiff in this case cannot recover against the 
doctors or the hospital unless it is proven, that, 
L Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS Hospital's 
nursing staff or respiratory therapist or all of them, based 
on a degree of reasonable medical probability, failed to 
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exercise that degree of reasonable care and skill in caring 
for the plaintiff that was ordinarily possessed and used by 
others in the respective profession practicing in 1986 in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar communities under similar 
circumstances; 
2. Based on a degree of reasonable medical probability 
established through expert medical testimony from a duly 
qualified medical doctor, that such failure, if any, was the 
proximate cause of the death of Betty George; and 
3. That David George personally, and the heirs of Betty 
George, and the representative of the estate of Betty 
George, was damage by the negligence, if any, of one of the 
defendants or all of them. 
If you do not find, by a preponderance of the evidence, all 
of the foregoing propositions with regard to either Dr. 
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS Hospital, the party 
or parties, as the case my be, against whom any one 
proposition is not found cannot be found to have committed 
medical malpractice and your verdict must be in favor of the 
defendants or defendants. If you find that the evidence in 
evenly balanced on any of the above-mentioned issues, then 
your verdict should be for the defendant or defendants on 
whose behalf the evidence is evenly balanced. 
Instruction 16A was inserted into the final set of instructions on the 
last day of trial just before the trial court instructed the jury and closing 
arguments. Appellant has no idea how it got there since there was no 
discussion at all about it. Appellant's counsel never approved it, nor did 
they have any chance to object to it until after the jury was instructed. 
What is known is that LDS Hospital's proposed instruction [R-293], was 
rejected out-of-hand as being confusing, contrary to law and clearly 
erroneous. Note that the form of the instruction which was read to the jury 
was not even filed under November 14, 1989, five days after the trial ended. 
[R-409, 431.] 
Quite apart from these irregularities, Instruction 16A is an incredible 
quagmire of confusion, and created a clearly erroneous and impossible burden 
for appellant on the causation issue. The error inherent in 16A is 
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particularly highlighted when contrasted to the simple and correct statement 
in Instruction ie 
E o ; e.xan;p.«- p a r a, g r a p h 1 • >f ' ^ ]l T e a13 i * ^  d -»t> p e 2 1 a n t t o p r o du c e me d I c a 1, 
that is r physician testimony on t.:-:e n u r s i n g standard of care,.. This is 
contrary *• o I^ w and -^  *IP - correct instructions su--* -- r^r.rj«^ i-*ns 23-30 
[R-52 6 -28., raq a;;1 <-~u... : *-.- i r h - . . *r - t< :aJ cause 
of death through a physician, something the cour t had previously and 
repeatedly ruled was irrelevant and unnecessary. In addition, ine nidi Court 
had also specifically ruled that it would not allow such testimony from any 
expert witness. I See, Addendum II.] 
Paragraph 3 required that all eligible plaintiffs had to suffer damage 
in order to recover. This statement is contrary to law since each heir is 
entitled to recover damages individually„ Further, the claim rf the Estate of 
Bettv G e o r u ^ • - i^ m^ r,«-•--' •* . "''••,-r *- • :-* / - ~ - - :.- iTip] etely 
independent of the cidi.T toi wrongful death, The closing paragraph of 
Instruction 16A imposes incomprehension upon error,, 
That. ';h'» i"j , nay lnve been confused, or in i s.,1 ed by Instruction 3 6A, 
resulting in the negative answer to question 3B < ., :. :)e Special Verdict form is 
manifest, and requires a new trial in the interests of fairness. 
INSTRUCTION 21 [R-517] provided: 
The proximate cause of an injury is that which r in natural 
and continuous sequence produces the injury, and without 
which the result would not have occurred, There may be more 
than one proximate cause for an injury. 
Appellant asserts that the correct proximate cause instruction in this 
case was that embracing the "reduced chance" or "substantial factor" test. 
After the trial court rejected appellant's proposed instructions in that 
regard, this was considered the next best thing. It at least correctly 
informed the jury that "there may be more than one proximate cause for an 
injury." 
INSTRUCTION 21A [R-518] provided: 
You are instructed that where the proximate cause of Betty 
George's death and therefore the injury or loss claimed by 
plaintiff is not established by a preponderance of the 
evidence based on reasonable medical probability from 
testimony of a medical doctor, but is left to conjecture or 
speculation and may be reasonably attributed to causes over 
which the hospital or doctor had no control or 
responsibility, then the plaintiff has failed to sustain the 
burden of proof as to proximate causation. 
This instruction was also inserted on the last day of trial, after the 
close of evidence, just before argument. It had been specifically rejected by 
the trial court on the previous day in a conference between the court and 
counsel for the specific purpose of agreeing on a final set of instructions. 
It is clearly erroneous and confusing in a number of respects: 
a. It contradicts instruction 21 by implying that there can be 
only one proximate cause; 
b. It states that all of the injuries and loss claimed by 
plaintiff flow from the death of Betty George. This eliminated the 
substantial claim of the Estate for injuries suffered by Betty George prior to 
her death. 
c. It states plaintiff must prove the medical cause of death 
through a doctor. It was thereby contrary to law, as well as the Court's 
multiple, consistent rulings throughout the trial. 
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Instruction 16A and 21A had the effect of improperly requiring a verdict 
for the hospital as to proximate cause. They prohibited the jury from 
considering the competent, admitted testimony ot appelant, 's expert witnesses. 
They required appellant to prove an irrelevant is^ue at. a : .me when it was 
i mpossi ble to do so, They prohibited the ji iry ' •" .:>^ ;l i.mi.:c. its fundamental 
function of concluding that the established negligence of the hospital was a 
contributing proximate cause of the injuries sustained. 
INSTRUCTION 32 [R-530] PROVIDED: 
The Court instructs you that LDS Hospital is responsible for 
the negligent acts or omissions, of any, of its nurses and 
respiratory therapists. If you find from the evidence that 
a proximate cause of the death of Betty George and the 
damage claimed by David George was the negligence of the 
nurses or respiratory therapists of the defendant, LDS 
Hospital, as negligence is defined in these instructions, 
such acts or omissions aref in law, acts or omissions of the 
hospital. 
In^t r ic - -, :u ^ **. -• if »j'^- -" • - ^w„ It WOUld 
have allowed t.ne jury c,o peiform its function avai t.*ua p r o x i m a t e cause from 
the evidence of negligence. Unfortunately, the combined effect of 16A, 21A 
a nd t h e S pe c i a 1 Ve rd i c t f o rm p i: o h i b i t e d t h e j u ry f r om pe r f o rmi n g 11 s f u i i c t i o n . 
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